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James Gray called them the “Winter Years.” They were “Ten Lost Years” 
for Barry Broadfoot.1 For the Canadians who lived through them, they 
were the Dirty Thirties, the Dustbowl Decade, the Depression. It was 
a time when hundreds of thousands of ordinary Canadians were “up 
against it” and depended in large measure on government relief for 
their survival. It was also a time when cities and towns across Canada 
struggled under the yoke of local responsibility, that centuries-old con-
vention that held local authorities accountable for providing relief to 
the poor.
For the first few years of the 1930s, responsibility for administering 
all aspects of urban unemployment relief fell primarily to city govern-
ments. As of 1933, however, senior levels of government began to assume 
a larger role in the development, administration, and oversight of relief 
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policy. The shift was signalled early that year by the federal government’s 
effective assumption of responsibility for the single unemployed. In 
addition, the federal government refused to continue funding urban 
public works projects as unemployment relief measures. Such changes 
in federal policy relieved municipalities of considerable burdens. At 
the same time, they undermined the degree of control that city govern-
ments were able to exercise over relief policy, thereby depriving them 
of a means to survive the Depression on their own terms.
This book examines how three Prairie cities—Edmonton, 
Saskatoon, and Winnipeg—met the challenges associated with admin-
istering and delivering relief to their unemployed residents before they 
were eventually obliged to give way to federal and provincial relief poli-
cies that increasingly marginalized their activities. While in many ways 
the concept of local responsibility imposed an onerous burden on city 
governments, it simultaneously afforded municipal officials, at least 
through the first few years of the 1930s, considerable latitude, enabling 
them to pursue relief policies designed to lessen what they believed were 
the Depression’s more dangerous effects as well as to cope with the eco-
nomic crisis more broadly. At the same time, their scope of operation 
was constrained by federal and provincial agencies, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, by local business and community interests and the unem-
ployed themselves. Local responsibility, in other words, forced municipal 
governments to mediate between forces both inside and outside their 
borders. These forces served at once to hinder and help municipal relief 
administrators in their efforts to carry out their responsibilities to the 
urban unemployed, while at the same time safeguarding their primarily 
middle-class conceptions of social order and the capitalist status quo.
This delicate balance between inside and outside forces began to 
break down in 1933, in the face of a newly evolving national approach 
to unemployment relief. Imperceptibly at first, municipal administra-
tions were caught up in larger policy trends that ushered them into the 
modern federal system of social welfare. In the process, city officials who 
had initially wielded considerable influence over the nature and char-
acter of their local relief systems saw that influence diminish. No single 
change in policy at the federal level produced this shift in the locus of 
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responsibility. Instead, it was a series of legislative acts and program ini-
tiatives that took relief policy out of local hands and brought it under 
federal control. More than anything, the shift was prompted by the fed-
eral government’s recognition that the Depression was no short-term 
emergency—that, more so than anyone had imagined at its outset, the 
financial crisis was the product of much deeper, structural problems in 
the economy. Inevitably, then, the severity of the Depression, together 
with its longevity and seeming imperviousness to local solutions, culmi-
nated in greater federal control over welfare policy.
Despite the centrality of municipal unemployment relief to 
the Depression experience, however, historians writing on the 1930s in 
Canada have paid it relatively scant attention.2 As earlier studies demon-
strate, given its dependence on international investment and a healthy 
export market, the Canadian economy was especially vulnerable to the 
severe global economic crisis. When, after 1929, investment dried up and 
export markets dwindled rapidly, the Canadian economy came crashing 
down.3 Exacerbating this bleak situation was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act, passed by the American government in 1930, which further dimin-
ished Canada’s access to crucial export markets in the United States.4 
Later examinations of the Depression in Canada focus on the experience 
of ordinary Canadians, describing the hard times they endured in both 
urban and rural settings.5 While these studies provide a wide sweep of 
the Depression experience, none of them deal in any detail with impor-
tant trends at the provincial level—where, according to historian James 
Struthers, relief was “more intimately connected with the lives of the poor 
than national social security policies aimed at the general population”—
much less the municipal one.6 Finally, historical explorations of the 
Prairie West have tended to focus primarily either on the dustbowl, crop 
rust, and grasshopper disasters facing western farmers or on the emer-
gence of new and important political entities, especially the Social Credit 
Party in Alberta and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).
In what follows, I build on previous studies, but I place the city at 
the centre rather than on the periphery of my analysis. This study is the 
first concentrated effort to explore the Depression experience principally 
from the perspective of municipal governments rather than that of the 
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business community, the unemployed, or religious charitable organiza-
tions. This perspective is important, not only because cities were on the 
front lines of administering and delivering unemployment relief but 
also because the role of city governments in the Depression experience 
is largely absent in the literature, beyond the recognition that they were 
saddled with a responsibility that they struggled to meet.
THE DEvELOpMENT OF WELFARE pOLICy:  
THEORETICAL pERSpECTIvES
Over the past half century, historians and other social scientists have 
viewed the development of welfare policies through a variety of theo-
retical lenses. Ultimately, their investigations have centred on one basic 
question: What forces drive welfare policy? Scholars have used at least 
six theoretical frameworks to answer this question. The first, which 
we might call the functionalist approach, argues that welfare poli-
cies emerged as inevitable products of industrialization, urbanization, 
and the rise of the wage earner.7 Industrialization and urbanization, 
in this view, isolated wage earners from kin networks on which they 
once relied during periods of economic instability. At the same time, 
these two processes, working in tandem, generally produced wealth 
and a bureaucratic structure, allowing states both to finance and to 
administer welfare programs that could fulfill the function that kin 
networks once served. As James Struthers points out, the functionalist 
approach does much to reveal the shortcomings of earlier Whiggish 
analyses of the welfare state that cast welfare policies as the work of 
benevolent social reformers.8 The theory also explains the combina-
tion of state-funded unemployment relief and bureaucratic forms of 
welfare administration that emerged in Prairie cities well before the 
onset of the Depression. What it does not account for, however, is the 
persistence of kin networks that helped individuals and families sur-
vive Depression-related unemployment during the 1930s despite the 
existence of state-funded unemployment relief.9 Nor does it explain 
the variation in the welfare programs that have developed in states that 
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have undergone similar processes of industrialization, urbanization, 
and the creation of a wage-earning class.10 The functionalist approach, 
in other words, cannot account for the different welfare trajectories of, 
say, the American and Canadian states.
For some critics, a viable alternative to the functionalist approach 
involves the consideration of a state’s political culture. Understanding the 
development of social welfare policy, these theorists argue, requires an 
approach that takes national (or even regional) peculiarities into account 
and emphasizes the uniqueness of particular political cultures. For politi-
cal culture theorists like Louis Hartz and Gad Horowitz, specific national 
cultures, much more than structural economic changes, determined the 
character of welfare programs and regulated both the pace of their devel-
opment and the extent of their reach into civil society.11 For example, a 
comparison of the character of toryism versus liberalism, or of corporat-
ism versus individualism, in Canada with the forebears of these ideolo-
gies and politico-economic orientations in Great Britain clearly offers an 
explanation for the difference in welfare policy in these two industrial 
states. But while the political culture approach shows why one nation or 
another produces welfare policies of a particular character, it lacks the 
specificity required to explain the precise timing of particular policies or 
the changes in policy over time.
In response to this critique, other theorists have proposed the idea 
that organized labour or other social forces push states toward enact-
ing welfare legislation at critical moments. This approach, referred to as 
social democratic theory, accepts the idea of a dominant national culture 
but emphasizes the potential (or real) existence of competing “intrana-
tional” cultures. One expression of this theory argues that Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King’s fear of a left jab from the CCF prompted his governing 
Liberals to enact social welfare legislation during the early 1940s to an 
extent they otherwise would not have.12 At that time, according to this 
view, Canada’s leftist political culture, as articulated by the CCF, faced 
off against the centrist or even conservative political culture of King’s 
Liberals. At its simplest, social democratic theory reduces the develop-
ment of welfare policies to a polarized confrontation between pro-labour 
groups on the one side and the business-friendly state on the other. In the 
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Canadian context, such a labour-centred approach tends to neglect the 
role of farming interests, whether in the CCF or in other farmer-labour 
collaborations across the Prairies and in Ontario throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s.13 In more complex forms, however, social democratic theory 
can incorporate many groups that band together in political coalitions 
or blocs to lobby for social welfare legislation.14
Social democratic theory, then, is useful in exploring, at the munic-
ipal level, the relationships between unemployment relief policies and 
the recipients of that relief, whether politically organized or not. Policy-
makers fashioned relief policy with their understanding of recipients’ 
needs in mind. And although I take the view that this understanding 
was often at odds with both the recipients’ actual needs and their own 
sense of what they needed, the Depression nevertheless bound policy-
maker and recipient together in intricate ways. The relationship between 
these two agents was, in other words, more of a contest, a give and take, 
than a polarized, pitched battle among differing economic and political 
interests. The Depression compelled both policy-makers and recipients 
to take account of one another and respond to, if not necessarily acqui-
esce to, each other’s experience.
A fourth approach argues that capitalist forces initiate (or support) 
social welfare policies in order to exert control over workers. Marxists 
and neo-Marxists, for example, argue that, despite a political rhetoric 
of serving the poor, welfare programs have actually served big business. 
Such programs function more to maintain the capitalist order than to 
better the lives of citizens; welfare policies in fact control and regulate 
welfare recipients and legitimize state power. American social scientists 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, in an early and influential expo-
sition of this perspective, argue that seemingly progressive and benevo-
lent state interventions, through measures such as the unemployment 
relief implemented during the 1930s, constitute little more than attempts 
to maintain social control over the working population during times of 
mass unemployment. In Piven and Cloward’s view, the maintenance of 
social order depends in large measure on occupational stability. “So long 
as people are fixed in their work roles,” they argue, “their activities and 
outlooks are also fixed; they do what they must and they think what they 
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must. Each behavior and attitude is shaped by the reward of a good har-
vest or the penalty of a bad one, by the factory paycheck or the danger of 
losing it.”15 During periods of economic stability, then, private industry 
employment controls civil behaviour and maintains civil order. During 
such periods, some unemployment is not only acceptable; it is desired. 
After all, there are few greater threats to a worker’s job security than a lean 
and hungry jobless population waiting on the fringes for its chance to 
replace the employed. During periods of economic instability and mass 
unemployment, however, such checks and controls on worker behaviour 
evaporate. Private industry’s promise of a paycheque disappears, and the 
lean and hungry become more the rule than the exception. “Without 
work,” Piven and Cloward contend, “people cannot conform to familial 
and communal roles; and if the dislocation is widespread, the legitimacy 
of the social order itself may come to be questioned.” Once that legiti-
macy is questioned, a palpable threat of civil disorder looms, a threat that 
“may even overturn the existing social and economic arrangements.”16
Because this book is concerned in part with the ways in which city 
policy-makers used relief policy to promote specific roles among mar-
ried men and to discourage the negative behaviours that they associated 
with single men, I draw heavily on this perspective. Leaving aside for the 
moment how the unemployed themselves subverted and otherwise con-
tested city relief policy, the picture that emerges out of the urban Prairie 
Depression experience is one of municipal government–designed relief 
policies that aimed to control unemployed workers. From the perspec-
tive of the policy-makers’ ideal, rather than that of the much messier real-
ity replete with compromise and contestation from myriad quarters, the 
social control approach at least illuminates policy-makers’ assumptions 
that underlie welfare policy. But relief recipients, business interests, local 
media, women’s groups, citizens’ organizations, church leaders, organ-
ized unemployment groups, unions, and other social forces played a role 
at least equal to that of policy-makers in influencing how welfare policy 
played out. Incorporating recipients’ (and anyone else’s) resistance and 
agency into the story is essential to producing a sharper description of 
policy development. Without taking account of the diversity of voices 
contributing to welfare policy, the social control model risks falling into 
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the governing-and-governed dichotomy so characteristic of the more 
simplistic version of the social democratic approach.
Bureaucratic autonomy theorists such as Theda Skocpol take seri-
ously the roles of governments and, especially, bureaucratic administra-
tors in the formation of public policy generally and of welfare policy in 
particular. In this view, governments and their agents are active partici-
pants in the articulation, promotion, and administration of social policy 
goals and activities. But they are at once enabled and constrained by the 
political and institutional structures of the government of which they 
are a part.17 The bureaucratic autonomy approach also emphasizes the 
reliance of policy-makers on institutional memories of past efforts to 
carry out welfare practices. Specific welfare legislation or policies, then, 
are signposts on a long and interconnected roadway of previous welfare 
policy development. This perspective explains in large measure the per-
sistence, and the sometimes extraordinary influence, of concepts dating 
back to the poor laws of the seventeenth century—the principles of less 
eligibility, local responsibility, and the work ethic, for example—on the 
relief policies that emerged in Prairie cities (and elsewhere) during the 
1930s. The theory also highlights the crucial importance of understand-
ing the mechanics of relief administration during the Depression.
One of the most recent approaches to understanding the devel-
opment of welfare policy relies on a gender analysis. This framework 
has proven especially fruitful in illustrating both the assumptions that 
policy-makers held about the social roles that men and women should 
play and the effects of these assumptions on welfare policy. These gen-
dered assumptions, principally reflecting a notion of male independence 
and female dependence, have permeated the activities of private groups 
and individuals, public institutions, and governments. In this analysis, 
Depression-era municipal unemployment relief emerges as a tool to pro-
mote both a particular gendered social order (patriarchy) and a particu-
lar economic order (capitalism).18
The concept of gender, of course, is as much about men and their 
experiences as it is about women and theirs.19 Beyond that, however, at its 
most powerful gender analysis considers gender as relational—that is, as 
something expressed in relationships between men and women, or even 
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among different groups of men or different groups of women.20 Only 
in the very recent past have some Depression studies been devoted to 
the effects of unemployment and relief on men in particular. Historian 
Lara Campbell, for instance, explores how the Depression’s economic 
and social instability affected the family, with a focus on masculinity 
and the family economy.21 Similarly, Cynthia Comacchio examines the 
Depression’s effects on fathers and husbands, arguing that “men whose 
self-identity hinged on their provider status experienced unemployment 
and public assistance as personal failure and dishonour.”22
Early scholarly analyses of masculinity emphasized a virtually uni-
versal sense of manliness that informed men’s actions. Men, in this view, 
were strong, vital, proud, risk-taking, aggressive. But while this concep-
tion might offer a broad, and somewhat vague, idea of what it meant to 
be a man, it does not represent the diversity of men’s past or present expe-
rience. Masculinities, to use sociologist Robert Connell’s very practical 
term, are historically diverse and continuously contested and redefined. 
They vary not only among different social groups (classes, ethnicities, 
sexualities, generations, regions, nations) but also among individuals of 
the same social group, and even within individuals themselves in differ-
ent situations and at different times in their lives.23 These variations not-
withstanding, however, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, a 
man’s sense of self-esteem came increasingly to depend on his ability to 
support his family by earning a wage.
THE IDEAL OF THE MALE BREADWINNER
By the interwar years, the male breadwinner ideal had long been in 
ascendance in the industrial world.24 According to historians like Ivy 
Pinchbeck and, later, Sara Horrell and Jane Humphries, economic 
changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution in Britain “pro-
moted increased dependence on male wages and male wage earners.”25 
But the male breadwinner ideal did not emerge fully born out of the 
Industrial Revolution. Instead, its rise to the status of conventional 
wisdom by the late nineteenth century occurred in fits and starts.26
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Historian Anna Clark proposes a three-stage process that, by the 
first decade of the twentieth century, had fully embedded the idea of the 
working-class breadwinner in British society. According to Clark, during 
the period between the introduction of the New Poor Law in Britain in 
1834 and the 1850s, the main breadwinner role “was a rare privilege and 
onerous responsibility, not a right of working men.”27 In the next two dec-
ades, policy-makers came to view the breadwinner role as a “reward ordi-
nary working men should be able to earn by proving their respectability.” 
All working men, in other words, could attain the “respectable” status 
of maintaining and protecting their own families through their labour 
without having to rely on their wives’ or children’s labours outside the 
home. It was not until British trade unionists, fearful that women’s lower 
wages would undercut their own, agitated for (and, in 1911, won) the 
introduction of unemployment insurance that a new era emerged in 
which the main breadwinner role was neither a rare responsibility nor a 
reward for respectability. Instead, it had become a right that all working-
class men should expect.28
This did not mean, however, that women’s waged work and their 
contributions to the family economy declined sharply with the transi-
tion from a pre-industrial to an industrial economy. Instead, as Horrell 
and Humphries show, the decline in women’s participation in the waged 
market economy throughout the first half of the nineteenth century 
was “neither continuous nor uniform across occupational categories.”29 
Still, beginning as early as the mid-1800s, the idea of the independent 
male wage earner and the female dependent slowly became ever more 
fixed in both middle- and working-class society. By the 1930s, the role of 
the married man as the main breadwinner appears to have been firmly 
established.
The consequence for working women was an increasingly mar-
ginalized role in the workplace throughout the last half of the nine-
teenth century. But this process, too, was marked by fits and starts. In 
her examination of the idea of the family wage in late-nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century America, for instance, historian Martha May 
argues that, even as late as 1895, budget analysts, progressive reformers, 
and academics intent on discovering scientifically the true needs of poor 
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families routinely counted the earnings of all household members in 
their calculations of family incomes. They thus recognized the impor-
tance of multiple earners to family survival and exposed the fallacy of 
the notion that a male breadwinner alone could earn sufficient wages 
to support his family.30 In the early twentieth century, however, social 
reformers had stopped including women’s and children’s contributions 
to the family economy. They were convinced that working women (and 
children under the age of fourteen or so) damaged the “family’s psycho-
logical health and welfare.”31 Every hour that a woman spent at work, 
reformers argued, was an hour spent not in contributing to her family’s 
survival but rather in neglecting her children.32
By the 1920s, especially in the growing urban centres, men (and 
most women as well) viewed the man’s proper role as that of bread-
winner, while woman’s proper place was in the home, looking after 
children.33 As men accepted the mantle of breadwinner, women were 
increasingly cast (by themselves as well as others) primarily as mothers. 
Among women, this belief represented a full-blown “maternalist” ide-
ology that would have tremendous implications for the social under-
standing of welfare. Political scientist Theda Skocpol argues that in the 
United States, where a good deal of debate has emerged on the subject 
of welfare’s gendered implications, women of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries succeeded in influencing, guiding, and even 
directing public agencies toward the development of a maternalist wel-
fare state that benefited women and children.34 Maternalism, historians 
Seth Koven and Sonya Michel suggest, was reflected in a welfare state 
that operated using “ideologies that exalted women’s capacity to mother 
and extended to society as a whole the values of care, nurturance, and 
morality.”35 Historian Nancy Christie has arrived at similar conclusions 
about Canada. She argues that the decades leading to the Depression 
were marked by social welfare policies (especially mothers’ allowances) 
more or less based on a maternalist discourse, emphasizing women’s role 
as mothers and, at least in practice if not in words, recognizing women’s 
contributions to the nation through their reproductive work.36
But while this ideal was widely accepted, most Canadians found 
it difficult to live the reality of such sharply delineated and prescribed 
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gender roles. As late as 1929, on the eve of the Depression, Canadian 
women made up nearly 20 percent of the paid labour force.37 And yet, as 
historian Veronica Strong-Boag argues, “women’s increased presence in 
the paid labour force and their enfranchisement in the political system 
in the 1920s and 1930s did almost nothing to change [the] fundamental 
allocation of duties” that saw women primarily responsible for domes-
tic work and men for breadwinning.38 Despite these prescribed roles, 
women who stayed out of the waged labour workforce contributed heav-
ily to their families’ economic survival, performing much of the work 
associated with taking in boarders, producing goods like knitted cloth-
ing for sale, and providing paid services such as child care and laundry.39 
As historian Gerald Friesen points out, it was doubtful that, in Prairie 
cities, “one adult wage-earner could provide more than the bare mini-
mum in food, clothing, and housing for a family.”40 Yet even though the 
paid work of wives (as well as older children) was critical to the fam-
ily’s survival in most working-class households, their contributions to 
the family economy were viewed as secondary, which allowed the male 
breadwinner ideal to remain untarnished. Whereas men were regarded 
as wage earners, women’s paid labour (taking in laundry, cleaning other 
people’s homes, and so on) was subsumed under the category of “domes-
tic duties” and thus rendered invisible—while, of course, their unpaid 
household labour left their husbands free to go out to work. Ironically, 
then, the ideal of the male breadwinner was to a large extent an illusion 
sustained by the work, paid and unpaid, performed by women.
The onset of the Depression finally challenged the ideal of the 
male breadwinner. When increasing numbers of family men no longer 
earned a wage, the breadwinner ideal became ever more difficult to sus-
tain.41 The Depression’s challenge to the model of the male breadwin-
ner had far-reaching implications for many newly unemployed men 
and their families. Cynthia Comacchio argues that the economic and 
social upheaval associated with the Depression broke down traditional 
gender and work roles and saw many men assuming the position of “vol-
untary spectator” inside the unfamiliar routines of life at home. Even 
as employment of the sort traditional to men became almost impossi-
ble to find, “women’s work”—jobs that would have jeopardized a man’s 
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masculinity, such as domestic service, child care, waitressing, or working 
in textile mills—remained available. Turning gender roles on their heads, 
some wives and daughters thus left the home to work, replacing their 
husbands and fathers as the chief breadwinners in the process.42 “Since 
the very essence of masculinity was deeply tied to this notion of the 
male breadwinner and head of household,” political scientist Margaret 
Hillyard Little suggests, “it is no wonder that many men were deeply 
troubled by events beyond their control.”43 Without doubt, the onset of 
the Depression ushered in an era of severe social anxieties about the role 
of men, especially those who were married, and their relation to their 
work (or lack of work), their families, and their society.44
Unemployed men, as we shall see, attracted most of the attention 
of relief policy-makers during the 1930s. In city council chambers and 
relief offices, unemployed men, whether single or married, were the sub-
jects of great anxiety and concern. Single unemployed men left to their 
own devices, relief officials believed, would congregate in cities and cause 
trouble—panhandling at residents’ back doors, organizing and partici-
pating in protest rallies, committing crimes, and otherwise engaging in 
negative behaviour that threatened relief policy-makers’ ideas of civil 
order. Married unemployed men were also troublesome, but city relief 
officials were less concerned about their potential danger to civil order 
than about the danger to social stability they represented. Left without 
work for too long and unable to provide for their families, relief officials 
believed, married men would become despondent, demoralized, and 
even emasculated. In the end, their inability to maintain their breadwin-
ner role would upset “natural” gender dynamics and threaten the sanc-
tity of society’s very bedrock: the family. In a society that placed great 
emphasis on prosperity and progress, stable growth, industriousness, and 
efficiency, the Depression and its related unemployment problems were 
an aberration, as were unemployed men themselves. But, especially in 
the early 1930s, their situation was a fact, aberrant or not, that municipal 
relief systems tried to address. Those relief systems did not, however, oper-
ate in a vacuum. Unemployment relief recipients, business interests, pro-
vincial officials, and the federal government asserted their own visions—
sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory—compelling city 
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administrators either to face down these alternate visions or to adapt 
their relief policies accordingly.
THE NORTH AMERICAN CITy IN HISTORy
The main protagonists of this story are interwar-era urban dwellers. It 
is therefore appropriate to reflect, theoretically and historically, on the 
nature of the city during that period. Through the early years of the 
twentieth century, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg were part of a 
North American phenomenon that saw increasing numbers of people 
moving from the country to the city.45 Indeed, cities on the Canadian 
Prairies were latecomers to a transformative process that stretched 
back to the mid-nineteenth century, when cities like New York, Boston, 
Chicago, St. Louis, and Cincinnati were emerging as the titans of politi-
cal, economic, social, and cultural America.46 The transformation of 
the continental landscape from rural to urban was, as elsewhere in 
the industrial world, slow and uneven. Some cities, such as New York 
and Boston, emerged early as important port towns benefiting from 
the wealth generated by the transport of overseas and inland goods. 
Slowly—with the introduction and growth of extensive transporta-
tion, communication, and financial networks—such cities were able to 
extend their metropolitan influence over a wider and wider hinterland. 
Other cities, Chicago in particular, exploited their geographic position 
on the Great Lakes and served as important trading hubs between 
the St. Lawrence system and the continental interior.47 North of the 
border, Toronto, Montréal, and Hamilton had become cities of grow-
ing economic, political, and cultural import by the late nineteenth cen-
tury.48 Through the early years of the twentieth century, notes historian 
Donald Wetherell, the city “exerted a powerful influence as the creator, 
vanguard, and leader of cultural, social, and economic life in Canada.”49
By the late 1800s (in the case of Winnipeg) and the early 1900s (for 
Edmonton and Saskatoon), Prairie cities had already developed com-
plicated forms of bureaucracy.50 Drawing on the experiences of older 
cities to the east, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg set up elected city 
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councils to represent urban ratepayers and mayors’ offices and to serve 
(at least in theory) the cities’ interests as a whole. In turn, the city halls 
directed squadrons of (primarily) men of specialized skills: a team of city 
planners headed by a chief engineer, a sanitation and waterworks depart-
ment, a city solicitor to buy and sell debentures and draft city bylaws, a 
medical officer of health, a chief of police in charge of city constables 
and detectives, various inspections personnel, boards of education, fire 
and transportation departments, relief and welfare officers, city commis-
sioners, and clerks. These bureaucratic forms provided municipal leaders 
with considerable control over the development of their cities. Urban 
historian Jonathan Teaford charts similar developments in the late nine-
teenth-century American context in his book The Unheralded Triumph: 
City Government in America, 1870–1900.51 He argues that early American 
cities were typically able to offer their middle-class residents a consist-
ently high level of services. At the same time, he notes, the working class 
and the poor enjoyed relatively few benefits of those same services. Alan 
Artibise brings the story of urban development in the western Canadian 
context into the twentieth century, outlining how an early booster men-
tality slowly succumbed to a more corporate outlook as urban bureau-
cratic forms grew ever more solidified in western cities.52
Yet despite their level of bureaucratic organization, the cities were 
in no better shape to deal with the severe economic and social prob-
lems thrust upon them by the Depression (and by the concept of local 
responsibility) than they had been as villages or towns in their earlier 
days. The revenue generation available to them consisted of little more 
than property taxes and the sales of debentures. As the Depression wore 
on, both sources of revenue dropped off precipitously. Increasingly, espe-
cially through the early Depression years, worthless properties reverted 
to the cities in lieu of taxes, and debentures grew ever more difficult to 
sell on the open market. Simply put, Prairie city administrations did not 
have enough money to carry both themselves and their unemployed resi-
dents through the economic and social crisis facing them.
Nevertheless, all of this urban development meant that “the city” 
began to take on important meanings in the minds of both urban dwell-
ers and rural folk. On the one hand, the city represented wealth, power, 
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prestige, and sophistication. On the other hand, it epitomized vice, 
debauchery, danger (especially for young single women), and aliena-
tion.53 By the 1920s, western Canadian urban centres shared these con-
flicting attributes, though to a much lesser extent, with larger and older 
metropolises elsewhere. The city, of course, was more than a collection of 
ideas or a set of representations. On the Canadian Prairies, as elsewhere, 
cities served as transportation nodes for the grain traffic produced on sur-
rounding farms and destined for distant markets. They also functioned 
as marketplaces, offering diverse goods for sale, from agricultural imple-
ments to retail articles to professional and trades services. They were hubs 
of labour exchange, where farmers could secure seasonal harvesters and 
lumber companies could find workers. With their universities, orchestras 
and theatre companies, and government offices, they were educational 
and cultural and political centres. And, during the Depression, they were 
perceived as safe havens in which to wait out the economic storm.
It is no coincidence that the three cities under study here are all 
located east of the Rocky Mountains and west of the Lakehead. This 
book is premised on the assumption that regional peculiarities made 
the Depression experience in western Canada distinct from that in the 
rest of the country. For one thing, western cities were much more heav-
ily dependent on surrounding agricultural production than were cities 
elsewhere in the country. When the farms failed, especially after 1932–33, 
Prairie cities suffered deeply. Compounding this dependence on agricul-
ture was the fact that, by the late 1920s, these cities had a much smaller, 
less robust industrial base than other Canadian cities, especially in cen-
tral Canada.54 This meant that Prairie cities lacked the stabilizing poten-
tial of more diverse economies, such as those of Hamilton or Montréal or 
Toronto. In addition, the Depression lasted longer in the western part of 
the country. While the economic crisis began to abate in central Canada 
in 1933, the recovery in the West did not begin until after 1937.
Otherwise, is there anything especially distinctive about Edmon-
ton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg? Did their policy-makers do anything 
unusual or innovative during the 1930s that would set these cities apart 
from other municipal centres of comparable size? In a word, no. In fact, 
relief policy-makers in Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg drew on 
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widely held views and common assumptions about how best to deal 
with Depression-related unemployment. And while the Depression 
experiences of these three cities differed in certain respects from those 
of other urban centres in Canada, cities across the nation were operating 
under more or less the same provincial and federal governmental stric-
tures with respect to relief funding, and cities everywhere laboured under 
the yoke of local responsibility. In this sense, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and 
Winnipeg serve as examples, yielding insights into how urban relief 




The Rise of the  
City Relief Machines
In respect to each group in need of care—the family, the single man, the unemployed 
woman—smoothly running machinery appears to exist to . . . meet that need at a 
reasonable minimum compatible with health and decency.
“Family Welfare in Greater Winnipeg, 1934”1
It is spoken of as an efficient piece of machinery. The men think that efficiency is 
not everything. The electric chair is also an efficient piece of machinery.
Unemployed man from Edmonton, on the relief system, 19362
The onset of what would come to be called the Great Depression com-
pelled municipal authorities in cities like Edmonton, Saskatoon, and 
Winnipeg to confront a series of unemployment-related challenges the 
likes of which they had not encountered before. Increasing numbers 
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of families sought relief from city offices and private charities, making 
heavier-than-normal demands on local soup kitchens and bread lines, 
and stretching the resources of city relief departments. And the small 
armies of single men migrating into western cities seeking—but not 
finding—work after the harvest season’s close only exacerbated the sit-
uation.3 With winter bearing down in the late autumn of 1929, munici-
pal officials in cities across the Prairies grew increasingly anxious. It 
was too early to tell whether the emerging unemployment problem 
was the result of an extraordinarily bad seasonal downturn or evidence 
of a more chronic and structural cyclical business recession. The New 
York stock market crash in October certainly hinted at the latter, but 
the abrupt drop in key economic indices like the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange seemed worlds 
away from three smallish cities on the Canadian prairies.4 Closer to 
home, and much more problematic in the immediate term, was a 
combination of what Gerald Friesen calls a “disappointingly small” 
wheat crop and a sharp decline in wheat prices on the world market. 
The former was related to a drought that began during the important 
summer growing months, and the latter to production outstripping 
demand and to a series of European domestic price supports, embar-
goes, and quotas on foreign cereal grains.5
Whatever the causes of the growing numbers of unemployed, 
Edmonton’s city council felt that the emerging crisis was serious enough 
to warrant a meeting with the provincial government, something the 
council had not requested since the early 1920s. The Edmonton Bulletin 
agreed that a conference on unemployment was necessary, especially 
given that autumn’s poor harvest. “It has been apparent ever since the 
crop situation developed,” the Bulletin’s editors averred in early December, 
“that the coming winter would find more than the usual number of men 
unable to get along in the slack season without some measure of help.”6 
The mood in Saskatoon was similar. In late December, officials from 
that city travelled to Regina, the provincial capital, to discuss an unem-
ployment relief strategy with provincial officials and representatives of 
Prince Albert and Regina.7 Even in Winnipeg, which was older and more 
economically diverse and stable, unemployment numbers were causing 
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much worry. The city struggled with an influx of what local officials later 
coldly called the “natural ‘backwash’ of idle farm labourers, and casual 
workers from Northern construction, lumbering, and mining camps.”8
This was certainly not the first time Prairie cities had faced reces-
sions in their short histories; they had confronted similar situations just 
before the Great War and again through the early 1920s. Neither was 
mass unemployment an unknown phenomenon prior to the 1930s.9 
Unemployment and its associated problems had been chronic features 
of Canada’s urban and industrial experience for decades.10 And west-
ern cities had had in place at least since the start of the century relief 
apparatuses to deal with poverty and unemployment. But the unemploy-
ment crisis looming over the winter of 1929–30 was of a different order. 
Prairie cities had never before faced an economic catastrophe so severe 
or a social dislocation so jarring.11 In subsequent years, especially during 
the dark winter months, the crisis would only worsen. “In the history 
of the Province,” Manitoba officials remarked in mid-February 1932, “the 
problem had never been as great as it was during the winter of 1930–31. 
And it should be made clear here that the winter immediately passed 
was worse still.”12 Brian McKillop points out that Winnipeg “was hit with 
a particular vengeance. . . . By the fall of 1930 wheat was being sold on 
the Liverpool market at the lowest price since the seventeenth century.” 
Nor was wheat the only commodity critical to Winnipeg’s wealth in real 
trouble by the early 1930s. “Tractor purchases in the prairie provinces,” 
McKillop notes, “declined from 14,557 in 1929 to 762 in 1933. The gross 
value of manufactured products in Winnipeg fell between 1929 and 
1932 from $109.3 million to $56 million. Eatons’s mail order slumped 
from $22,027,000 of business in 1930 to $17,139,000 by 1932.”13 Historians 
Graham Taylor and Peter Baskerville distinguish the 1930s from earlier 
economic downturns this way: “What made the depression of the 1930s 
‘great’ was not just its severity but also its long duration and seeming 
imperviousness to remedial action.”14
Relief officials in Winnipeg were quick to recognize this distinc-
tion, and especially its implications for the administration and delivery 
of relief. The Greater Winnipeg Welfare Association recalled of that city’s 
first encounter with the Depression, “It may be said at once that it very 
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soon became evident that the existing Welfare Agencies, including the 
Churches, were not equipped to care for the new situation.” The city’s 
churches and private agencies, the association continued, “functioned 
under normal conditions and more or less met the needs of those normal 
conditions,” aiding Winnipeg’s poor through seasonal downswings in 
the economy as well as deeper cyclical recessions. But the Depression 
was different. “We feel this distinction cannot be too clearly or forcibly 
drawn,” the association said. The vast amounts of public money for relief 
purposes demanded by the Depression simply “could not be entrusted 
to either the churches or the private relief agencies for administration.”15
In their stead, policy-makers in Edmonton, Saskatoon, and 
Winnipeg developed what officials in Winnipeg called “relief machinery”: 
ad hoc relief administrations designed exclusively to meet Depression-
related unemployment problems.16 Their main functions were to coor-
dinate unemployment relief financing arrangements with the provincial 
and federal governments; propose, organize, and carry out urban work 
relief programs; and deliver direct relief to unemployed victims of the 
Depression. They concentrated their efforts only on those urban resi-
dents affected by unemployment, leaving poor relief cases with causes 
unrelated to the Depression to other welfare bodies and private charita-
ble organizations. Of course, lines separating the unemployment-related 
poor and the remaining poor were often blurred, but the policy-makers 
in charge of the city relief machines nevertheless struggled to maintain 
the distinction for at least two reasons. First, most city relief machine 
activities were funded jointly by the federal, provincial, and munici-
pal governments. Keeping unemployment relief monies separate from 
other municipal spending made accounting easier and allowed cities to 
charge any unemployment-related relief spending to agreements with 
the more senior levels of government.17 Second, distinguishing between 
unemployment-related and other relief expenditures reflected municipal 
thinking about the difference between those who were poor because they 
could not find work and those who were poor because they could not 
work at all (for example, widows, orphans, the elderly, and the disabled).
The city relief machines would remain at the front lines of unem-
ployment relief provision and administration until mid-decade, when 
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the federal and provincial governments would take a more active and 
direct role in the provision and delivery of relief. During their period 
of ascendance, roughly between 1930 and 1933, the city relief machines 
formed the most important and immediate connection between the 
state and the unemployed, enjoying relative policy autonomy from 
senior levels of governments yet encountering serious and complicated 
policy challenges from local business and community interests, as well as 
from the unemployed themselves.
THE EMERGENCE OF AN uRBAN WEST
Edmonton graduated from town to city status on 8 October 1904. 
One month later, the new city of more than eight thousand people 
was ready to celebrate. The weight of the region’s past was not lost on 
the party’s planners: fastened to the walls of the Thistle curling rink, 
the city’s largest structure and the site of the day’s celebrations, were 
thousands of dollars’ worth of furs—muskox, beaver, buffalo—recall-
ing the great fur trade that had attracted Europeans far into the inte-
rior more than a century before.18 The furs were set off by yards of 
colourful and imperial red, blue, and white bunting, giving the room a 
festive, official feel. The main stage at one end had been set up to resem-
ble a trapper’s cabin, and off to one side stood what a Calgary Daily 
Herald reporter called an “Indian tepee,” representing the Cree people 
who had once dominated the area.19 But the distinguished guests arriv-
ing for the banquet and the speeches—mostly business, religious, and 
political leaders—would not have missed the organizers’ nod to the 
future: brought into the rink especially for the occasion was mayor and 
motorcar enthusiast William Short’s automobile, one of the first in the 
city. It was an auspicious start for the small town with big city dreams.
Less than a year later, Prime Minister Laurier’s administration cre-
ated the new province of Alberta and—much to the dissatisfaction of 
Calgary, the rival city to the south—named Edmonton its capital city. 
Still, Edmonton in September 1905 looked much like it had as a town 
only two years before. Its sidewalks remained little more than wooden 
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planks that, in the words of one local historian, “rose and fell as they 
followed the surface of the ground.”20 The constant horse traffic on the 
unpaved streets kicked up terrific dust on dry days and created terrible 
muck on wet ones. The winters were cold. Those strolling through the 
city’s downtown would have seen mostly wooden buildings with false 
fronts—livery and blacksmith shops, stores and saloons and pool halls, 
several hotels, and banks.21 There were a few brick buildings, like the 
McKay Avenue School and the new Windsor Hotel, but by and large, the 
city’s rough-hewn look easily betrayed its frontier town roots.
Great changes were afoot, however, as a steady stream, and soon 
a flowing river of settlers passed through Edmonton’s Dominion Lands 
Office to claim their homesteads.22 Many new arrivals chose to remain 
in town. Some found work at one of the city’s several coal mines, lum-
beryards, or brick works, or—especially after 1902, when the Edmonton, 
Yukon, and Pacific railways met up with the Calgary-Edmonton Railway 
and linked to the Canadian Pacific—loading and unloading goods and 
agricultural produce at the city’s bustling rail yards. In subsequent years, 
with the introduction to Edmonton of the Canadian Northern Railway 
in 1905 and the Grand Trunk Pacific in 1909, the city would enjoy the 
traffic of three important railways. Some newcomers took up jobs on the 
many building sites scattered throughout the city.23 Others came intend-
ing to start small retail businesses; establish law, real estate, and contract-
ing offices; or provide other professional services for the growing city.24
The paths to Edmonton were many, and for some, like future 
mayor Charles May, they promised wealth and social mobility. Born in 
Wellington County, Ontario, in 1858, May travelled west to Manitoba 
at age twenty-two to farm in the northern part of the province. Some 
time later, he moved to Winnipeg, where he worked as a carpenter and 
builder. In 1902, perhaps drawn by the boom town’s reputation, he 
arrived in Edmonton, where he set up a successful building and contract-
ing firm, winning tenders to construct numerous buildings that would 
become city landmarks, including Edmonton’s main post office, the first 
station for the Canadian National Railway, two bank buildings, and the 
residence of Frank Oliver, founder of the Edmonton Bulletin and federal 
minister of the Interior. New arrivals like May fit easily into an already 
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established elite that, like its counterparts in Saskatoon and Winnipeg, 
had been busy constructing an architecture of political, economic, and 
social dominance over the city through powerful local associations like 
the exclusive Edmonton Club, the Chamber of Commerce, and the city 
council.25 Edmonton’s urban elite joined what Gerald Friesen describes 
as “the several hundred entrepreneurs, financiers, merchants, and govern-
ment and church leaders who ‘set the tone’ or established the rules in the 
new society. They took up where the preceding generation had left off, 
asserting the rule of law, the power of the church, the influence of the 
school lesson, and the inevitable correctness of British traditions.”26
The influx of workers through these early years would leave an 
equally important mark on the city.27 Like Winnipeg before it, Edmonton 
developed an increasingly stark geographical division along class lines. 
Members of Edmonton’s well-to-do business and professional classes 
secured the west end of town to build their homes. On the east side were 
the city’s working-class neighbourhoods. Still further east, the small cot-
tages turned into rooming houses and cheap hotels housing growing 
numbers of single young men recently arrived from Central Europe and 
Great Britain.28 On a visit from Winnipeg, J. S. Woodsworth reported 
on one east-end home: “In one house ten by twelve by nine .  .  . eight 
people [were] sleeping, where by laws of sanitation there should have 
been three.” In the basement of another house, Woodsworth found eight-
een sleeping, “each man paying $3 a month for the privilege.”29 In 1906, 
the city had few unions, but in August of that year, organizers from the 
Canadian Trades and Labour Congress and the American Federation of 
Labor arrived and urged workers to organize.30 The organizers evidently 
met with some success: that September, Edmonton workers marched 
in the city’s first Labour Day parade.31 At the end of the decade, more 
than half of the city’s population was engaged in four discrete trades: 
building, manufacturing and mining, domestic and personal service, and 
transportation.32
Edmonton’s boom town experience also added new ethnic 
dimensions to the city. Some 5 percent of the population in 1906 called 
themselves Germanic, while a further 5 percent might, in the words of 
one historian, be divided into “Slavic or other east European extraction 
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.  .  . Scandinavians, Jews, East Asians, and Dutch.”33 Another 5 percent 
were French. Still, even by 1906, Edmonton remained solidly dominated 
by Anglo-Celtic peoples who traced their origins either to Ontario or 
directly to Great Britain, making up no less than 85 percent of the city’s 
population.34 By 1910, the situation had changed, as more immigrants 
had moved into the city. In that year, immigrants from Eastern Europe 
made up approximately 15 percent of the city’s population, and another 
8 percent counted themselves of Germanic or Scandinavian origin. But 
Anglo-Saxons, at 70 percent, still made up the vast majority.35 In 1912, 
when the cities of Strathcona and Edmonton amalgamated, the col-
lected population jumped to fifty thousand. It had been a busy start for 
an ambitious town. In less than a decade, Edmonton’s population had 
increased sixfold, three important railways had entered the city, housing 
and business-related construction had become a near constant, and the 
city had been named both the provincial capital and the site of the pro-
vincial university, much to the chagrin of Calgarians.
Changes no less dramatic were occurring over the same period 
five hundred kilometres to the east in Saskatoon. By the second decade 
of the twentieth century, Saskatoon had emerged as one of five dominant 
metropolises on the Canadian Prairies. In rapid and dynamic succession, 
the small and wholly unremarkable Prairie hamlet of the 1890s progressed 
to a commercial, cultural, and educational centre of growing economic 
and political importance by the end of the Great War. Founded largely 
on Methodist and temperance principles, Saskatoon began as a rather 
unlikely attempt to create a utopian oasis of sobriety where, in the words 
of the settlement’s founder, John Neilson Lake, “alcoholic beverages 
shall not be sold.”36 During the summer of 1882, a party of thirteen had 
left Toronto in search of a suitable townsite on a forty-two by eighteen 
mile rectangular tract of land set aside for the Temperance Colonization 
Society. After a long journey by rail, trail, and boat, the small group set-
tled on a spot between the Métis settlement of Batoche to the north 
and a Sioux reserve to the south, and spread on either side of the South 
Saskatchewan River.37 But the harsh winter of 1882–83 and the severe 
isolation of the frontier hindered any real initial growth, despite the 
group’s best intentions. The small colony even abandoned its Methodist 
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and temperance principles, but this was largely because the members of 
the Temperance Colonization Society could not legally restrict access to 
the settlement to those sharing their beliefs.38
It was not until 1890—when the Qu’Appelle, Long Lake, and 
Saskatchewan Railway and Steamboat Company built a branch line 
through Saskatoon connecting central Saskatchewan with the main 
Canadian Pacific Railway line at Regina—that the fledgling community 
had a sound basis for future growth and development. The railway eased 
the isolation of the frontier and offered a strong and necessary sense of 
connection with the rest of the young Dominion. Thereafter, the rail-
way transformed Saskatoon into a shipping point for the emerging cattle 
range industry and a terminus for agricultural goods from the Battleford 
district to the west.39 Saskatoon also functioned as a distribution centre 
for agricultural implements necessary for grain production in the sur-
rounding area. In short, the coming of the railway, the development of an 
agricultural market, and, after 1907, the establishment of the provincial 
university ensured Saskatoon’s continued development and growth.40
Although much smaller than the four other Prairie urban centres 
at the turn of the century, Saskatoon’s population grew from 113 in 1901 
to an astonishing 25,739 only twenty years later, making it the seven-
teenth-largest city in Canada. Saskatoon’s net assessment value, a negli-
gible $2.5 million in 1906, stood at more than $56 million by 1913.41 The 
city’s revenue jumped from $226,000 in 1910 to more than $927,000 only 
twelve years later.42 As remarkable as those numbers are, however, they 
hardly capture the sense of excitement, optimism, and frontier spirit of 
Saskatoon’s first decades. The wild dreams and visions of grandeur even 
led some commentators to count Saskatoon among the “great families 
of Western cities.” Saskatoon was unabashedly placed in the company of 
Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago, Minneapolis, and Winnipeg.43 Nothing 
seemed out of reach; anything seemed possible.
Saskatoon’s boosters, that small core of local elite whose fortunes 
were tied to the city’s economic success, channelled that optimism into 
attracting large-scale immigration and investment. Manifested in a mad 
and fantastic real estate boom, the booster strategy contributed to a wave 
of unprecedented growth. A dealer from one of Saskatoon’s 267 real 
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estate firms described the boom as a time when “you could sell anything 
anywhere to anyone at any price.”44 Prosperity had finally descended on 
the Canadian Prairies, and western cities like Saskatoon and Edmonton 
benefited tremendously. By some accounts, land purchased for $300 
a front foot in 1909 sold for more than $1,700 a front foot only three 
years later. Serious money could be made, often in the space of months, 
sometimes in mere days.45 And serious money drew serious investment, 
not to mention large-scale immigration. The local elites’ relentless pur-
suit of “big city” status and the corresponding economic benefits drove 
Saskatoon toward incorporation (in 1906), significant boundary exten-
sions, massive infrastructure works, and, of course, deficit financing.46 
The latter would return to haunt the city when the good times went sour 
just before World War I.
Figure 1. A view of Saskatoon, 1902. Like other frontier towns in the West, Saskatoon 
at the turn of the twentieth century looked more like a movie set than a city. This 
would soon change as a flood of immigrants poured into the Canadian Prairies and 
transformed the region. City of Saskatoon Archives, 2011-181.
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Despite the immense capital investment, the increased borrowing 
power that came with city status, and the waves of immigrants pour-
ing into cities like Edmonton and Saskatoon during the boom years, 
the cities accrued cumbersome debts, which were mostly the result of 
massive, though necessary, infrastructure works. Saskatoon’s per capita 
general debenture debt reached $290 by 1917, the third highest in the 
country after Regina and Vancouver. Adding insult to the injurious 
climbing debt was Saskatoon’s steadily decreasing revenue flow after 
the boom ended in 1913. The collection of property taxes, one of the 
few means of revenue generation open to the city government, was 
increasingly replaced by the collection of properties in lieu of taxes 
from bankrupt property owners. In 1917, the city recorded a deficit, and 
it continued to do so intermittently for the next twenty years. In an 
Figure 2. Bustling 21st Street, in Saskatoon’s emerging business district, 1912. By the 
second decade of the twentieth century, Prairie urban centres like Saskatoon had evolved 
into powerful economic, political, and social hubs. City of Saskatoon Archives, 2011-181.
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effort to counteract the debilitating loss of revenue, the city adminis-
tration could do little but raise local property taxes.47 Similar troubles 
emerged in Edmonton. In March 1914, the city’s treasurer reported that 
$1 million of the previous year’s taxes had not been collected. Added to 
this was an additional $250,000 in taxes that had failed to materialize 
over the past few years.48 Yet the city’s population continued to grow 
astronomically—from fifty thousand in 1912 to more than seventy-two 
thousand two years later, with corresponding investments in essential 
infrastructure and services.49
Through this early period, Winnipeg was, in the words of Gerald 
Friesen, “the first city of the prairies.” It was, of course, the region’s first 
urban centre, formed in 1870, but it was also first among all other Prairie 
urban centres in that it was the largest and most economically and 
politically important in the region. It would remain so until at least the 
mid-1900s, when the young upstarts, Edmonton and Calgary, surpassed 
Winnipeg in importance. But such an unhappy future would have been 
inconceivable to Winnipeggers of the late nineteenth century, when 
Winnipeg’s star was rising. The city’s population in 1891 was a command-
ing twenty-six thousand, more than six times that of Calgary, the nearest 
Prairie rival with a mere four thousand residents. The Canadian Pacific 
Railway passed through the city in 1881, remaking Winnipeg almost over-
night into Canada’s “gateway city”; indeed, the city was well on its way 
to becoming the “Chicago of the North.” By the end of the century, the 
tracks of other railways and branch lines converged in Winnipeg from 
all directions, among them the Canadian Northern, the Grand Trunk 
Pacific, the Midland, and Colonization branches. The railways established 
rail yards and shops, offering employment to the thousands of new arriv-
als to the city, including Britain- and Ontario-born Anglo-Saxons, Poles, 
Galicians, Jews, Germans, and Scandinavians.50 By 1890, historian Jim 
Silver observes, “the city had become the headquarters of the Canadian 
grain trade, and had developed a sophisticated system of financial insti-
tutions.”51 By the turn of the century, Winnipeg had firmly established 
itself as an important economic, political, and even social centre. Most 
of the grain and cattle produced in the West passed through Winnipeg 
(and after 1899, all grain inspection in Winnipeg was made compulsory), 
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enhancing immeasurably the city’s general wealth and prestige. In 1902, 
more wheat passed through Winnipeg than through Chicago.52
Much more so than in either Edmonton or Saskatoon, Winnipeg’s 
urban geography developed early along class and ethnic lines. In the 
city’s north end lived Winnipeg’s poor, where, as Gerald Friesen notes, 
“poor Jewish, Icelandic, and British immigrants with few or no skills 
to sell on the labour market lived in . . . shabby dwellings and endured 
such slights from the better elements as the suggestion that they fostered 
a ‘Shanty Nuisance’ and that their area was ‘attaining an unenviable 
notoriety in police circles as the resort of criminals and half-breed pros-
titutes.’”53 To the west stood the “modest frame houses of the respect-
able, but not wealthy citizens.”54 For the most part, these were many of 
the same Winnipeggers who would have viewed the Diamond Jubilee 
in 1897 as an opportunity to confirm and celebrate their allegiance 
to “their traditional cultural sentiments, centred in the British nation, 
the monarchy, and the empire” in the face of the north end’s changing 
character.55
The Prairies’ second boom, roughly between the turn of the cen-
tury and 1913, did not transform Winnipeg so much as continue the 
solid economic growth that had been evident since the 1880s. For the 
Winnipeg elite, the brief recession of the 1890s represented little more 
than a minor stumbling block. “The years of the great western boom,” 
writes W. L. Morton, “saw Winnipeg rise to metropolitan stature, and real-
ize in large part the aspirations of its founders.” Building contracts in 1907 
stood at $12 million.56 In 1910, Winnipeg’s Development and Industrial 
Bureau reported that the city had 236 factories employing more than 
fourteen thousand people and producing some $36 million worth of 
goods.57 Two years later, city officials proudly called Winnipeg “the chief 
distributing, industrial, and financial city of the Canadian West.”58 But 
not all Winnipeggers shared in the wealth produced by the city’s growth 
through these years. James Shaver Woodsworth’s All People’s Mission 
reported in 1909, for instance, that it had had “an unprecedented number 
of appeals for employment and clothing . . . which have not ceased yet, 
men still being unable to obtain work which yields enough to support 
their families.”59
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When the boom finally ended in 1913, the dominance of at least 
five urban centres on the Prairies had been established. Winnipeg was 
a growing metropolis, while Edmonton and Calgary, in Alberta, and 
Saskatoon and Regina, in Saskatchewan, no longer viewed smaller 
Prairie centres as rivals, as they had at the turn of the century. The devel-
opment of railways, the influx of newcomers and capital, and the growth 
of urban services such as sanitation and sewage systems, electricity, and 
other infrastructure in large measure illustrated their economic and 
political importance to the region. Increasingly too, beginning in the 
1920s, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg looked northward for eco-
nomic diversification opportunities and new markets.60
THE IDEA OF uNEMpLOyMENT
The history of unemployment, it might be said, is the history of efforts 
to understand and define it. There have always been people who have 
been without work for a period of time, although, until quite recently, 
such people have not generally been deemed “unemployed.” Instead, 
as John Garraty explains, they were simply understood to be idle.61 
Medieval serfs may have lived in extreme poverty and may have been 
without work during the winter, but they could not be considered 
unemployed in any modern sense. Their paternalistic relationship with 
the lord of the manor meant that they could not leave their work on the 
land of their own free will, nor could the lord dismiss them from the 
land they worked. Neither did artisans in medieval towns commonly 
experience anything approaching unemployment in the modern sense. 
They had, by the thirteenth century, organized themselves into guilds 
that at once protected them from want and regulated entry into their 
trades so as to ensure that all members had sufficient work.62 Even 
those on the margins of medieval society, who survived by whatever 
means they could, were described as beggars, outlaws, or vagabonds, 
not as unemployed. To the medieval mind, the “unemployed” simply 
could not exist, for according to the medieval world view, as Garraty 
points out, “work was available for all who would labor.”63
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Later, especially during the seventeenth century, more and more 
people in Europe fell idle despite the enormous wealth generated by 
mostly European exploitation of colonial resources abroad. This increas-
ing lack of work had several causes. First, the population was growing, 
putting heavy stress on food resources. Second, a series of devastating 
crop failures plagued the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, exacerbat-
ing the food crises and driving many to seek refuge in the cities and 
towns.64 Finally, those two centuries were marked by long, brutal, and 
costly wars, causing tremendous social dislocation and widespread pov-
erty. Yet despite the growing poverty and the steadily increasing num-
bers of idle beggars, vagrants, and vagabonds roaming across continental 
Europe and Great Britain, the concept of unemployment as we under-
stand it today had not yet formed. After all, in such an age of empire, the 
problem was believed to be not a lack of available work but rather a lack 
of willingness to work. If some people could not find work where they 
lived, they could do so in the colonies, aboard naval ships, or, increasingly 
through the late sixteenth and into the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, inside the newly conceived houses of industry.65
Rather than being understood in terms of unemployment, people 
without work were seen through the lens of poverty. Poverty, in turn, was 
seen as a consequence of the bad habits and practices of the poor, not 
of problems in the larger economic and national structures that caused 
people to lose their jobs and become poor as a result. Thus, following 
the introduction of the Elizabethan Poor Laws in 1601, the idea that the 
able-bodied poor should learn the virtues of thrift and self-sufficiency 
through sober hard work gained ground. The learning of such virtues, 
many believed, would single-handedly solve the problem of poverty.66
Not until the end of the eighteenth century, however, did any-
thing approximating a modern conception of unemployment emerge. 
Slowly, the idea that famine and wars and larger structural economic 
problems, rather than a lack of industry, lay behind people’s inability 
to find work began to take root. Still, the concept of unemployment 
was understood much more literally in the early nineteenth century 
than it was a century later by the policy-makers of the 1930s. Prior to 
the 1850s, notes American historian Alexander Keyssar, the unemployed 
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were still seen as “those who were simply ‘not employed,’ who were idle 
or not working.”67 This literal definition cast a wide net that included 
anyone, even children, without work, regardless of the reason. In the 
decades following the 1850s, and especially during the years after the 
depression of 1873, a distinction between two types of unemployed 
persons began to emerge: the voluntarily unemployed, whose ranks 
included “the sick and incompetent, the thriftless, the lazy and vicious, 
the willing paupers and the professional beggars,” and the involuntarily 
unemployed, who were “idle from no fault of their own.”68 Reflecting 
this shift, in 1878, the influential American statistician Carroll D. Wright 
limited the definition of the unemployed to those “out of work and 
seeking it.” For the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor, which 
Wright led, the unemployed were “those who had occupations but did 
not have jobs.” Wright’s instructions to local officials charged with deter-
mining unemployment rates in their districts were even more explicit, 
advising enumerators to count as unemployed only able-bodied adults 
“who really want employment.”69 Thus, by 1900, Keyssar concludes, in 
both England and the United States (and undoubtedly Canada as well), 
“men and women who were jobless and in need of work were routinely 
described as unemployed.”70
At the root of this new, narrower definition of unemployment 
were two interrelated shifts in the economic structure of the Western 
world. The first was the development of industrial urbanization, espe-
cially during the latter half of the nineteenth century, which gave rise to 
a much larger, more pronounced and concentrated working-class popu-
lation than had hitherto existed. These were people largely dependent 
on wages for their survival, and the threat of losing their jobs entirely—
particularly during times of illness, economic hardship, and recession—
raised the spectre of unemployment more starkly than ever before. The 
second economic shift was the financial panic and ensuing depression 
of 1873, which in turn laid bare the reality of mass industrial unemploy-
ment and raised the equally devastating spectre of social dislocation and 
disorder. Efforts to minimize the damage caused by unemployment led 
to the development of policies to address the problem, and policy-mak-
ers began for the first time to distinguish between poverty caused by 
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industrial unemployment and other types of poverty, such as that among 
the infirm and the aged and among widows and orphans.
By the 1930s, then, urban relief policy-makers on the Prairies had 
a rich reservoir of thinking and acting on unemployment on which to 
draw. The distinctions between the voluntarily and the involuntarily 
unemployed and between poor people who were unable to work and 
those who could work but were unable to find jobs were already well 
established by the time the Great Depression began.
uNEMpLOyMENT RELIEF BEFORE 1929
By the onset of the Depression, relief of the poor in Canada had long 
been considered a local responsibility, both by legislation found in 
most cities’ acts of incorporation and by convention dating back at least 
to Britain’s earliest Poor Laws.71 Canadian city governments, therefore, 
stood on the front lines of providing for the care and maintenance of 
those residents who, for a variety of reasons, found themselves without 
work or could not support themselves. By the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century in Canada, much of this early welfare provision took the 
form of what sociologist Mariana Valverde calls the “mixed social econ-
omy.”72 The idea of the mixed social economy stands in contrast to ear-
lier historical characterizations of the welfare state’s development that 
described how privately organized and administered welfare practices 
prevalent in the nineteenth century “were slowly but surely left behind 
in the historical dust as ‘the welfare state’ rose in majestic splendour.”73 
Valverde and others tell a more complicated story, one in which the 
public and the private were inextricably linked and where lines between 
state and non-state efforts to administer relief to the poor were blurred. 
Beginning in the mid-1870s, Valverde argues, Ontario funnelled finan-
cial support to private welfare bodies, including churches, and exten-
sively regulated privately managed welfare services. Thus, the history of 
welfare provision is a history of the relationships forged between the 
state and civil society rather than of the latter abruptly being succeeded 
by the former. It is also a history in which the rhetoric suggesting that 
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“virtually all social services, from poor relief to orphanages, were pri-
vately funded and operated” did not match the reality. State financing 
and regulation—but not outright control—of private charities allowed 
governments to maintain the illusion of what Valverde calls a “self-suf-
ficient civil society of hardy pioneers and charitable philanthropists” 
without having to establish costly “legislative machinery” (as a contem-
porary writer for the Toronto Globe put it) to administer relief to the 
province’s poor.74
On the Prairies, municipal welfare efforts, much like private 
charities in Ontario, received financial support from provincial govern-
ments, particularly in times of recession. Presumably, this arrangement 
was made to allow provincial authorities in Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Manitoba to escape having to establish expensive and precedent-
setting relief administrations of their own. Well before the onset of the 
Depression, therefore, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg had in place 
welfare administrations designed to fulfill their responsibilities to the 
local needy while receiving contributions from the federal and provin-
cial governments. The development of these cities’ welfare services fol-
lowed two main paths, each highly gendered: the first dealt almost exclu-
sively with women and their dependent children, while the second dealt 
entirely with male breadwinners.
The first path handled what Edmonton’s relief officer described 
as “ordinary indigents” covered under the various Town Acts, Mothers’ 
Allowances, Neglected Children’s Aid programs, and old age pensions.75 
Among the earliest expressions of this sort of relief in Edmonton was 
the Women’s Hospital Aid Society, operating from the 1890s and staffed 
exclusively by volunteers.76 Edmonton’s chronically poor were looked 
after by other voluntary private aid societies, including the Salvation 
Army, the Beulah Mission Home, and the Bethphage Home. The city 
government generally provided these organizations with small grants. 
By 1912, Edmonton boasted its own Civic Relief Department providing 
food, accommodation, medical care, and burial services to the poor.77
In Winnipeg, the city for which the most complete “ordinary indi-
gent” records are available, the city council employed a city relief officer, 
who provided “public assistance to citizens in their own homes” until 
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1908.78 The position was filled by a civil servant who had no formal train-
ing in professional social work techniques, and, according to an unem-
ployment relief report produced in 1934, his work was carried out “in 
much the same more or less spasmodic and inadequate way as prevailed 
in most other large centres.” In 1908, in response to what was perceived 
as a disorganized and haphazardly applied system of relief, Winnipeg’s 
mayor, James Henry Ashdown, called for plans to develop a more rigor-
ous and centrally organized relief system that would avoid overlapping 
of services and would “meet the needs of applicants more adequately.” 
The Associated Charities, organized shortly thereafter, was designed to 
meet these goals. Consisting of representatives from the city’s thirty-three 
charitable organizations, the mayor, the police magistrate, the relief and 
health officers, the school inspector, the commissioner of immigration, 
and the inspector of public institutions, the organization “assumed the 
responsibility of supplementing city relief from funds donated by inter-
ested citizens.”79 It investigated all applications for city relief, established 
a city wood yard as a work test, and requisitioned from the municipal 
government any food and fuel it needed to carry out its responsibilities. 
But much like Winnipeg’s first city relief officer, the Associated Charities 
was directed and run largely by civil servants with no training in profes-
sional social work.
Gradually, the City of Winnipeg assumed more control over relief 
administration. By 1917, what had been the Associated Charities, now 
renamed the Social Welfare Commission, was financed entirely by the 
city. City Bylaw 9642, which brought the new commission into being, 
placed in the hands of a board consisting of eight aldermen and six 
citizens the responsibility for investigation, case management, mothers’ 
allowances, and the establishment of residence requirements for patients 
in public hospitals. Those charged with operating the new commission 
were plainly a mix of public servants, politicians, and citizens with no 
formal training in social work practices. Nevertheless, by 1917, Winnipeg 
could boast that it had “developed the most extensive public social wel-
fare division in the Dominion.” Operating alongside (though entirely 
independent of) the new public system were myriad privately run organ-
izations, including the Home Welfare Association, the Personal Service 
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League, district community centres, Goodwill Industries, lodges, frater-
nal societies, veterans’ and military organizations, service clubs, and most 
of the city’s religious denominations. But there was no longer a central-
ized and organized private unit through which all charities passed. The 
result, according to Winnipeg welfare officials, explained “the diversity, 
and the largely unrelated activities of private relief and of ‘friendly visit-
ing’ of various types.”80 Sources for the history of welfare in Edmonton 
and Saskatoon are less complete, but both cities, by the second decade of 
the twentieth century, had developed relief departments organized and 
run by the city commissioners.81
While the first welfare path dealt solely with relief that was unre-
lated to unemployment—that is, looking after poor people who could 
not (or were not expected to) work—the second path dealt with the 
poverty caused by unemployment related to recurring, cyclical reces-
sions and to seasonal work. Both types of unemployment were typically 
addressed through special ad hoc unemployment relief programs that 
emerged in response to short-term emergency situations and were dis-
banded when city officials decided the emergency had passed. The relief 
work given to the urban unemployed was small scale (cutting wood, 
breaking stones, cutting ice at the river, and so on) and was funded 
through tripartite arrangements among the municipal, provincial, and 
federal governments. It offered minimal aid to unemployed city resi-
dents in need and endeavoured to maintain the work ethic by requir-
ing some form of labour in exchange for aid. In addition, it sought to 
avoid welfare dependence by employing the principle of “less eligibility.” 
First articulated in Britain’s Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, this prin-
ciple sought to ensure that the living conditions of someone on relief 
would be less desirable (less “eligible”) than those of someone working 
in even the lowest-paying private sector job, the assumption being that 
this would deter the able-bodied from applying for relief. Similar prin-
ciples were later relied on by municipal relief officials in the autumn of 
1929, and all of these early features of emergency unemployment relief 
persisted into the 1930s.
As the First World War drew to a close, the recession of 1913, which 
had been delayed by wartime production, reasserted itself and led to 
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the re-emergence of unemployment problems in Canadian cities. The 
steady immigration that had swelled the populations of Prairie cities 
through the first decade of the century translated into increased com-
petition for fewer jobs after the war. At the same time, thousands of war 
veterans, whose travel fares to anywhere in the country were paid for by 
the Dominion government as part of a soldier resettlement program, 
descended on Canadian cities.82 Not only did the soldiers’ return exac-
erbate municipal unemployment problems and increase competition 
for already scarce jobs, but it also made social stability as tenuous as eco-
nomic stability. “Telegrams poured into Ottawa from the nation’s larg-
est cities,” notes James Struthers, “warning of dangerous levels of unrest 
among returned men.”83 The men, municipal authorities emphasized, 
needed somewhere to go. And that somewhere was preferably not their 
cities.
The Dominion government’s response was the creation in 1918 of 
the Employment Service of Canada (ESC), described by historian Udo 
Sautter as “a national network of labour exchanges jointly financed and 
administered by the federal and provincial governments.” With the war 
still going strong in Europe, the ESC’s first priority, in the spring of 1918, 
was to address agricultural workforce shortages by arranging for returned 
men to work on farms. As Sautter argues, the ESC worked for a “more effi-
cient use of manpower and ultimately as a means to prevent potential, 
and to fight real, public unrest.”84 By November, the rapid demobiliza-
tion of soldiers transformed the ESC’s mandate from placing men where 
there were labour shortages to lessening unemployment. The ESC, then, 
aimed not only to help employers find an adequate labour supply but 
also to assist “the job seeking individual [who] had to fend for himself in 
an anonymous market whose dominating forces he was ill-put to under-
stand and with whose intricacies he was not able to cope.”85 Despite 
these Dominion-wide efforts at rationalizing the labour market for the 
benefit of both employers and workers (by 1919, according to Struthers, 
there were eighty-eight employment offices across the country), respon-
sibility for unemployment relief remained in municipal hands.86 As the 
nation slid into recession, showing alarmingly high unemployment rates 
by the winter of 1920, the ESC lost much of its relevance. Through its 
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labour exchanges and employment offices, it could bring employers who 
needed workers and workers who needed jobs together, but it could not 
create new jobs. By February 1921, roughly a quarter of a million men 
were unemployed, representing 12 percent of the labour force.87
Through the recession of the early 1920s, city officials in Edmonton, 
Saskatoon, and Winnipeg recognized an emerging unemployment prob-
lem caused by generally depressed conditions. That recession offers a 
useful illustration of how relief officials responded to unemployment 
before the Depression. In Winnipeg, authorities established a special 
Emergency Unemployment Relief Office staffed by ten people: a super-
intendent, four clerks, and five investigators who issued meal tickets, 
arranged for work at the city’s wood yard, and provided sleeping accom-
modation at the city’s Immigration Hall.88 The staff members, mostly 
drawn from the ranks of the unemployed, were not experienced welfare 
workers. Still, according to Winnipeg’s emergency relief superintendent 
in 1922, they “showed exceptional tact and ability and an utter disregard 
for what constituted a working day,” working long hard hours process-
ing as many as five hundred applicants per day. By the end of May 1922, 
when Winnipeg’s emergency relief scheme ended, it had helped 12,680 
men, women, and children.89 As in Edmonton and Saskatoon, however, 
Winnipeg’s emergency relief schemes operated only between November 
and May of any year in which policy-makers perceived an unemploy-
ment problem. This meant that whatever limited unemployment relief 
the jobless might access during the winter months became unavailable 
between May and October, mainly because policy-makers assumed that 
those unable to find work in the winter could easily find it on surround-
ing farms during the summer and autumn months.
The urban emergency relief measures clearly emphasized the 
work ethic. Saskatoon, for instance, made arrangements with the fed-
eral and provincial governments to provide $4,500 worth of relief work 
over the winter of 1920–21.90 Unemployed men laboured at such jobs as 
street sweeping, snow shovelling, brush work, and infrastructure repairs 
supervised by the city’s engineering department. Winnipeg required 
unemployed men to work for their relief at the city’s wood yard, quar-
ries, sewers, pipelines, and street commissioner’s department.91 During 
 The Rise of the City Relief Machines 41
the much more severe winter of 1921–22, Edmonton, with the help of the 
provincial and federal governments, made nearly $45,000 worth of work 
relief available to some 450 unemployed men.92 Edmonton’s unemploy-
ment relief body, the Public Welfare Board, comprised one municipal 
alderman, a provincial member of the legislative assembly, and two 
prominent citizens. Through its years of operation, dating at least as far 
back as before the Great War and lasting into the early 1920s, the board 
oversaw the movement of single men to lumber camps during the late 
autumn and winter, received delegations of unemployed groups bearing 
complaints, and coordinated public works relief with the city’s engineer-
ing department.
The insistence on exchanging work for relief was not new. As 
we have seen, its roots stretch back to the development of workhouses 
and houses of industry in Britain beginning in the seventeenth century. 
Work relief would, many believed, discourage people from seeking aid 
if they could get along without it. This was most evident in the prin-
ciple of “less eligibility,” which would reverberate through subsequent 
decades, right down to the eve of the Depression.93 As the British Poor 
Law Amendment Act of 1834 stated, the “first and most essential” charac-
teristic of all relief provided to the able-bodied was to ensure that their 
“situation on the whole shall not be made really or apparently so eligi-
ble as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest class.”94 
Work relief would also, it was thought, ward off the moral degeneration 
that many believed resulted from poverty and shiftless behaviour. A cor-
responding belief was that relief actually contributed to pauperism. As 
British historian Lynn MacKay writes of poor relief in early nineteenth-
century Britain, “Many in the upper classes believed that it undermined 
initiative and the willingness to work hard, that it bred dependency, and 
that these moral failings were largely the cause of the ever-escalating 
levels of poor relief.”95 These ideas remained largely unchanged more 
than one hundred years later. “The method of relief without work has 
had a damning effect upon men who have come under my personal 
and intimate knowledge,” Winnipeg’s emergency relief superintendent 
warned in May 1922. “There is distinctly evident a complete change in 
the attitude of those applying for relief. During the past three years, this 
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has developed from bashful inquiry, to confident expectation, and finally 
to belligerent demand with the avowed intention on the part of a too 
large minority to secure, by misrepresentation if necessary, every possible 
nickel’s worth of relief.”96
THE GREAT DEpRESSION AND ITS 
pREDECESSORS
In the second half of the 1920s, with the return of moderate prosper-
ity, seasonal emergency unemployment relief largely disappeared from 
Prairie cities. It was not until the early winter of 1929–30 that these 
urban centres once again faced emerging unemployment problems. 
The severity of the Great Depression set it apart from previous reces-
sions. In Winnipeg alone, relief schemes from the early 1920s typically 
aided twelve thousand people over the course of an entire winter. In the 
early 1930s, that city aided more than three times that number over the 
course of just one month.97 Just as dramatic was the rise in relief cases 
from 1928 (a non-recession year) to 1929. In Saskatoon, for example, 
twice as many families sought relief in December 1929 as had during 
the same month one year before.98 Furthermore, the recorded number 
of families on relief often disguised a much larger unemployment 
problem simmering just below the surface. Saskatoon’s chief engineer, 
for example, warned the city commissioner on 24 December 1929 that 
many more families were facing hard times but had not yet applied for 
relief.99 With at least four months of winter ahead, the unemployment 
situation seemed unlikely to improve before spring, when private con-
struction firms typically began their work season. A little more than 
one month later, Saskatoon’s local situation more than confirmed the 
engineer’s prediction: by the end of January 1930, the number of job-
less married men on city relief in Saskatoon, a city of only forty-one 
thousand, had shot to more than nine hundred.100 If single men had 
been counted, the number would have been much higher.101
Similar early warning signs appeared in Winnipeg and 
Edmonton. Through all of 1928, less than four hundred married men 
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out of a total Winnipeg population of 175,000 sought relief from the 
city. The following year, that number dropped to less than three hun-
dred. By the end of February 1930, however, it had jumped to 1,306, 
twice the number of the previous two years combined—and that only 
two months into the year.102 This dire situation was compounded by 
the nearly two thousand single men unemployed and seeking relief 
from the city. Municipal relief expenditures told an equally worri-
some tale. Edmonton’s relief costs increased steadily through the first 
few months of 1930, from $400 per day in early January, to $600 per 
day in February, and then to $800 in March.103 An exasperated Mayor 
Douglas, nearing the end of his rope, pointed out in late March that 
“it is practically impossible for the city to continue with the present 
relief scheme much longer. It is costing us about 900 dollars a day.”104 
Translated into annual expenditures, this would account for nearly 15 
percent of the city’s total annual budget.105
Figures such as these set cities like Edmonton, Saskatoon, and 
Winnipeg within a larger unemployment-related crisis emerging 
throughout the industrial world. Its effects were uneven, its causes com-
plicated, but what is certain is that Canada was especially hard hit. Its 
close economic ties to the United States brought the Canadian economy 
down swiftly after the stock market crash in New York in October 1929. 
Thereafter, with the general deterioration of industrial economies world-
wide, together with the debasing of export markets for its staple goods, 
Canada’s economy suffered further erosion. Finally, high tariff barriers 
such as the Smoot-Hawley tariff in the United States all but stopped 
Canadian exports to the United States. Within Canada, the Depression’s 
effects were likewise uneven. While its human costs are difficult to meas-
ure, historians have suggested that people working in unskilled and 
semi-skilled trades, as well as people relying on export staples for their 
livelihood, suffered most.106 By 1933, some 30 percent of the nation’s 
entire workforce was unemployed, but unemployment did not hit all 
regions with the same force. The Depression hit the Prairie provinces 
harder than it did other regions of the country. Between 1929 and 1933, 
per capita incomes in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba fell further 
than incomes in any other province (see table 1). 
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Part of the reason for this was the near total collapse of the agricul-
tural economy in the southern plains belt. A combination of oversupply 
and low demand caused wheat prices to plunge from $1.24 per bushel in 
1929 to just $0.34 per bushel in 1932. As if that were not enough, western 
farmers faced unprecedented crop destruction. In 1931, grasshoppers, saw-
flies, and gophers devoured their crops. What little wheat remained on 
the stalks was subject to the swirling dust storms that carried away top-
soil and crops.107 The disaster besetting Prairie farmers deeply affected 
the cities that provided services to them. As William Cronon effectively 
illustrates with his description of Chicago’s experience in Nature’s 
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, western cities were highly inte-
grated with and dependent on surrounding agricultural production. For 
cities like Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg, therefore, the failure of 
the agricultural economy was devastating. Decreased traffic of goods that 
normally passed through all three cities and on which they depended 
caused unemployment in everything from retail trades, to construc-
tion, to packinghouse work, to the staples handling trades. Winnipeg, 
Saskatoon, and Edmonton had emerged by the 1930s primarily as whole-
saling, distributing, food processing, and service sector centres serving 
Table 1. Average per capita income by province, 1929–30 and 1933
1929–30 1933 % decrease
British Columbia $594 $314 47
Alberta $548 $212 61
Saskatchewan $478 $135 72
Manitoba $466 $240 49
Ontario $549 $310 44
Québec $391 $220 44
Nova Scotia $322 $207 36
New Brunswick $292 $180 39
Prince Edward Island $278 $154 45
SOuRCE: Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 150. 
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regional markets that depended in large measure on wheat farming. 
Manufacturing in Edmonton and Saskatoon was geared mainly toward 
supplying light industrial goods for regional (mostly mixed-farming 
agricultural) needs.108
Only Winnipeg had developed any significant export manufac-
turing, but even this was no match for the Depression and the city’s 
reliance on wheat, a fact that city authorities ruefully acknowledged. 
“Though her more statesmenlike leaders for years had impressed upon 
the West, the danger of building so great a social structure upon wheat 
alone,” Winnipeg officials claimed, “their counsels were submerged in 
the constant flow of ‘easy money’ in a prosperous world wheat market.” 
That easy money—charming, almost blinding in good times—disap-
peared fast in bad times, leaving unfulfilled promises and disaster in its 
wake. “The world collapse of wheat prices, and recurring crop failures 
in such a large area of the West have therefore ‘hit’ Winnipeg harder 
than any other of Canada’s larger cities,” city officials asserted.109 It was 
a problem that they believed peculiarly afflicted western cities: “Such 
rapid growth, dependent so largely on good grain crops, and a good 
world price, has meant recurrent periods of prosperity and recession.” 
And the city’s “very large Labor Market” made it “the focal point to 
which men and women drift in periods of unemployment.” Municipal 
authorities further pointed out that the “climatic conditions” of south-
ern Manitoba made Winnipeg’s unemployment problems worse than 
those of large centres to the east because poor agricultural seasons drew 
farm labourers to the city seeking work.110
It was more than just increased numbers of people seeking relief 
that differentiated previous recessions from the one confronting city 
authorities in the autumn and early winter of 1929–30. Applicants for 
Depression-related relief were also, at least in the minds of relief policy-
makers, of a different class and character from those in the past. These 
were not the sorts of relief cases municipal authorities and private 
charitable organizations had grown accustomed to through their cities’ 
booms and busts, and through war years and postwar years: these were 
not the widows, the unemployable, the aged, and the disabled—in short, 
the anomalous but seemingly inevitable poor in any industrial society. 
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Instead, they were mostly families and individuals who, in normal eco-
nomic times, had typically managed to make ends meet one way or 
another on their own and who only sought aid from public relief pro-
grams or private charities when bad times got worse.111 A report on unem-
ployment in Winnipeg produced in late 1932 called these the “thousands 
of citizens who never before had occasion to ask for such assistance but 
who, because of losing their gainful occupations found themselves in 
sore straits.”112 It was primarily to this class that the city relief machines 
turned their attention.
THE CITy RELIEF MACHINES
“Relief Services are, and are designed to be a piece of relief machin-
ery,” wrote the authors of 1934 report on family welfare commissioned 
by the Winnipeg Unemployment Relief Committee.113 Officials in 
Winnipeg drew on the image of the machine not because Winnipeg’s 
relief administration actually ran like one but because city relief policy-
makers wanted people to believe that it did. Neither was the machine 
image meant to evoke notions of bossism or patronage, as it had in 
other historical contexts, such as Boston or Chicago in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century.114 Instead, it emphasized policy-
makers’ own ideals of efficiency and precision. Winnipeg relief officials 
took pains to emphasize that the city’s relief machine “did not func-
tion as part of the Civic Social Welfare Commission at all,” referring 
to the municipal body responsible for non-Depression-related welfare 
services.115 Each city created a special name for its unemployment relief 
delivery system to distinguish it from other welfare services offering 
aid to the urban poor. These relief systems employed their own staffs, 
answered directly to city council or to city council-appointed boards, 
and drew funding entirely from public sources.
In Winnipeg, relief officials called their machine the Civic 
Unemployment Relief Committee (CuRC). Appointed by city coun-
cil, the committee consisted of six aldermen, the mayor, the provin-
cial deputy minister of Labour, and Manitoba’s superintendent of the 
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Employment Service of Canada. Sitting as an observer was a representa-
tive of the federal government. The CuRC was “entrusted with the entire 
administration of family unemployment relief in and for Winnipeg.” It 
maintained its own headquarters and offices, first at the city’s wood yard 
and later in St. Boniface near the Assiniboine River. By the spring of 1932, 
the CuRC was responsible for 8,100 families, as well as a number of single 
men and women, totalling roughly 37,000 people and costing $3.5 mil-
lion each year.116 The numbers even surprised Winnipeg’s relief officials. 
“Who would suggest, a few years ago, that it would be necessary to keep 
5,000 single men in Winnipeg by opening dining halls and giving them 
two meals per day?” a report on unemployment relief asked at the time. 
“Out of a total [provincial] population of 699,841, Winnipeg City has 
over 37,000 individuals supported by direct relief.”117
The unemployment relief administrations in Edmonton and 
Saskatoon similarly coalesced into recognizable “machinery” by the early 
1930s. The City of Edmonton developed the Special Relief Department 
as an adjunct to its more general Relief Department.118 The two depart-
ments operated out of separate offices and with separate staffs, though 
both answered to the city commissioners directly and exclusively.119 On 
a per capita basis, Edmonton’s Special Relief Department compared 
roughly with Winnipeg’s Civic Unemployment Relief Committee, deal-
ing with, on average, approximately 2,200 families each month during 
the winter of 1932.120 The department employed thirty-nine full-time 
people at a cost of nearly $40,000 per year in wages.121 In Saskatoon, the 
city council alone made unemployment relief policy and addressed any 
problems directly through a special standing committee formed in early 
1930. This lasted until early October 1932, after which the city council 
delegated all relief business to a new Civic Relief Board consisting of six 
members of the business community together with the city’s mayor. In 
1934, however, the Civic Relief Board reverted back to city council con-
trol after the board proved extraordinarily unpopular among the unem-
ployed.122 In November 1932, after the Civic Relief Board had begun its 
work, a typical week involved taking care of 1,270 families at an approx-
imate cost of nearly $10,000. The costs included groceries, milk, meat, 
bread, water, fuel, wages for relief department workers, and wages paid 
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out to married men working on relief jobs. The average weekly cost per 
family was about $7.25.123
In each North American city, a small group of local politicians 
and city managers held primary responsibility for sketching the broad 
contours of Depression-related city relief: the mayor, aldermen, city 
commissioner, city solicitors, relief officers, and city engineers. American 
historian Jonathan Teaford, writing in the context of general city admin-
istration in the United States, calls these the “technical experts vital to 
day-to-day operations.”124 When it came to operating the day-to-day busi-
ness of administering and delivering relief in Edmonton, Saskatoon, 
and Winnipeg, the activities of these so-called experts, primarily men, 
were critical. The mayors and aldermen, together with the various board 
members drawn from the community, formulated local relief policy. The 
city commissioners acted as liaisons among the various city departments 
involved in local relief administration and advised the mayors and the 
city councils. The city solicitors made all legal arrangements for raising 
money, passing bylaws, and corresponding with ratepayers associations 
and municipal boards. The relief officers ran the relief departments 
according to instructions from relief policy-makers. The city engineers 
advised on potential public works and, together with contractors and 
occasional outside advisers, organized all work relief programs carried 
on in the cities.
The three cities’ relief machines operated in similar ways, distrib-
uting relief, organizing work relief schemes, and coordinating financ-
ing arrangements with the province and the federal government. In 
Winnipeg, applicants for relief applied at the CuRC offices and stated 
their requirements. Staff then made a record of the application, and 
investigators “endeavoured to satisfy themselves as to the bona fides of 
the applicant and his needs.” Where investigators recommended relief, 
officials in the committee offices gave the applicant coupons, each having 
a fixed value for the purchase of specific relief articles, depending on his 
needs as decided by relief officials. The coupons could then be exchanged 
for goods at “any one of several designated stores.” The merchant supply-
ing the goods “then presented the coupon to the proper civic authority 
and it was redeemed in cash.”125 Work relief was likewise organized out 
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of the committee offices, where men were required to report for their 
instructions. They were inspected and, if deemed suitable for work, given 
a work card and told where and when to report on various work schemes 
in operation at the time of application.
Saskatoon’s relief machine shared many of these practices. 
Applicants there visited special relief offices, stated their needs, and signed 
a relief card. Investigators then inquired after their bona fides, measured 
these against the applicant’s statements, and, if everything checked out, 
recommended a course of relief allocation and work assignment. After 
October 1932, when relief administration in Saskatoon passed from the 
city council’s standing committee on unemployment to the Civic Relief 
Board, the board itself dealt with questions of relief policy and made 
decisions on individual applicant cases brought before it by investigators 
from the investigation branch. The Civic Relief Board met each weekday 
to hear all questions in camera, refusing in all but the rarest cases to host 
delegations of the unemployed directly and allowing no appeal process 
to its final decisions.126
Like relief practices in Winnipeg and Saskatoon, Edmonton’s 
Special Relief Department made no effort to seek out needy cases, instead 
expecting the unemployed to make application for relief of their own 
accord.127 When an applicant arrived at the department offices, an offi-
cial commissioner took an affidavit, made out an identification card, and 
gave it to the applicant. The identification card thereafter acted “as a pass-
port in the Department,” ensuring smooth delivery of services, according 
to the department’s director. Once the applicant had left the department 
offices, his affidavit went to an investigation branch for processing.128 
There, an investigator was assigned to the case. The investigator would 
take the affidavit, make some inquiries into the applicant’s situation, and 
then report to the chief inspector and recommend whether or not the 
applicant’s case qualified for city relief. The final decision was left to the 
chief inspector, who determined “on behalf of the City, whether the case 
is worthy of relief or not.”129 If everything checked out, the department 
informed the applicant that the case was successful, and relief “in accord-
ance with the [relief] schedule” was administered. Thereafter, investiga-
tors—each of whom was assigned one territory “so that they become 
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familiar with all the avenues of information in that district”—called on 
each relief case at his or her home at least once every three months. Work 
relief instructions, if work was available, were issued “as the men come 
for relief and as their turn falls due.” If the department refused the appli-
cation, the applicant had recourse to an appeals process of sorts: the same 
officers who recommended refusal the first time were again assigned the 
case and asked to review their earlier decision. If the officers stood by 
their initial recommendation, the department’s director made the final 
decision, although dissatisfied applicants did have one final recourse: to 
appeal directly to the city commissioners or the city council itself.
STRIKING A BALANCE AMONG IDEOLOGIES
In general, relief officials based many of their policies on a blend of 
what they viewed as “hard economics” and the particular moral and 
social order they wanted their relief policies to promote. The ideo-
logical currents that influenced local policy-makers imposed certain 
constraints—both ideological and practical—on their work through 
the early 1930s. State theorists have, since the early 1960s, developed 
a number of theories of state dynamics in an effort to explain why 
governments and policy-makers act as they do under various circum-
stances. Among the earliest of these theories are those of the New 
Left historians Gabriel Kolko and James Weinstein, both of whom 
describe the development of what they refer to as a “corporate lib-
eral” state dynamic that animated much of late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century political policy-making.130 According to Kolko and 
Weinstein, economic elites dominated state (including local) policy 
making, accepting and even sometimes initiating state intervention in 
the economy, including welfare policies. They did this either because 
such intervention was in capital’s long-term interests or because 
it helped maintain the status quo in the face of challenges to their 
economic dominance. In the context of Prairie cities in the 1930s, the 
economic devastation of the Depression certainly qualified as a signifi-
cant threat to the power of economic elites, and the response of city 
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governments to the Depression—namely, the creation of bureaucratic 
mechanisms to administer unemployment relief—looks like an effort 
to maintain the status quo. Yet, as later social scientists observed, the 
corporate liberal model depends on some questionable assumptions. 
First, it assumes that economic elites consistently act in unified, meas-
ured, and thoughtful ways. As we shall see in the following chapter, 
at least at the local level, this was not the case. Business owners, from 
those involved in the building trades to neighbourhood retailers, acted 
in anything but a unified manner. Second, the model overstates the 
degree to which economic elites are able to dictate policy decisions. 
City politics in Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg did reflect a 
strong representation from the business community (in the form of 
Edmonton’s Civic Government Association or Winnipeg’s Citizens’ 
Committee, for example, both of which billed themselves as primarily 
pro-business). Yet city councils in those cities also included members 
who were pro-labour or who were independents, and these members 
must have exerted a countervailing influence.131 The fact remains, how-
ever, that city relief policies, as illustrated in the following chapters, did 
tend to favour the status quo, and that status quo tended to favour the 
capitalist system as a whole.
Another theory—referred to as hegemonic competition—con-
tends that the capitalist state maintains, of necessity, a position autono-
mous from business elites, allowing it to mediate between society’s com-
peting economic interests, both between and within classes.132 The state, 
according to this theory, is beholden neither to the various segments 
within the dominant capitalist class nor to the dominated non-capitalist 
classes. Instead, it occupies a moderating role and seeks to lessen capital-
ism’s inherent contradictions by mediating between (and among) major 
corporate interests and smaller competitive-sector corporations, on the 
one hand, and working-class interests, on the other. Yet, as with the cor-
porate liberal theory of state, the hegemonic competition theory relies 
on the assumption that one entity—in this case, the state itself—retains a 
consciousness of its role in capitalist society and works to mute perceiv-
able contradictions as that society relates to its constituent parts. Again, 
in the context of local government operations in Canadian Prairie cities, 
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this is doubtful. The city relief machines—and the policy-makers who 
created them—operated under an array of constraints, including fed-
eral and provincial strictures, larger inherited societal assumptions and 
biases, and economic realities. Taken together, these constraints—all out-
side of direct relations with the business community—make it unlikely 
that local governments had anything more on their agendas than getting 
their cities through the crisis intact; performing any explicit mediating 
role among economic classes was probably far from their minds. Still, the 
actual operation of the city relief machines, and especially the attempts 
of the policy-makers to measure business interests against the interests 
of the unemployed, appears to follow the theory (even if the theory does 
not necessarily follow the reality).
A third perspective on the role of the state, developed by Theda 
Skocpol and Fred Block, is state autonomy theory, which regards the state 
as an independent agent, capable of pursuing its own agenda regardless 
of the demands of specific social and economic interests. Assuming that 
the state is concerned with the long-term survival of capitalism, as is gen-
erally the case in industrialized Western nations, it will naturally tend to 
create policies to further this goal. For its part, the business community 
shares the state’s investment in the fundamental structures of capitalism; 
however, businesses (no matter what their size) are focused almost exclu-
sively on the growth of short-term profit. According to this theory, then, 
during the Depression years, the autonomy of the US government ena-
bled it to implement New Deal policies—policies that it believed to be 
in the best interests of capitalism’s survival in the longer term—despite 
considerable opposition from the business sector.133 How closely did the 
city relief machines cooperate in the effort to safeguard the capitalist 
order? Given the manner in which these machines operated, it appears 
that, on balance, policy-makers shared a bias toward the status quo. In 
most instances, their efforts to address unemployment and provide relief 
were grounded in the conceptual assumptions of their nineteenth-cen-
tury forebears. These included a preference for work relief over a system 
of “doles,” so as to reinforce the work ethic, the use of the principle of 
less eligibility to discourage any but the “genuinely” poor from seeking 
relief, and the concomitant desire to avoid creating welfare dependence. 
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In this sense, the relief officials might properly be conceived of as “hold-
ing down the fort” during capitalism’s greatest crisis. Whether they were 
engaged in a thoughtful and sustained effort to protect capitalism behind 
the shield of their relief policies, though, is less clear.
Skocpol and other state autonomy theorists later modified their 
ideas, arguing for a more pluralistic approach to state development and 
taking account of different institutions and interests in the fashioning of 
public policy.134 For Skocpol, paramount to understanding federal wel-
fare policy development is an examination of state structures, political 
culture, and organized politics, as well as of wider societal interests and 
their perceptions, suggestions, and complaints about the emerging wel-
fare state.135 This appears to explain how relief officials developed relief 
policy at the local level: they believed that helping business through 
hard times was important, but, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, 
they also routinely took account of the interests and views of the com-
munity, the unemployed, professional bodies, and private citizens.
One final critical perspective that helps to explain how Prairie 
cities (and cities more generally) functioned is the theory of city boos-
terism. Donald Wetherell defines “boosterism” as “the promotion and 
encouragement at the local level of social cohesion and purpose around 
the goal of economic growth.”136 Scholars exploring the development of 
a local, regional, or even national ethos through the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries argue that the booster mentality served several 
important purposes. By appealing to broad and often vague notions 
of the common interest, city elites attempted both to draw business 
and industry to their cities and to dampen ethnic, class, and gender 
tensions. Indeed, efforts to draw people and industry to their cities, 
and especially to create environments friendly to potential newcomers 
and industries, were among the top priorities of city councils. In their 
view, what was good for the city economically was good for the city 
more generally. In Prairie cities, real estate dealers, the local business 
elite and the media, and city councils together developed a powerful 
ideology that emphasized the common sense of shared interests. And 
this ideology, although most certainly not reflective of societal divi-
sions, nevertheless informed relief policy-makers’ approaches to welfare 
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programs. In the final analysis, the city relief machines operated in accord-
ance with many of the same ideological assumptions that had governed 
other welfare initiatives in the past, assumptions that were fed in part by 
city officials’ fears of a deteriorating work ethic and welfare dependence 
among recipients. Officials in Winnipeg, for instance, assessed the “social 
implications” of relief, pointing to a “dependency problem” among recipi-
ents and to a “blunting of personal initiative and to the mental attitude 
that they do not need to worry since they are bound to be cared for.”137
The publicly funded and municipally controlled city relief 
machines by no means displaced or replaced private or public/private 
charities and welfare services. Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg, like 
other urban centres, sported all manner of charities offering aid to the 
urban poor, from the secular to the religious, and everything in between. 
Winnipeg had thirty-seven different private welfare bodies operating 
through this period; Edmonton had at least thirty-two, including the 
Salvation Army, the Canteen Club, the Canadian Legion, the Canadian 
Red Cross, the Edmonton Bulletin’s “Not Forgotten Fund,” the Edmonton 
Journal’s “Sunshine Fund,” the Elks, the Royal Society of St. George, the 
Order of the Royal Purple, and various churches. These private charities 
persisted into the 1930s, becoming increasingly integrated into sociolo-
gist Mariana Valverde’s “mixed social economy,” which was marked by a 
collaborative public/private effort at welfare financing, service delivery, 
inspection, and regulation. As early as 1913 in Winnipeg, for instance, 
all charities seeking public funds to support their activities were made 
to undergo “examination of their bona fides and characters” by a civic 
charities endorsement bureau run by the city council. The endorsement 
bureau further required every charity to show that it had “responsible 
and satisfactory local management,” that its administrative body met at 
least four times per year, and that it was “rendering services commensu-
rate with the money expended.”138
In short, the city relief machines were not simply a part of broader 
and ongoing local welfare systems. Instead, they addressed only those 
unemployment cases directly caused by the Depression, leaving more 
general, chronic welfare problems to existing relief organizations, pri-
vate charitable bodies, and churches. Illustrating this distinction was 
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the fact that each city’s relief machinery operated out of offices separate 
from other, more general welfare departments such as aid programs for 
unwed mothers, abandoned children, the aged, and the infirm. City relief 
machines also employed their own staffs, answered directly to city coun-
cil, and drew funding entirely from public sources. The relief machine’s 
main job was to provide unemployed single men and unemployed mar-
ried men and their families with what city officials considered basic 
necessities—clothing, shelter, fuel, food, and, more rarely, cash—and 
only for so long as the Depression was causing the unemployment. 
Relief machines were also charged with organizing and carrying out 
work relief programs designed to provide unemployed men with work 
on public buildings and bridges, sidewalk and sewer works, and other 
odd jobs such as street sweeping and snow shovelling.139 Finally, the 
relief machines coordinated their responses to unemployment-related 
problems with provincial and federal relief efforts. This made economic 
sense because, beginning in the summer of 1930, municipal relief was 
funded through legislative arrangements with the provincial and federal 
governments, each typically funding one-third of direct relief costs and 
sharing various proportions of work relief costs. The city relief machines 
did not, of course, appear from nowhere fully formed and functioning. 
Instead, relief efforts meandered along in an ad hoc fashion, with city 
councils and city commissioners making policy decisions only as situa-
tions required. In subsequent chapters, I explore more fully the machines’ 
operations and argue that, despite Winnipeg officials’ insistence that 
their “general plan, set-up and operation .  .  . appeared to operate with 




The Anatomy of  
City Relief
In general, policy-makers’ class and gender assumptions flowed from 
and favoured a capitalist and patriarchal society. But, as historian Linda 
Gordon argues in the American context, their goals were “fragmented 
and inconsistent.” Most welfare policies, Gordon insists, “represent the 
jerry-built compromises which are the artefacts of political and social 
conflict.”1 Depression-era welfare policies were not simply imposed 
from above by a ruling elite and accepted without question or com-
plaint by those below; they were compromises fashioned through 
complex arrangements among different interests. The character of the 
city relief machines was likewise influenced and directed both by 
policy-makers, with their “fragmented and inconsistent” goals, and by 
external forces, including the senior levels of government, local busi-
ness interests, community groups, and the unemployed themselves. 
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All of these elements of urban Prairie society affected, in various ways, 
the functioning of the relief systems by attempting to bend them to 
their own advantage. Yet in the end, the city relief machines main-
tained considerable control over both the direction and the charac-
ter of unemployment relief in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and Edmonton. 
External forces were able to stretch and strain and bend them, but the 
machines’ basic features as constructed by city policy-makers remained 
intact.
That relief and welfare administrations of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century were gendered is well known. Historians like 
Theresa Healey, Alice Kessler-Harris, Nancy Christie, and Linda Gordon 
have shown how welfare policies, in particular, as well as efforts to deal 
with unemployment and poverty more generally, distinguished between 
male and female recipients.2 But relief systems also categorized men. The 
city relief machines studied here employed qualitatively different relief 
policies for single and married men, revealing a deeper layer of the gen-
dered welfare system. This distinction illustrates the different ways in 
which policy-makers imagined the jobless man. The unemployed mar-
ried man represented stability, maturity, and responsibility, and he tended 
to move in more or less the same circles as he had when employed. The 
unemployed single man, in contrast, represented shiftlessness, youthful-
ness, and potential danger; he was restless—riding the rods, living in 
makeshift jungles, or begging on back doorsteps.3
These distinctions—both in how city policy-makers imagined 
married and single men and in how city relief policy was applied to 
them—are characteristic of “two-track” welfare programs, in which dif-
ferent welfare policies and practices are applied to different categories of 
recipients.4 According to Linda Gordon’s explanation of the two-track 
system in the United States from 1890 to 1935, the first track included 
old age pensions and unemployment insurance programs that “dispro-
portionately serve white men” and were less stigmatizing and more 
generous than second-track programs. Second-track programs, made 
available to women and minority men, followed more closely the old 
British Poor Laws tradition of stigmatization and low stipends that keep 
“recipients below the poverty line and are not designed to allow them to 
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attain a respectable working-class standard of living.”5 Suzanne Mettler 
explores this effect through her analysis of unemployment insurance 
and aid for dependent children during the Depression in the United 
States. Unemployment insurance grew ever more “fortified and elevated” 
and eventually “became regarded as an earned ‘right.’” Aid for depend-
ent children, primarily aimed at helping single mothers and children, 
in contrast, “became stigmatized as it grew to resemble the sort of ‘relief’ 
programs its framers had tried to avoid.”6 In similar ways, and as we shall 
see below, the relief that city relief machines offered to married men 
tended to be more generous and less stigmatizing than that offered to 
single men. Married men’s relief was explicitly set up to help them main-
tain their self-respect and pride. When it came to single unemployed 
men, the city relief machines were more concerned with the potential 
danger and disorder, as well as the “wasted youth,” that they represented, 
and the relief policies reflected this concern.
ACCESSING RELIEF:  
THE RESIDENCE REquIREMENT
One of the first and most important policy problems the city relief 
machines had to contend with was deciding who was entitled to relief. 
City governments soon discovered the difficulties in determining who 
among the unemployed were city residents, and therefore entitled to 
city relief, and who were not. Ambrose Bury, a Conservative Mp repre-
senting Edmonton-East and the former mayor of Edmonton, put his 
finger on the nub of the problem. “In the case of unemployment the 
chief factor is the drift of the unemployed from municipality to munic-
ipality and from province to province,” he pointed out in December 
1929. “And neither the municipalities nor the provinces have any power 
to prevent this movement.”7 Bury set the migration problem squarely 
at the feet of the federal Liberal administration’s immigration policy 
of the 1920s. “So long as the immigration laws and procedure are exclu-
sively matters of federal control and neither the provinces nor the 
municipalities have any power over the volume or quality of the tide 
60 The Wages of Relief
of immigration coming into the country and no power over the move-
ments of immigrants once they are in the country,” he charged, “it is in 
my judgement illogical unreasonable and dead against facts to say the 
matter is entirely one for the municipalities and provinces.”8
In order to deal with the problem, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and 
Winnipeg, collaborating with their respective provinces, insisted on a 
residence requirement. Alderman Hair in Saskatoon, speaking to the 
Lion’s Club in late 1929, asserted that the city would not consider as a 
resident anyone who had been in the city less than six months.9 Shortly 
thereafter, with the Depression growing worse and the relief applications 
increasing, Edmonton and Winnipeg lengthened their residence require-
ments to one year.10 In establishing residence requirements, city relief 
policy-makers were drawing on a history of relief practice going back at 
least as far as the first Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601. At that time, England 
introduced a parish-based relief system supported by public taxes to deal 
with the extreme poverty in some quarters. The Poor Law commissioners 
believed that establishing residence in the parish before accessing relief 
was crucial to maintaining the integrity of the relief system. Without 
a proof-of-residence requirement, nothing could stop recipients from 
receiving relief from several parishes at once.11 Such a policy was simi-
larly critical to Depression-era cities with tight budgets and spiralling 
relief costs. “We cannot take care of [migrants]; we are financially unable,” 
Edmonton’s Mayor Douglas flatly reported to Premier John Brownlee 
in the spring of 1931.12 The hard rule was that non-residents could not 
expect relief in Edmonton, Saskatoon, or Winnipeg.
But a residence requirement could hardly stop unemployed 
migrants from seeking relief from western cities. Regardless of the strate-
gies that city administrations used to discourage destitute families and 
individuals from entering their cities, the people kept coming and, more 
importantly, seeking relief. Responding in December 1930 to repeated 
complaints from Mayor Douglas about migrants, Premier Brownlee 
suggested that “some very drastic affidavit be drafted as to where these 
people have been in the last year so that action can be taken against any 
who falsely register as residents of the City of Edmonton.”13 Whatever 
the outcome of the premier’s suggestion, the situation had changed little 
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by the following summer. “Whenever the notion gets into the minds of 
some of these people that they are going to get something to eat,” Mayor 
Douglas reported in 1931, “they stick with it and become our residents 
mighty quick.” Migrants, he wrote, were a “national problem. It is not 
the fault of the City of Edmonton . . . that these people are destitute at 
the present time, and I am quite convinced that we have been paying for 
people, all last winter, that were not our charges.”14
Although residence requirements did not discriminate among 
single or married, male or female applicants, city authorities were 
much more likely to encounter single male migrants than single female 
or family migrants. A typical case was that of a man recently arrived 
in Edmonton from Calgary “with no fixed abode and penniless.” The 
city relief office refused to support the twenty-nine-year-old, pointing 
out that “we meet with innumerate cases just like this.”15 This story was 
repeated on a much broader scale. In 1930, Winnipeg refused relief to 
some 10 percent of all single male relief applicants under its residence 
ruling.16 Early in 1931, Edmonton relief investigator Harold Gutteridge 
reported to the city commissioner that of a hundred single men living 
in boxcars at the edge of town whom he had recently interviewed, only 
twenty-seven could “claim some semblance of city residence.” Of these, 
Gutteridge wrote, “there are five men who satisfy me that they are bona 
fide city residents.”17 Edmonton’s city commissioner, David Mitchell, was 
convinced that “a very large percentage of single men making applica-
tion for relief were not the city’s responsibility.”18 The city’s comptroller 
agreed, estimating in January 1931 that as many as “twenty percent of 
single men applying for relief produced residence qualifications which 
would not be substantiated upon investigation.”19 In December, Daniel 
Knott, the mayor of Edmonton, wrote Premier Brownlee insisting that 
of the twenty-four hundred single unemployed men who had congre-
gated in the city, fully half were non-residents and therefore not his 
city’s responsibility.20 In Saskatoon, city officials faced the same prob-
lem. Residence requirements could not keep single men from migrating 
into the city, especially at the close of harvest season. “It is very clear,” the 
mayor wrote to prospective aldermen just before municipal elections in 
November 1930, “that single men are starting to flock into Saskatoon and 
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it is also very evident that there are agitators of the worst type trying to 
create trouble amongst the single men.”21
The approach to the much rarer migrant family was different. 
In Saskatoon, for instance, the provincial government agreed to pay all 
relief costs for migrant families that met certain provincial specifications, 
provided that the city administer the relief “on exactly the same condi-
tions as your board would administer relief to a resident family similarly 
situated.” Saskatoon’s Civic Relief Board had “authority not only to deter-
mine the amount and kind of relief to be given to the family, but also 
whether any steps might be taken to get the family off relief by returning 
them to their place of domicile in any other way usually adopted by your 
board in the treatment of relief cases.”22 One family from Fish Creek, 
well to the northeast of Saskatoon, applied for city relief after only two 
months’ residence. The Civic Relief Board granted the family temporary 
relief while it tried to get them back to Fish Creek.23 A Cree family from 
the much closer municipality of Cory, located just outside the city’s west-
ern limits was, however, refused outright on the grounds that they were 
not city residents. A city relief investigator located the family’s tent “after 
considerable difficulty” and “explained through an interpreter to [them] 
that the City could do nothing for residents of Cory,” advising them to 
contact officials of that district instead.24 Edmonton likewise treated 
migrant families differently from migrant single men. The city relief 
officer reported to Mayor Knott early in 1932, “Owing to the disorganized 
state of the country districts where little, if any, sympathy is extended to 
necessitous families, they are obliged to come to the City.” Edmonton, 
together with the province and the federal government, paid for their 
relief.25 Apparently, migrants occasionally had help in making the move 
from one city to another. Regina, city officials in Saskatoon complained 
to Premier Anderson, had paid some of its own residents enough money 
to allow them to live in Saskatoon for six months. At the end of the six 
months, and much to the chagrin of Saskatoon relief officials, the newly 
minted Saskatoon residents applied for relief in “their” city.26
City officials in all three cities were convinced that a good 
number of the migrants fell into the particularly vexing category of the 
“foreigner.”27 How cities determined what constituted a “foreigner” was 
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never exactly clear, but relief policies typically attached a longer resi-
dence requirement to them than to “non-foreigners.”28 Most cities, for 
example, insisted that this class of relief applicant show residence in the 
city for at least two years.29 Edmonton’s mayor in 1931 had his own ideas 
on how to deal with the problem. “The great bulk of these fellows who 
are demanding food to-day are foreigners,” he pointed out to Premier 
John Brownlee, “and I can see no remedy for it whatever, except to 
deport them.”30 The province’s Department of Municipal Affairs agreed 
with the mayor’s assessment. “Aliens in the Province are receiving relief 
on the same basis as Canadians,” one department member wrote in a 
memo to the province’s relief committee in June 1931. Their numbers, 
he warned, “provide our agitators with a following making unreasonable 
demands on the municipal and the provincial governments. They do not 
hesitate to express their desire to institute Soviet rule.” The department 
counselled deportation.31 Officials in Saskatoon insisted that all recent 
immigrants applying for city relief “sign forms agreeing to deportation 
before giving them relief.”32 Manitoba’s Public Works minister informed 
the federal Labour minister in 1930 that Winnipeg was “carrying a very 
large share of the burden of the immigrants who are not established and 
there is probably some justification for the feeling that local authorities 
are already carrying too large a share of the expenditure.”33 Winnipeg’s 
mayor, Ralph Webb, was already “conducting some negotiations with 
the Hon. Minister of Immigration looking towards some solution.”34 
Deportation was at the top of his list. All of this municipal discussion, 
of course, relied entirely on co-operation from the federal government, 
since immigration matters fell exclusively under federal jurisdiction.
Although many counselled deportation in response to the 
“migrant” situation, that solution carried its own problems, at least accord-
ing to Saskatoon’s medical officer in charge of relief cases: “Probably all 
of those deported carry back to the Old Country a bad report, condemn 
Saskatoon, and discourage immigration. The cost of their deportation 
and maintenance is a small part of the damage they do, because harm 
from their unfavourable advertising is a great deal worse. Letters from 
deported persons have been received complaining of their treatment and 
not speaking very favourably of this country.”35 Leaving these migrants in 
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the cities, however, raised other problems. In January 1930, for instance, 
the same medical officer noted that “immigrants form a considerable 
percentage of the unemployed here in winter.” Of 443 unemployed single 
men registered at the end of January, he pointed out, nearly half were 
immigrants. “This is exactly as one would expect,” he suggested. “Persons 
coming from foreign countries, not accustomed to our ways of living 
and working, and in some instances not understanding the language, are 
handicapped to a considerable extent, but it would appear that even after 
the first year a number of these men do not profit by the lessons to be 
learned after a year’s residence in this country.”36 Saskatoon’s city relief 
officer, Frank Rowland, agreed that foreigners behaved differently than 
non-foreigners. Foreigners, whom he described as “people from Central 
Europe and Russia,” were “not interested in farming, preferring the city 
life and the present form of relief.” He also pointed out that 95 percent 
of applicants seeking to take up land as part of a land-settlement scheme 
were Anglo-Saxons: only 5 percent were foreigners. Immigrants were 
“crowding into the city,” he warned, making Saskatoon “more or less their 
headquarters, especially in the winter when employment is scarce.”37
While western city administrations typically refused to accept 
single men who migrated across city borders as legitimate relief recipi-
ents, municipal officials nevertheless often made some small emergency 
relief available to them. These emergency relief programs were designed 
to limit the amount of time that migrants spent in the cities and ulti-
mately to hasten their departure. Migrants were given a few meal tickets 
and perhaps a bed for the night, and then were actively encouraged 
to leave town. In part, this was because municipal authorities were 
anxious about the potential threat to social order of masses of tired, 
hungry, and frustrated single men. “The best possible is being done to 
limit demands,” Edmonton’s relief officer told the city commissioner 
in May 1931, “while at the same time, having due regard to the peace 
and order of our City, which might readily become disturbed due to 
the large number of unemployed in the ranks of the single men, who 
are moving aimlessly about.”38
The practice of offering limited emergency relief was not entirely 
limited to single men. Cities offered some small relief to single migrant 
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women with children, though relief departments considered them nei-
ther a family proper nor a danger to social order. One woman came to 
Saskatoon in October 1932, after her husband died in an accident on 
their farm, which was located near the rural district of Cory, just west 
of Saskatoon. In this case, city officials said nothing about residents of 
Cory being ineligible for help and instead placed her and her nine chil-
dren on weekly relief.39 In an unusual case in November 1932, another 
woman, who had been living on an Alberta farm for the past year and 
a half, returned with her six children to Saskatoon at her own expense 
after her husband died. When she applied for city relief, Saskatoon’s 
Civic Relief Board refused her application, offering only to pay her way 
back to Alberta.40
City relief authorities, though, were typically careful not to 
go too far down the road of offering some small emergency relief to 
unemployed migrants because it could very well have the opposite of 
the intended effect, actually drawing single men into the city. “If Calgary 
and Edmonton keep giving relief to single men, we are going to have 
a problem here,” Edmonton relief officer McKee confided to the city’s 
commissioner. “In order to protect ourselves we are no longer register-
ing single men, but we do still provide transportation if men have a job 
somewhere.”41 Offering overly generous relief to emergency cases, moreo-
ver, sometimes raised the ire of provincial authorities. In 1935, Alberta’s 
superintendent of charity relief, A. A. Mackenzie, told Edmonton’s city 
council, “I would point out that the City granting relief to cases that are 
definitely a responsibility of another district makes it difficult not only 
for this Department but for your city relief. Allowing people to defy con-
stituted authority creates a precedent which is used by the unemployed 
organizations to encourage other people to insist upon relief being given 
irregularly.”42 Alberta’s premier, John Brownlee, reminded the Edmonton 
city council that unemployed workers’ wages “should be kept in line 
with the policy of the Government and other municipalities, otherwise, 
it would lead to difficulties.”43 Just what those difficulties might be, the 
premier did not say, but it seems likely that Brownlee wanted to avoid 
situations where one municipality’s work relief wages were more gener-
ous than another’s because this would draw unemployed men seeking 
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work relief to the city with the highest wages. After all, two years earlier, 
the premier had remarked in a letter to Calgary’s mayor that “there is 
already a great transient movement to and fro from Province to Province 
which will be attracted to any centre seeming to offer special consid-
eration.”44 Manitoba’s minister of Public Works offered the same warn-
ing to city officials in Winnipeg. Writing to the chairman of the Civic 
Unemployment Relief Committee in June 1931, the minister pointed out 
that “it would be very dangerous for us, in Manitoba, to adopt regula-
tions which would be more favourable than in other parts of Canada.”45
With thousands of the unemployed on city relief, some non-
resident applicants inevitably succeeded in accessing relief by lying to 
investigators about the length of time they had been in the city. But 
wherever city officials found evidence of recipients who had “unlawfully 
obtained supplies by misrepresentation,” they took serious action, press-
ing criminal charges with penalties of jail time, fines, or a combination 
of both. In April 1931, for example, Edmonton’s relief officer informed 
the city council that his department had successfully prosecuted two 
men accused of relief fraud. One man was sentenced to three months in 
prison and ordered to return the $32 he had received in relief, while the 
other pled guilty and was sentenced to two months in jail.46 City officials 
in Winnipeg and Saskatoon were similarly concerned about fraudulent 
relief claims, and a good measure of their time was spent attempting to 
deal with the problem.47
In the end, the whole migrant problem illustrated the heavy pres-
sures put on cities by the wider concept of local responsibility, a yoke 
that municipalities found increasingly difficult to bear. And while organ-
ized national responses to employment management, especially the 
Employment Service of Canada, emphasized the movement of workers 
across the country, by the early 1930s, this was exactly what cities were 
trying to minimize. Without a national, or even provincial, system of 
relief (other than the movement of workers) to coordinate efforts on 
a much broader scale, city authorities could do little more than com-
plain to the more senior governments, prod them into supplying more 
resources and cash, and continue to refuse relief to those applicants 
unable to satisfy their residence requirements. But how city governments 
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responded to migrants also revealed their primary concern that most 
were single men and that single men represented danger and disorder.
CATEGORIES OF RELIEF:  
GENDER AND MARITAL STATuS
All three cities under study here divided those potential recipients 
who satisfied the residence requirements into categories that they typi-
cally called married men, single men, and single women. Married men 
and their families were offered qualitatively different relief than single 
men and women. These divisions, based on sex and marital status, 
corresponded with and reinforced the kind of social relations policy-
makers wanted to promote. One class of unemployed persons entirely 
absent from relief policy was married women.48 City relief policy-mak-
ers simply assumed that married women fell under the authority and 
care of their husbands’ relief provision. This stands in contrast to wel-
fare policy earlier in the century, when, according to historian Nancy 
Christie, women made successful claims against the state as moth-
ers, and the general welfare state was based on a “maternalist system 
of public provision.”49 By the Depression, however, women’s status 
as mothers in the eyes of the state was on the wane and was increas-
ingly replaced by welfare policy’s concern with men as breadwinners. 
“Motherhood,” Christie argues, “no longer constituted an independ-
ent claim on the state.” Thereafter, women “were defined in public dis-
course and in concrete policies as mere dependents of men with no 
separate identity of their own.”50 This analysis accords well with how 
the city relief machines treated married women. Married men, how-
ever, had a duty and an obligation to look after their wives and children. 
“Undoubtedly, a man has a legal responsibility to take care of his family,” 
declared the director of Edmonton’s special relief office in 1934.51
Married men’s relief typically consisted of groceries to stock their 
kitchen cupboards, fuel to heat their homes, rent payments to avoid evic-
tions, and clothing for themselves and their families. Part of the reason 
for this effort at making their relief experience similar to their “normal” 
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routine was because married men represented social stability in ways that 
single men and women did not. Delegates to a conference on unemploy-
ment relief in Edmonton agreed with Calgary’s mayor, Andrew Davison, 
when he reported to Premier Brownlee in June 1931, “We are not having 
very much trouble so far as the married people are concerned. Most of 
the agitation in Calgary comes from the single men, fostered of course by 
some of our communistic friends.”52
City relief officials soon discovered, however, that not all cases 
fit so easily into their categories. Married men’s obligations were taken 
seriously by urban administrators, but in at least one case, they did not 
extend so far as a deserted man’s obligation to his own child. The man 
had left Calgary for Saskatoon shortly after his wife left him and their 
son. Upon arrival, he approached the Civic Relief Board, seeking relief 
“so he can look after his child and not work.” The board rejected the 
man’s application, deciding instead that the child’s female caretaker, a 
certain Mrs. McCurdy, “be allowed forty-five cents per day for the care of 
the child and that no relief be granted to the man.”53 The board evidently 
believed that a man staying at home with his child was not appropriate. 
In another case that defied the city’s categories, Saskatoon’s Civic Relief 
Board was willing to support a man and his common-law wife as a mar-
ried couple, but when the man moved in with a different woman and her 
child, and asked for relief for the three of them, the relief board balked. 
The investigator in charge of the case informed the second woman that 
she would get relief for herself and her child only if she left the man 
and went “into a home approved by the Department.”54 The Civic Relief 
Board, of course, would henceforth treat the man as single.
As we have seen, city officials viewed single unemployed men 
as the most troublesome. Single men from families in Saskatoon were 
encouraged to stay with their parents; more troublesome were single 
unemployed men with no family in the city. Rather than offering aid that 
would enable these men to support themselves in their own lodgings, 
city relief offices provided them with café and rooming house tickets on 
an emergency basis until arrangements could be made for the men to go 
to relief camps or to work on nearby farms.55 Single unemployed men 
were typically offered two or three meal vouchers per day, which could be 
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redeemed at local cafés, but this relief was limited to the winter months. 
Thereafter, it was assumed that single men could find work on farms. 
This view of single men as transients held even when single men actually 
had homes. In October 1932, one single man applied to Saskatoon’s Civic 
Relief Board seeking “fuel for cooking purposes.” The man did not own 
a stove but wanted the fuel to use in his landlady’s stove. The board nev-
ertheless refused his application on the grounds that he was single.56 The 
differential treatment for single men was carried to an extreme in the 
case of two Edmonton men who owned their own homes and qualified 
only for single men’s relief. According to the United Workers’ Council, 
an organization working on behalf of the unemployed, their inability to 
pay their property taxes or to buy food forced them “to leave their homes 
in order to go on single relief and obtain meal tickets and bed tickets.”57
While the relief offered to married men reflected the assumption 
that those men had homes, city relief policy related to single men was 
based on the supposition that they were transients who properly belonged 
outside the city or, at the very least, should be under provincial or federal 
control. By 1932, all three cities were still registering single men, but they 
typically forwarded the lists of registrants to the federal and provincial 
governments. In Edmonton, the police department assumed the job of 
registering unemployed single men, reflecting the anxiety that city offi-
cials felt about them. Saskatoon registered single men through the relief 
department and then forwarded the data “to the Provincial and Federal 
Governments urging immediate action for their care and maintenance.” 
City officials in Saskatoon took the added step of inserting a news item 
in newspapers “advising that no relief will be given . . . to unemployed 
single men as it is considered this is a Federal responsibility and request-
ing single men to keep away from this city.”58
The city relief machines likewise treated single women differently 
than men, regardless of men’s marital status. Single women were, ideally, 
expected to find relief in the homes of their kin or in private homes as 
domestics. Winnipeg relief investigator Margaret Kee, for example, tried 
to “induce many of the unemployed girls and women to consider the 
work of domestic service on the farm,” but it seems that she had little 
luck. “There is a strange attitude towards this proposed work,” she wrote 
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in a letter to the assistant deputy minister of Public Works. “A spirit that 
appears almost defiant is shown by some. Very careful observation has led 
me to believe there is an undercurrent at work that is hindering the suc-
cess of this work, but just what it is,” she added mysteriously, “I am not yet 
prepared to say.”59 Relief officials in Edmonton reported similar attitudes 
among single unemployed women. In a letter to the city’s commissioner 
in early September 1931, one relief officer claimed, “All women and girls 
applying for assistance are being sympathetically met, patiently listened 
to, and the best service permitted and possible extended to them.” He 
admitted, however, that the applicants “seem indifferent about getting 
jobs, fail to keep their appointments, do not turn up at places referred to, 
refuse to go on farms at $10 per month or even $15 per month.”60
Single women had several reasons for their reluctance to take 
domestic farm work, one being the low pay. A young woman specu-
lated in a letter to the editor of the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, for example, 
that some single women refused the work because farmers were taking 
advantage of their vulnerable situation. “It is a shame,” the woman wrote, 
“the way some farmers are capitalizing [on] this unemployment situa-
tion. Just because there are girls without number looking for work, they 
think girls should jump at the chance to work for $5 a month and expect 
a girl to milk and help with work outside the house as well as do the 
housework.” The writer went on to describe her personal experiences on 
a farm. Upon arrival, she was told to look after an eighteen-month-old 
child, cook meals for four people, milk five cows each morning and each 
evening, and do all the churning and separating, as well as the laundry. 
When she left after serving one month in the home, the “lady of house” 
told her that “it served me right if I starved for the rest of the winter.”61 
Another woman, “a good strong girl who came from the farm,” reported 
that all that farmers do is “work you to death for 5 dollars per month.” 
Perhaps a little too candidly, the same woman revealed that she was 
“going to try and play off sick so she will be able to stay in the city” and 
draw direct relief.62 Some single women who were considering domes-
tic work feared that farmers “would not be good to them.” Others had 
family responsibilities in the city and could not simply pack up and go 
to the country. One single mother, for instance, would take work as a 
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domestic on a farm only if she were allowed to take her sixteen-year-old 
boy along, while another refused to leave her children alone in the city. 
Another possible reason for the women’s rejection of farm work, accord-
ing to a former chambermaid, was the hard work involved. She declared 
that she would not “split wood, carry water and scrub floors.”63
ON THE DOLE:  
DETAILS OF uRBAN RELIEF DELIvERy
Although the development of urban relief machinery was an ongo-
ing process, certain general features emerged early and remained fairly 
consistent into the early 1930s. These features reveal the different ways 
in which officials in each city negotiated the sometimes rocky and 
complicated terrain of relief delivery and administration.
 Clothing Distribution
Clothing was clearly an important relief item, not only because of the 
cold winter months on the Canadian prairies but also because people 
on relief typically could not afford to replace worn-out garments.64 
Each of the three cities had its own means of distributing clothing 
among the unemployed. In Edmonton, the job was performed by the 
Special Relief Department, which, in the early 1930s, expended more 
than $60,000 on relief clothing.65 Recipients in need of clothing vis-
ited the department’s clothing bureau carrying with them a voucher 
obtained from the department offices for specific items. The bureau 
was staffed by four people—a woman in charge of recording distribu-
tion, two men unpacking goods and filling applications for clothing, 
and one man attending to invoices, pricing, and inventory. Bureau staff 
checked each voucher for specific items of clothing against the appli-
cant’s previous record “so that the depot knows just what has been 
received by the relief case in the past,” and then attempted to redeem 
the voucher.66 Although it seemed a simple process, it was sometimes 
chaotic. “We have hundreds of calls from mothers and children who 
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are continually requesting shoes, stockings, underwear, dresses, and 
boys’ shirts,” Carl Berg, the bureau’s director, informed the mayor of 
Edmonton, Daniel Knott, in June 1932. “Last Saturday .  .  . our place 
was completely filled with women and children who were clamouring 
for clothing.” Children, the director explained, were “going to school 
with practically nothing on their feet and dresses and overalls which 
are all rags.” The children’s mothers had mended the family’s clothes 
as best they could, but at some point, mending could no longer save 
old clothes. Married men on relief were also in dire straits, the direc-
tor noted, with some having “no other clothing to work in than their 
only suit .  .  . when they accept a job to go out into a ditch or simi-
lar labor. Such men should at least be given a pair of overalls and a 
working shirt.”67 The situation had become so desperate by the follow-
ing winter that Edmonton’s United Workers’ Council demanded that 
“the place be closed down and applicants be given orders on stores for 
their requirements” because applicants were not able to get the clothes 
they required at the bureau.68 Meanwhile, Saskatoon’s clothing depot, 
which was run by volunteers, relied entirely on donations of clothing 
and otherwise provided only shoe repair and tailoring services. This 
saved the city a good deal on relief costs; Saskatoon spent on average 
only $3,000 per year in the period from 1930 to 1932.69
The Greater Winnipeg Welfare Association, also a volunteer-run 
organization, handled Winnipeg’s clothing issues until 1932. Thereafter, 
as a result of complaints from both unemployed recipients and the city 
council over how the association purchased and distributed clothing, 
Winnipeg’s Civic Unemployment Relief Committee (CuRC) managed 
its operation.70 The change offered several advantages to the city admin-
istration. For one thing, the CuRC was better equipped to make cheaper 
bulk purchases, buying all clothing through the “Provincial Government 
Purchasing Bureau directly from factories and wholesalers.”71 For 
another, it was no longer necessary for city officials to supervise the vol-
untary Welfare Association; instead, they directed clothing distribution 
through the city’s central offices.72 This meant that city authorities deter-
mined the requirements of recipients by sending their own investigators 
to their homes. As for quality, the CuRC insisted that it could “give good 
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serviceable garments of a class which would ordinarily be bought by 
working people.”73
The change from the Welfare Association to the CuRC, however, 
made some city business owners wary. The Northern Shirt Company 
wrote to provincial officials one day after Winnipeg’s city council voted 
to set clothing relief in the hands of the CuRC. “The Greater Winnipeg 
Welfare Association has been a heavy purchaser at competitive prices 
of goods produced by Winnipeg workmen in Winnipeg factories,” the 
company’s president wrote W. R. Clubb, the minster of Public Works. 
That arrangement, he reminded the minister, furnished “employment 
for many men who otherwise would be obliged to call upon the City 
and the Province for relief.” The company’s president hoped that the 
transfer of responsibility “will not result in any change in policy but 
that Winnipeg workmen, will still be given an opportunity to supply the 
demand for goods required by the Unemployment Relief Committee.”74
Winnipeg retailers had similar business-related concerns, but 
theirs were about distribution, not production. Clothing distribution 
through a central office, they argued, hurt relief recipients, the city, and, 
of course, the retailers. If clothing and shoes were supplied through 
regular channels of trade, recipients “will not have to walk five miles or 
more to a Relief Depot,” where they would be handed a suit of clothes 
or a pair of shoes “by some office man who has no experience.” Instead, 
they would be able to “walk to the nearest clothing store or shoe store 
and be fitted by an expert shoe man or clothier who will hold himself 
responsible for the fitting to the recipient of Relief and for the wear to 
the Relief Department.” Furthermore, the city “will have a better check if 
anything goes wrong with the shoes or with the clothing simply because 
they will deal with each section separately.” The city would also benefit 
in receiving taxes from the retailers, who had been “finding it very dif-
ficult to carry on and pay their share of business tax to the city.” Finally, 
relief business would not only benefit the retailers themselves but would 
also prevent a “further lay off of help particularly during the months of 
January and February.”75
Footwear was an important element of relief clothing distribu-
tion, and much like shirts and pants, sweaters and coats, the methods 
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of distributing shoes and boots concerned local business interests. On 
16 December 1932, Edmonton businessman F. S. Wright alerted the city 
commissioner to the private sector’s future prospects should municipal 
officials continue to operate a shoe repair shop out of the unemploy-
ment relief office. “I visualize a time in the near future,” he warned, “when 
these officials, will also, in the ‘cause’ of economy go into other lines of 
business with the result that there will be no business at all excepting 
municipal and government business—everyone will be on relief.”76 
However exaggerated his prediction, Wright nevertheless exposed some 
of the more paradoxical features of the city’s increasingly active role in 
the delivery of relief services to Depression-era unemployed workers. 
First, as municipal involvement increased, so too did the tendency of 
some local entrepreneurs and industries to experience the city not as 
regulator or administrator, or even as booster of private enterprise, but 
rather as competitor for the limited local business. The introduction to 
the shoe repair business of so formidable a competitor as the city, with its 
use of relief workers who were paid in kind and its steady stream of relief 
“customers” receiving free services, certainly undermined private shoe 
repair businesses. Indeed, between January and November 1932, the City 
of Edmonton’s shoe repair shop handled more than eleven thousand 
pairs of shoes, making no small dent in the local industry.77
But, despite Wright’s complaint, it made little economic sense for 
the city to leave shoe repair services to private operators, at least accord-
ing to the city’s chief engineer. After all, he argued in reply to Wright’s 
letter, doing so would merely force the unemployed shoemakers work-
ing in the city’s shop to find other relief work or else go on the dole, 
while at the same time necessitating cash payments to private sector shoe 
repair shops for their services to the unemployed. In the end, such a move 
would do little more than shift the unemployment problem from here 
to there without fundamentally ameliorating it. Furthermore, he contin-
ued, it was doubtful that private shoe repair shops lost much business 
to the city’s operation. Paying from their own pockets for private sector 
shoe repair was probably not a high priority for unemployed men, given 
their already tight (or non-existent) budgets and lack of visible working 
prospects. But although such arguments may have made good economic 
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sense to the city, they offered little to the many shoe repair businesses 
struggling with the same depressed conditions affecting unemployed 
workers and their families.
 Housing and Food Relief: Married Men and Their Families
In addition to clothing, provisions for food and shelter became a 
municipal responsibility. Whereas single women, either with or with-
out children, were expected to rely on their kin to fulfill these needs or 
to find work as domestics, unemployed men received relief from the 
city in which they lived. Here again, policies guiding relief distribution 
differed according to marital status.
Unemployed married men could apply for relief to pay the rent, 
but the amounts offered varied considerably: some city relief authorities 
calculated twenty dollars per month, for example, while others believed 
that ten was sufficient. Until the spring of 1932, the City of Saskatoon paid 
only a single month’s rent, and only if the tenant had been evicted. Not 
surprisingly, this was entirely unsatisfactory to some landlords. In May 
of that year, a delegation of landlords visited city council seeking a more 
expansive policy. “In many instances,” they complained, “unemployed had 
occupied residences for months without contributing one cent.” As a solu-
tion to this problem, the delegation suggested that the city ask the provin-
cial and federal governments to contribute two-thirds of the cost of rent 
for qualified cases, with the city paying the balance.78 In Edmonton, those 
in need of rent money applied to the Special Relief Department, which 
consisted of three staff members dedicated to processing rent requests. 
The staff processed each application and then decided whether to accept 
it based on an examination of the applicant’s history card. If the applica-
tion was approved, rent was paid to the applicant’s landlord directly.79 If it 
was rejected, unemployed families had little choice but to find some other 
way to avoid eviction. When one man learned that his household effects 
were to be seized for arrears of rent, he “moved them from the place of sei-
zure” in order to protect them and subsequently faced a charge of theft.80
As for food relief, married men and their families obtained gro-
ceries either from retail stores, using vouchers, or from central city-run 
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stores. Of the three cities, only Saskatoon experimented with the idea 
of a central relief store. Opening in June 1932, it was an attempt to cen-
tralize and make more efficient the distribution of food among family 
relief recipients. Before the introduction of the new central store, relief 
recipients had received vouchers that they could exchange for thirty-
three specified goods at any city grocery store. At a council meeting in 
late March 1932, city councillors discussed abandoning the open voucher 
system and adopting the central store. Those in favour (only one alder-
man disagreed) pointed out that under the current system, considerable 
substitution in food items was taking place, in addition to which most 
of the business was going to “two or three large stores” rather than to 
smaller grocers.81 One alderman further noted that the city might save 
money by inconveniencing relief recipients. “If the store were centrally 
located,” Alderman Crimp suggested, “and the adult members of the 
family were obliged to go to the stores [of goods] and get the groceries, a 
lot of them might soon be buying their own.”82
Switching to a central city-run store system did allow the munici-
pal government significant savings. Buying bulk from wholesalers, rather 
than issuing vouchers redeemable at city grocery stores, enabled the city 
to acquire large quantities of food at bargain prices. Moreover, the relief 
store allowed the city to confine relief groceries “to certain items of high 
food value” and to ensure that store attendants could easily explain to 
recipients any changes to the relief diet prescribed by the city.83 Ostensibly, 
trained dieticians could scientifically determine the precise proportions 
of specific foods required to keep a family healthy, while at the same 
time keeping a close eye on costs. Municipal officials were thus able to 
exert substantial control over the foods available to unemployed fami-
lies. At the same time, while the central relief store supposedly ensured 
that unemployed families ate a healthy diet and did not splurge on foods 
that were neither essential nor nutritious, such municipal involvement 
implied that recipients could not be trusted to make responsible deci-
sions on their own.
Many of Saskatoon’s storekeepers were unhappy about the city’s 
relief store. Some merchants lost much of the relief business they had 
enjoyed prior to the store’s opening, when the relief orders on which 
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they had counted simply stopped. “The Civic Relief Store is not in the 
best interest of the taxpayers and citizens in general, nor is it fair or equi-
table to those engaged in the lines of businesses covered by the opera-
tion of the Store,” Saskatoon’s West Side Business Men’s Association 
complained in 1934. “Any saving made is more than offset by the damage 
occasioned business interests of the city and the consequent loss of rev-
enue in licenses and taxes, which will be more than ever apparent this 
year.”84 Some storekeepers estimated that over the course of just one 
week, they lost nearly $5,000 worth of grocery-related business to the 
city’s relief store. Merchants also complained that “the relief store was 
instrumental in . . . losing contact with some of their former customers,” 
severing the long-standing customer relations on which they relied.85
But the original voucher system had had its own set of problems 
with respect to customer relations. Unlike cash, grocery vouchers limited 
customers to specific food items. Voucher holders could not substitute 
one item for another even when both items were of equal value. Some 
relief shoppers may have had sufficient (and maybe free) access to butter, 
milk, and eggs from family or friends living on nearby farms but needed 
goods such as coffee or sugar. Relief vouchers would not allow relief 
shoppers to exchange their butter, milk, or egg allotment for items not 
on the city’s list.86 Clearly frustrating to recipients, the inflexibility of 
relief vouchers thus set up potentially damaging customer-relations situ-
ations for storekeepers. Merchants “cannot afford to refuse requests for 
substitutions,” the Civic Relief Board reported in 1932, “as the applicant 
may have been a good customer of theirs for years and probably will be 
again when he gets back to work.”87 For some storekeepers, then, the risk 
of alienating their long-time customers prompted them to allow substi-
tutions despite the voucher system rules.
In addition to dissatisfied relief recipients and the ambivalent 
merchant response to the relief store, municipal officials in Saskatoon 
had to contend with provincial government strictures. In 1933, Thomas 
Molloy, the Saskatchewan deputy minister of Railways, Labour, and 
Industries, advised the city of new federal and provincial policies dictat-
ing that all relief purchases “should be through the regular channels of 
trade and that wherever possible Canadian goods should be purchased 
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in preference to those from foreign countries.” These policies resulted 
from “pressure . . . brought upon the Governments by the Western Cattle 
Dealers’ Association and the Milk Producers’ Association.”88 The source 
of beef and dairy products for Saskatoon’s central relief store is not 
known, but the province’s directive suggests that the city was not limiting 
its bulk purchases to local or even national products. Like most indus-
tries, the Depression hit cattle and dairy producers hard. In the cattle 
industry, the economic slump hindered sales that had already been in 
steady decline since at least the early 1920s. The situation went from bad 
to worse as cattle producers had to contend with new American protec-
tionist tariffs, especially after July 1930, when President Herbert Hoover 
imposed a 30 percent levy on live cattle imported into the United States. 
Throughout the 1920s, cattle producers had been exporting 90 percent of 
their live cattle stock to the United States. The tariff’s effects were disas-
trous. In 1929, 160,000 cattle shipments left Canada for the United States; 
by 1931, that number had dropped to a paltry 10,000.89 The combined 
effects of the Depression’s onset and the Smoot-Hawley tariff similarly 
threatened the Canadian dairy industry. Between 1920 and 1932, the price 
of Canadian butter fell from just under fifty-seven cents a pound to less 
than twenty cents a pound. After the 1930 American tariff took effect, 
duties on fresh milk increased from zero to three cents a gallon, and on 
cream, from zero to nearly fifty-seven cents a gallon.90
Given the all-but-closed American market on which cattle and 
dairy producers had relied through the 1920s, it is not surprising that 
they turned their attention homeward after 1930. The emerging relief 
machines in western Canadian cities seemed an obvious market and a 
potential saviour from economic ruin. After Saskatoon opened its relief 
store in 1932, the city spent an average of more than $800 on meat and 
$1,000 on dairy products in a typical week.91 With orders as large as 
these, it is not difficult to see why the cattle and dairy producers were 
so interested in the local market. Provincial meddling in Saskatoon’s 
relief purchasing practices, however, was not in the city’s financial inter-
est. Forcing the city to purchase Canadian goods whenever possible 
effectively barred Saskatoon officials from hunting out bargains south 
of the border.
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Like local businesses, relief recipients also had problems with 
the relief store. Many were forced to travel greater distances and thus to 
spend more time getting groceries than they had previously using the 
voucher system, which had allowed them to shop at their local store. 
Travel to and from the central store with little transportation but their 
own two feet was no easy task for many of the unemployed, particularly 
for those who lived across town from the store. Saskatoon’s icy prairie 
winters made the trek even more onerous for nearly half the year. When 
the Saskatoon Trades and Labor Council brought up the issue with city 
officials, seeking “free street railway transportation from the relief store 
to enable recipients of relief to get their goods home,” the Civic Relief 
Board answered that the relief store would parcel recipients’ goods into 
several packages, apparently making them easier to carry home, and 
would allow recipients to leave some goods at the store for pickup the 
following day.92 Relief recipients also complained about the poor quality 
of the store’s products, as well as the diet list’s inflexibility when it came 
to making substitutions.93 One woman complained that her family’s 
relief diet did not include enough butter, a commodity that her husband 
needed in greater quantities to sustain his strength while he worked on 
one of the city’s work relief programs. After comparison shopping, more-
over, some recipients claimed that prices at the relief store were higher 
than those charged by retail stores.94
Neither Edmonton nor Winnipeg operated a central relief store, 
and city storekeepers and married relief recipients alike seemed content 
with those cities’ grocery distribution policies. Winnipeg, for instance, 
used an open voucher system, allowing relief recipients to shop at any 
retail store in the city. As noted in a Winnipeg unemployment relief 
report for 1932, the result proved “satisfactory to recipients of relief as 
well as the merchants of the city.”95 But early on, Winnipeg officials iden-
tified some of the immediate problems. First, they believed that “people 
sought assistance who were not entitled to it.” Second, they suggested 
that the use of this system offered relief recipients the “opportunity for 
a certain amount of trafficking in coupons.”96 City officials, however, 
believed that most such problems could easily be avoided by hiring more 
investigators. The Edmonton relief office also issued to recipients grocery 
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vouchers that were redeemable at any local grocery store. To some busi-
ness interests in the city, this seemed only proper. As Edmonton busi-
nessman F. S. Wright pointed out, “City relief administrators showed 
good business acumen in seeing that the distribution of coal, milk, and 
groceries go through proper channels of business operation—that is 
through the retailer to the relief applicant. The benefit of this procedure 
as regards aiding business in slack time is obvious. It has kept many of 
the small merchants off relief.”97
Initially, Edmonton families on relief could expect four dollars’ 
worth of grocery vouchers and one dollar in cash each week. The city’s 
relief officer, H. F. McKee, implemented this policy in April 1932 so relief 
recipients “could exercise their own initiative in making purchases.”98 
Although the policy proved popular among recipients, it did not survive 
the year. By December, federal and provincial opposition had compelled 
city officials to eliminate the dollar in cash; instead, recipients were to 
receive five dollars in grocery vouchers. Not surprisingly, the change elic-
ited complaints from the unemployed. In mid-December, representatives 
of an unemployment group called the United Front Council appeared 
before city council demanding “immediate return of the dollar that was 
cut on the relief tickets.” Relief officer McKee replied that his department 
“was being subjected to criticism” from provincial and federal officials 
“in respect to the relief that was being given.” To compensate the unem-
ployed for the loss, however, the city began providing them with a “free 
lot and means of growing their own vegetables.”99
With regard to food distribution, Winnipeg’s relief officials 
believed that “in comparison with systems in force in other large cities,” 
theirs was “fair to the unemployed, yet sound from an economical point 
of view.” They admitted, though, that “the Unemployed Organizations, as 
is probably natural, are insistent that allowances are not sufficient.”100 As 
a direct result of those complaints, the city, together with the province, 
initiated an investigation into its food distribution practices. In the main, 
this meant sending copies of Winnipeg’s food and diet schedules to die-
ticians and other welfare “experts” with a view to “receiving an unbiased 
report from authority of the highest standing.”101 Almost without fail, the 
experts, who were from across Canada and the northern United States, 
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assured Winnipeg relief officials that their efforts were well justified and 
that their food schedules were entirely sufficient.102 Many also offered 
advice on dealing with relief recipients’ complaints. Lucy H. Gillett of 
New York City’s Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor 
was among those who suggested educating families about food prepara-
tion and nutrition:
We find—as you say is true in Winnipeg—many who feel our 
allowances are insufficient, but trained nutritionists who go 
into the homes always find the complaints arise because the 
quantities of various foods provided differ from those to which 
families have been accustomed and they do not know how to 
plan meals for them. In the majority of the cases, our 
educational workers are successful in showing them how to 
make satisfactory adjustments in food habits. Usually the 
health of the family improves and when this happens its 
members are convinced that they can live on a diet that differs 
from that to which they have been accustomed.103
Montréal’s Child Welfare Association concurred with this advice, 
asking Winnipeg relief officials whether they were providing education 
about food choices and preparation: “From our past two years’ expe-
rience, we have found that an adequate supply is only half the prob-
lem. This allowance must be accompanied by individual instruction in 
the homes by public health nurses, social workers, or nutritionists.”104 
Most correspondents likewise approved of Winnipeg’s voucher system 
as opposed to central relief stores. Marjorie Bell, director of Toronto’s 
Visiting Housekeepers Association, commended Winnipeg relief officers 
on their voucher system, considering it “much more satisfactory than the 
central depot or warehouse. The latter diverts trade from natural chan-
nels, gives undue publicity to recipients of relief and entails long dis-
tance travel with supplies by clients, who are quite often unfit physically 
for the task.”105
Determining the quantity of food that families on relief should 
receive entailed keeping abreast of food prices. To that end, relief offi-
cials periodically dispatched a committee of women to “actually buy 
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the supplies.” In addition, the Civic Unemployment Relief Committee 
enlisted the services of five “experienced and reliable women . . . to obtain 
frank opinion from the housewives of recipients of relief as to the ade-
quacy or otherwise of the schedule.” Upon completion of their task, the 
five women reported that some housewives were “just able to manage” 
but that more than half of the total 2,447 families visited had stated that 
the food allotments were “sufficient for their family requirements.”106
How did the relief diet affect the recipients’ health? Edmonton 
officials dispatched a Dr. Whitelaw to investigate this matter. In January 
1933, he reported:
I have been on the whole very agreeably surprised to find that 
there have been so few cases where it would be fair to say 
malnutrition exists. On the other hand I have found the great 
majority happy, healthy, and vigorous to a greater degree than 
might have been expected. Despite the Depression now 
existing it would appear from health reports that the general 
health reports of the community throughout our province and 
dominion is even more favourable than it has been during the 
periods of prosperity in past years. This may be due to a 
plainer, more sensible even if somewhat restricted diet made 
necessary or unavoidable because of the prevailing economic 
depression.107
A provincial relief investigation committee came to similar conclu-
sions five years later. In December 1938, the committee reported to the 
province, “Some of the officials consulted went so far as to say that 
there was less malnutrition among children of relief recipients than 
among children whose parents were in a position to buy them large 
quantities of processed articles of doubtful food value.”108
 Housing and Food Relief: Single Men
Food and shelter relief for single men was distinctly different from 
that for married men and their families. Rather than issuing vouchers 
redeemable at grocery stores or providing rent payments, municipal 
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officials distributed to single men meal and bed tickets redeemable at 
local cafés and hotels. By January 1931, approximately one thousand 
single men were assembling each morning at Edmonton’s relief offices 
to receive meal and bed tickets. Afternoons were given to reviewing and 
accepting new applications for single men’s relief. In order to reduce 
situations that relief officials believed might promote disorder, the city 
devised “a scheme .  .  . whereby an entire change of rooming houses 
takes place once a week and so far has been productive of the results 
anticipated—no complaints.”109 This strategy went some direction in 
aiding café and hotel owners as well. “So far a fairly equal distribution 
of services has been extended throughout the city,” Superintendent T. 
S. Magee of the Civic Relief Department reported to the city commis-
sioner in January 1931. “The reason for using so many [businesses] is 
we feel people in business . . . are passing through a period of depres-
sion while having to take care of rent, licenses, etc. [and] are entitled to 
participate.”110
In addition to compelling single men to move to a different room-
ing house every week, Edmonton’s relief authorities distributed the 
men throughout the city to reduce the possibility of subversive activi-
ties. “It prevents large numbers of men congregating at a given place,” 
the relief officer explained, “as we realize segregation as far as possible is 
beneficial to the department in handling our problems.”111 Presumably, 
Superintendent Magee wanted to avoid the potential problems that 
might flow from several hundred men taking their meals together and 
talking about his department’s shortcomings, or worse, organizing some 
sort of collective activity against the state. With more than three thou-
sand single men on city relief in mid-January 1931, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that Magee harboured serious concerns about possible situations 
where the men could congregate.
In Edmonton, unemployed single men could expect two meals 
per day and a bed at one the city’s many hotels. A typical ticket prom-
ised two fried eggs or hot cakes, one cup of coffee, bread and butter, and 
fried potatoes for the first meal, and a choice of four meats (liver, ham-
burger, whitefish, or sausage) with bread and butter, one cup of coffee 
or tea, and potatoes for the second.112 The ticket also carried the name 
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of the establishment where the meals could be had and the name of the 
hotel where the man could lay his head that night. But cafés and hotels 
were not the only beneficiaries of the city’s relief distribution policies. 
Individuals outside the regular city retail trade also supplied the relief 
market with food services and accommodation for single unemployed 
workers. During the first three weeks of May 1931, for example, one 
woman served Edmonton’s single unemployed more than seventy-one 
thousand bowls of porridge at a cost of one cent each. She billed the 
city accordingly.113 Similarly, a Mrs. Golden, proprietress of the Golden 
Community Mission, kept ten men and served meals for one hundred, 
all billed to the city.114 Edmonton citizens who ran boarding houses for 
single unemployed men received from the city ten cents per man per 
day, but while this income went some way toward paying city taxes and 
utilities, it was never enough. Boarding house operators compensated by 
trying to increase their share of the boarding house market. The city’s 
medical officer of health alerted the city commissioner to the full impli-
cations of the problem in March 1933: “Operators cannot operate at this 
price and so they squeeze many more lodgers than are allowed by law.”115
Unfortunately for the single unemployed, cities could not sustain 
the practice of supplying them with a bed and two square meals each 
day for long. During the first few years of the Depression, for example, 
city officials ceased registering single men after April 30, fully expecting 
the men to “shift for themselves” through the summer months. The cities 
would then reinstate the meal and bed scheme through the winter.116 
The general spring cut-off, however, had to be flexible enough to accom-
modate what the cities considered emergency cases. In late May 1931, for 
example, Edmonton relief officials felt “obliged .  .  . to provide sleeping 
accommodation .  .  . for thirty-five men” and to issue four meal tickets 
each to some one hundred men.117 The city relief officer, however, was 
aware of the emergency relief’s implications. “This service we fear will 
have an ever widening scope,” he pointed out to Edmonton’s city com-
missioner on 21 May 1931, “and may in the near future bring back many of 
those cut off on April 30.”118 Within one week, his fears were realized: by 
27 May, the city was providing emergency accommodation for 254 men, 
and delegations from both the United Empire Loyalists Association and 
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the National Unemployed Workers Association were demanding equal 
treatment for their members.119
Similar problems cropped up the following spring, and by August 
1932, the city, together with federal officials, was quietly investigating 
the possibilities of mass feeding and mass accommodation schemes for 
unemployed single men. In one scenario, the city would use the old fed-
eral penitentiary at the centre of town as a site for mass feeding only. In 
another, it would incur some small expenditure on a new set of build-
ings at the penitentiary to house and feed the men. Yet a third possibility 
was to set up a simple tent city at the exhibition grounds in Edmonton’s 
north end.120 When word of the city’s mass feeding plan finally trickled 
into the local business community, it prompted fifteen Edmonton café 
owners to issue a formal protest against the move and to call for the 
maintenance of the old ticket system. The mass feeding plan, the café 
owners complained, “will affect our ability to pay taxes and otherwise 
carry on business.” Edmonton Mayor Daniel Knott replied to the peti-
tion by pointing out that the provincial and federal governments had 
lately assumed all responsibility for the care and maintenance of unem-
ployed single men, including their mass feeding.121 The city could do 
nothing but go along with this new scheme. Still, the implicit threat 
behind the café owners’ petition was probably not lost on Knott. After 
all, business and property taxes were among the few forms of revenue 
generation open to the city.
Some of Edmonton’s unemployed workers likewise protested the 
mass feeding and housing plan. On 14 November 1932, a huge crowd met 
in the city’s downtown market square to oppose the idea, noting that 
“Calgary experience shows such kitchens only economize the already 
meagre relief allowances of single unemployed workers” and calling 
for cash payments to the single unemployed instead.122 The Edmonton 
Retail Clerks’ Association shared the sentiments of those attending the 
mass meeting about the meagre relief allowances, although probably 
for reasons quite different from those of the single unemployed men. 
In May 1931, association representatives S. H. Williamson and James 
McMillan wrote the city commissioner requesting that the city provide 
more substantial food, shelter, and sleeping accommodations to single 
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unemployed men. More specifically, they proposed that the city offer 
each man at least two meals per day at no less than 12.5 cents per meal.123 
Tellingly, the Edmonton Retail Trades Association cast its proposal in 
economic terms rather than focusing on food quantity or quality. While 
the association was doubtless interested in the welfare of the city’s single 
unemployed men, a more substantial city-funded diet would most cer-
tainly benefit the local retail trade as well.
Food and housing issues continued to bedevil city officials. In 1936, 
when the federal government began to wind down the Dominion relief 
camps, the provinces were faced with the problem of providing food and 
shelter for the men who had recently been released from the camps, many 
of whom were migrating back into the cities. In Edmonton, a delegation 
of seven, representing fifteen hundred unemployed single men who ate at 
a downtown community soup kitchen, complained to the provincial gov-
ernment about their situation. In addition to two meal tickets per day, the 
men received bed tickets worth ten cents each—but, as one man pointed 
out, there was “no accommodation for such things as soap or towels, 
no provision made for shaving and toilet necessities. . . . If a man wants 
a hair cut, he has to get it the best way he can.”124 As for meals, condi-
tions verged on the intolerable. “The heat and stench in the soup kitchen 
is more than we can bear,” one member of the delegation declared. “One 
of the boys fainted on Sunday night, and the men could hardly eat their 
supper.” Living under such circumstances was stigmatizing, and it robbed 
the men of their dignity and sense of independence.  “These conditions in 
many cases have been undermining our lives,” one of the men observed. 
“Our food and clothing leaves us isolated from the rest of society. There 
are demoralizing influences for the younger men in the kitchen.” What 
the men really wanted was cash “to pay for meals in a restaurant, or if we 
like, rent a little housekeeping room and buy our groceries.”125
A provincially appointed relief committee that was struck in early 
1938 to investigate relief conditions across the province found most of the 
problems associated with the kitchen “unavoidable.” Among these prob-
lems were the “association of some individuals of undesirable habits” and 
the “accumulation during the meal of unsightly quantities of unused 
food, creating an ‘atmosphere’ repugnant to aesthetic sensibilities.” More 
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distressing to the visiting committee, however, was the kitchen’s demor-
alizing effects, especially on its longer-term clientele: “A tendency is grad-
ually developed to lower the morale of those eating in the Kitchen. At 
first the individual finds eating at the Kitchen a necessity but objection-
able. Later this objection is gradually overcome by repetition, and eating 
at the kitchen becomes a habit, destructive to initiative and ambition.”126
Some of Edmonton’s single men found accommodation at room-
ing houses paid for by the city, but despite the medical officer’s warn-
ing in 1933 about overcrowded conditions, the problem remained some 
three years later. One unemployed man complained to provincial offi-
cials in 1936: “In one place in particular, there were eight men in a room 
where, according to city health regulations, it would only be allowed to 
Figure 3. Unemployed single men queue for food at Edmonton’s soup kitchen, 
1933. In this photograph, the kitchen appears precisely the way city officials wanted 
it to: clean, clear, orderly, operating with machine precision. Single unemployed 
men described a different kitchen in their brief appearance before the cabinet of the 
Alberta government in 1936. Glenbow Archives, ND-3-6523a.
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hold three men.” The city, he said, was doing its best to make conditions 
better, but the rooming house keepers simply could not afford to main-
tain clean, reasonable accommodations at ten cents per man per night. 
The man also warned of potential health problems due to overcrowding: 
“Because of men on relief being compelled to sleep with other men, 
probably they get diseases. We have had cases like that of men having to 
sleep with other men who were diseased.”127
In Winnipeg, unemployed single men apparently enjoyed better 
living conditions. On three separate occasions in early December 1932, 
representatives of the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council visited the 
sleeping and dining quarters on Water Street, which housed eight or 
nine hundred men. Water Street officials permitted the council’s delega-
tion to “inspect every phase of the serving of relief to single unemployed 
men,” and the council representatives were “on hand to see the first meal 
being served.” The breakfast meal consisted of porridge “with a fair grade 
of milk,” sausage or bacon, bread, butter and honey or syrup, and tea or 
coffee to wash it all down. Only the meat was rationed; the men could 
eat all they could of the rest. For the second meal, the men received soup; 
beef, pork, or some other type of meat; pudding; bread and butter, with 
jam, honey, or syrup; two kinds of vegetables; coffee or tea; and milk. 
According to the delegates’ report, both meals and sleeping accommoda-
tions were good.128
FINANCING RELIEF
City relief machines relied heavily on financial contributions from 
higher levels of government, which typically covered one-third to one-
half of the total costs associated with relief. Without that financial aid, 
as well as indirect financing help, the relief machinery simply could 
not function. The first Dominion-wide arrangement between the 
cities, the provinces, and Prime Minister Bennett’s new federal admin-
istration in Ottawa for funding the city relief machines emerged in 
September 1930. Thereafter, the federal government agreed to renew 
the arrangement, with various important modifications, until the end 
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of Bennett’s administration in 1935. Whenever the government (federal 
or provincial) threatened to withdraw its financial contributions or 
delayed renewing the agreements, the cities responded quickly. During 
the spring of 1932, for example, both the provinces and the munici-
palities grew increasingly alarmed at word that the federal government 
intended to discontinue its support of urban relief schemes. “It is abso-
lutely impossible for the province or municipalities to carry on the 
very heavy burden of direct relief,” Manitoba’s Premier John Bracken 
informed Bennett in April 1932. As the premier pointed out, Winnipeg 
was in an especially difficult position: direct relief was costing some 
$265,000 per month, an amount the city could not cover on its own.129 
A year later, it was the same story. The federal government had yet to 
renew its 1933 legislation after it expired on 31 March. By May, provin-
cial and municipal officials across the prairies were growing worried. 
“From my personal knowledge of the situation in the West,” Alberta’s 
Premier Brownlee informed Bennett on 9 May 1933, “I am quite con-
vinced that the urban and rural municipalities cannot be expected 
to assume any larger financial obligation than was required of them 
under the previous agreement. As we have been obliged to ask your 
Government for assistance, it is equally clear that the province cannot 
assume any larger obligation. I feel it is therefore absolutely necessary 
that the Dominion Government continue for this year to make a con-
tribution on the same basis as under the previous agreement.”130
Although the federal government promised city councils that 
funding for urban relief systems would be forthcoming, actually getting 
the money was often an arduous process. City officials relied on a variety 
of methods to subtly (and sometimes not so subtly) impress on senior 
government administrators the difficult position they were in as a result 
of the slow transfer of funds. These ranged from appealing to the federal 
government directly, to recruiting premiers and other provincial officials 
to intervene on their behalf, to using their “man in Ottawa,” typically a 
local senator or Member of Parliament. In 1931, for example, the federal 
government signed agreements with the Province of Alberta and the City 
of Edmonton to fund 50 percent of the cost of public works relief under-
taken in that city, with the balance shared by the city and the province 
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equally. The federal government’s portion of the cost, according to the 
agreement, was $200,000. Within three months, Edmonton had received 
less than $24,000 from Ottawa and nothing at all from the province. “Tax 
collection is not supplying sufficient money for current needs,” the city’s 
treasurer informed the city council in April 1932, “and Governments 
must pay money owing by them.”131 In this case, foot-dragging on the 
part of the federal and provincial governments forced the city to with-
hold more than $300,000 earmarked for Edmonton Public School Board 
salaries and wages and to direct the money instead toward the city’s gen-
eral operating expenses, at least until the federal funds came through. 
Edmonton’s Mayor Knott immediately fired off a telegram to Senator 
William A. Griesbach, one of Edmonton’s “men in Ottawa,” asking him 
to “please influence dominion to pay what it owes. Situation serious.”132 
The mayor then anxiously wired Alberta’s Premier Brownlee, advising 
him that “the city has no more credit at the bank.”133 In the end, after a 
good deal of heated communication between Edmonton and Ottawa, 
the federal government agreed to make good on its share. But, as Mp 
Ambrose Bury told city council, Ottawa insisted that its share was only 
$127,000, not the $200,000 that Edmonton expected. The shortfall, while 
not devastating, certainly put a difficult strain on the city’s finances.134
The proper functioning of city relief machines also relied on 
financing arrangements with the federal government. With their credit 
ratings at banks and other lending institutions growing ever more precar-
ious through the early Depression years, cities like Edmonton, Saskatoon, 
and Winnipeg depended on the government to underwrite or otherwise 
secure substantial loans on their behalf. At a 1932 conference attended 
by the four western premiers and the mayors of the major cities, it was 
agreed that “because cities and provinces cannot make necessary relief 
expenditures without borrowing, and because the federal government 
has access to low interest loans, the federal government should get loans 
on security of provincial treasury bills” and make more funds available 
to the provinces and the cities. Prime Minister Bennett, however, was 
not sympathetic: “The Dominion has nothing to do with debts piled 
up by the cities and the provinces,” he began, and went on to reiterate 
the federal position that the ultimate responsibility for unemployment 
 The Anatomy of City Relief 91
relief rested with the provinces and the municipalities.135 Saskatoon, in 
as dire a financial situation as any other city, secured a series of loans 
from the provincial government in order to carry out its relief programs. 
The loans rested on promissory notes signed by the city at 7 percent 
interest, a rate that city council considered unfair on the grounds that 
the “province [could] borrow money at a cheaper rate of interest than 
7%.” “It is assumed,” Saskatoon’s city clerk pointedly reported to Premier 
Anderson, “that there is no intention on the government’s part to make 
a profit from the transaction.”136
City administrators were also acutely aware of perceived inequali-
ties in the distribution of municipal relief funds, and they constantly 
sought to correct them. Edmonton city officials, complaining in March 
1930 that Calgary had taken “the lion’s share” of Alberta’s $243,000 of 
relief disbursement announced that spring, immediately sought author-
ity to spend any remaining and unallocated relief funds.137 The cities’ 
dependence on senior levels of government meant that the munici-
palities had little bargaining power. In November 1931, the federal and 
provincial governments compelled city officials in Edmonton to accept 
their terms when it came to dealing with single men. Noting that single 
men were “flocking into town,” the city agreed to provide relief for the 
men if they had registered prior to August of that year. In return, the 
province and the federal government together promised to cover two-
thirds of the costs of their relief. For single men arriving after August, the 
city would pay only 25 percent of their care, with the province paying 
another 25 percent and the federal government covering the balance. 
“It appears we must accept these terms if we are to function under the 
Government Scheme,” Edmonton’s relief officer, T. S. Magee, reported to 
the city commissioner.138
The provinces, while contributing financially, were not inter-
ested in taking control over the administration of relief in the cities. 
In Manitoba, for instance, provincial officials noted that “the Bracken 
administration’s policy has been to financially and otherwise, assist 
municipalities in dealing with unemployment, recognizing that elected 
councils and officials have the necessary intimate local knowledge upon 
which to base the measure of relief required.”139 Similarly, Alberta’s 
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director of employment services pointed out to Edmonton’s Mayor 
Knott that “some of the expenditures shown on direct relief statements 
are beyond what might be considered reasonable assistance. We have no 
desire to suggest to cities what should be given, though.”140
Depression-related unemployment relief policy was clearly about 
more than municipal efforts to reduce costs or to control what they per-
ceived as a potentially dangerous unemployment population, although 
these were critical elements of policy decisions. Ultimately, relief policy 
was designed to protect and promote city officials’ visions of their cities 
and their societies. How municipal officials administered relief had 
tremendous implications not only for how their cities experienced the 
Depression but also for what the social structure of their cities would 
look like once the economic and social crisis ended. The preference was 
clearly for couples who conformed to the model of male breadwinner 
and female homemaker, and the way that relief recipients were catego-
rized, as well as the associated relief distribution methods, attempted to 
stabilize a social structure that privileged such couples over men and 
women who were single. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, the 
realities of the Depression compelled city authorities to adapt constantly 
to new situations. In the end, however, while these challenges stretched 
and strained and bent the relief systems, the basic concepts and social 




The governor general was there with Lady Bessborough. So were 
Winnipeg’s mayor, Colonel Ralph Webb, and Manitoba’s minister of 
Public Works, William R. Clubb. And gathered beneath the leafy elms 
lining St. Mary’s Avenue stood hundreds of Winnipeggers in the late 
afternoon sun. It was mid-August 1932, and all were present to watch 
the laying of the cornerstone at Winnipeg’s new Civic Auditorium. 
With the last few notes of “God Save the King” still ringing from the 
Canadian Legion Band’s horns, Lord Bessborough accepted a trowel 
from the chief contractor and carefully lined the stone’s edges with 
mortar. Into a gap behind the place where the cornerstone would rest, 
William Clubb tucked a container that held some coins, a few papers 
of record, and several copies of recent newspapers. Workmen who had 
been standing nearby then neatly slid the stone into place.1
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The presence of the king’s representative, the Earl of Bessborough, 
governor general of Canada from 1931 to 1935, lent an air of royal specta-
cle to what was already a symbolic occasion. The cornerstone ceremony 
that August afternoon put the finishing touch on one of the last—and 
most impressive—in a series of public works projects designed to pro-
vide work relief to the city’s jobless residents. Built entirely by work-
ers taken from Winnipeg’s unemployment rolls, the Civic Auditorium 
represented thousands of man hours of work to hundreds of the city’s 
married jobless men, many of whom had been without steady income 
for years.
The auditorium was only one of many unemployment relief pro-
jects carried on in Canadian cities between 1930 and 1932. Financed by 
all three levels of government but administered entirely at the local level, 
the projects were designed to provide maximum employment to the 
growing ranks of the nation’s urban unemployed. The projects offered 
significant additional benefits to the cities. For one thing, they provided 
cities with lasting and useful infrastructure at a fraction of what they 
would have cost without federal and provincial financial involvement.2 
For another, the projects typically engaged large local manufacturing 
and construction contracting businesses, helping them to survive the 
economically difficult period.
Cities embarked on the first batch of projects in the late autumn 
of 1930 under a widespread belief that the economic downturn would 
not last and that work relief would only be needed to carry the cities and 
the unemployed through the coming difficult winter.3 By the following 
autumn, however, the Depression and its effects had only grown worse, 
so cities began another series of relief projects, again with the hope that 
the spring would bring some respite. When it did not, municipal gov-
ernments clamoured once more for federal and provincial financing 
for further work relief projects, but this time the senior governments 
were unwilling or unable to help. No new jointly funded major work 
relief projects would be forthcoming in the autumn of 1932; the era of 
national urban work-for-wages schemes was over. Thereafter, and for the 
remainder of the Depression, cities could only offer their urban unem-
ployed relatively modest jobs such as street sweeping or snow shovelling. 
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Dissatisfied, city authorities continued to impress upon both the fed-
eral and provincial governments the need for major jointly funded work 
relief projects, but the upper echelons of government remained reso-
lutely opposed to reanimating the programs that had marked the first 
three years of the Depression.4
City engineers and other technical experts played a central role 
in shepherding city work relief projects from conception to comple-
tion. These men were not social work leaders intent on providing the 
urban unemployed with aid and lifting them from their “demoralized” 
state. They were professional city planners who organized their approach 
to work relief during the early Depression years much like they had 
approached city building and maintenance work in normal times. To 
Figure 4. Winnipeggers enjoy a concert in the newly completed Civic Auditorium, 
1932. For the most part, relief projects were not regarded as boondoggles. Rather, 
municipal authorities felt that these projects contributed something of value to the city 
and often described them as “useful” or “necessary.” Provincial Archives of Manitoba, 
Winnipeg – Buildings – Municipal – Civic Auditorium, Collection item 23, N13469.
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these professionals, work relief meant jobs for the unemployed, not char-
ity for the urban poor. Their work was imbued with rationalist and sci-
entific principles of a Taylorist bent, not with the ideals of professional 
welfare workers, who emphasized case work and focused on the moral 
regulation of the welfare client.
Historian Bonnie Fox Schwartz notes this effect in her examina-
tion of the short-lived Civil Works Administration (CWA) in the United 
States. “Businessmen and efficiency experts,” she argues, “came to domi-
nate the CWA from Washington down to the state and county offices; and 
they ran the program more like an emergency employment corporation 
rather than charitable made work.”5 The work relief programs carried 
out in Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg were similarly dominated 
by city engineers and planners: they proposed the projects, organized 
the labour and materials required to implement them, and managed 
the workers and work distribution through to each project’s comple-
tion. And much like the CWA’s efficiency experts, they shared the spirit 
of the management innovations of the 1920s. According to Schwartz, the 
CWA’s efficiency experts stood in direct conflict with professional social 
workers, resulting in a contest over control of the CWA. In the end, social 
workers failed to support continued federal funding of the CWA after the 
winter of 1934; social workers, Schwartz argues, “saw the CWA as a disrup-
tion of proper case-work counselling, and they resented the engineers 
for usurping their hard-won role as chief dispensers of federal aid to the 
unemployed.”6 With the efficiency experts out of the way after 1934, the 
social workers could resume control over unemployment relief. There is 
little evidence of such a contest in Prairie cities during the same period, 
but, according to historian James Struthers, Canada’s most famous social 
worker, Charlotte Whitton, saw in the federal government’s abandon-
ment of work relief as an unemployment relief measure a “golden oppor-
tunity for the professionalizing of the dole.”7
In large measure, the direction of public works relief projects 
was governed by the local peculiarities in the orientations of city plan-
ners, city engineers, and citizens. Edmonton, for example, directed its 
work relief efforts mainly at sewerage and gravelling projects—the nuts 
and bolts of city infrastructure—while Saskatoon and Winnipeg both 
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pursued grander projects such as the Broadway Bridge and the Civic 
Auditorium, respectively. A concert hall, several bridges, various build-
ings, riverbank improvements, grading and gravelling and brush work 
projects, and major sewerage construction: all reflected city officials’ 
ideas about what their cities needed. During these difficult years, infra-
structure needs were, of course, always measured against the amount of 
work (the number of man hours, for example) that the project might 
offer the unemployed.8
Public works projects in Prairie cities—as well as relief administra-
tion generally—were carried out within the wider context of the expan-
sion in both size and influence of the cities themselves. The sheer growth, 
nothing short of astronomical, of Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg 
through the three decades leading to the Depression (see table 2) 
had transformed those places from mere contenders to three of the most 
important political, economic, and cultural centres in Canada.
CITIES AND CITy BuILDING  
IN THE EARLy 1900s
Authorities in the emerging five metropolises on the Canadian Prairies—
Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Edmonton—sensed keenly 
the promised wealth from the agricultural and settlement boom of the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Boosters believed that in order 
Table 2 Population growth in Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg, 1901 to 1931
1901 1911 1921 1931
Edmonton 3,000 25,000 59,000 79,000
Saskatoon 341 12,000 26,000 43,000
Winnipeg 48,000 157,000 229,000 295,000a
a This figure includes “greater Winnipeg.” The actual city population in 1931 was 179,000.
SOuRCE: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Seventh Census of Canada, 1931 
(Ottawa: J. O. Patenaude, King’s Printer, 1935).
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to capture the largest possible share of that wealth, city administra-
tions had to develop their cities’ industrial bases and urban infrastruc-
ture before their rivals, the smaller but equally ambitious surrounding 
cities, towns, and settlements.9 The early 1900s were therefore marked 
by building and city service construction on a scale never before 
seen on the Canadian Prairies. Newly formed cities like Edmonton, 
Saskatoon, Regina, and Calgary embarked on mad infrastructure con-
struction in an effort to keep pace with the booming real estate and 
agriculture-related markets then buffeting their borders—in Saskatoon 
alone, 267 independent real estate offices struggled to manage all the 
buying and selling and speculation. By 1912, Saskatoon had constructed 
forty-one miles of concrete sidewalk, one of the hallmarks distinguish-
ing a growing and important metropolitan centre; the concrete walks 
replaced the earlier boardwalk street perimeters and guarded city folk’s 
boots and shoes from the muck of the streets. A combined total of 
nearly eighty miles of sewers and water mains carried Saskatonians’ 
waste out of the city proper and provided homes and businesses with 
fresh running water.10 Eleven miles of street railway tracks transported 
citizens in and out of the downtown core.11 New banking buildings; 
agricultural implement company buildings; hotels and retail stores; 
schools, including the new provincial university; churches; and other 
civic buildings sprang up rapidly after the arrival of three branch rail 
lines in 1908.12
In Edmonton, the process of city building was well under way by 
1905. In December of that year, the city engineering department reported 
to the city commissioners that it had produced eleven miles of sidewalks, 
graded most city streets, and set up fifty-three street lights.13 Two years 
later, the city boasted a new street railway along Jasper Avenue, a water-
works department capable of pumping 5.5 million gallons of water each 
day, thirty-two miles of water mains, and twenty-five miles of sewers. The 
boom in the years prior to World War I saw even more development, as 
the population grew from 18,500 in 1908 to 63,000 in 1913, following the 
incorporation of Strathcona into the city.14
At the same time, Winnipeg was emerging as an important indus-
trial and commercial centre.15 Manitoba’s industrial output (of which 
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Winnipeg produced the bulk) stood at $13 million in 1900. Ten years 
later, it had grown to $54 million. Behind the growing industrial output, 
of course, was a growing industrial workforce that demanded more city 
services like roads and sidewalks, streetcars, housing developments, and 
electricity, sanitation, and sewer systems.16 A well-pleased Winnipeg 
Board of Trade reported in 1905 that “a greater amount of public works 
was carried out in 1904 than in any preceding year.”17 In that year, the 
city had built seventeen miles of asphalt, thirty-three miles of macadam, 
sixteen miles of block pavement, twenty-three miles of artificial stone, 
and 186 miles of plank walks. The sanitation department had also been 
busy, constructing eighty-seven miles of sewers and ninety-nine miles of 
water mains.18 By 1906, Winnipeg’s city council had convinced itself and 
the city’s ratepayers to form the publicly owned and operated Winnipeg 
City Hydro to generate enough electricity to service the city’s growing 
domestic and industrial needs.19 Construction of a power-generating sta-
tion at Pointe du Bois, some 150 kilometres northeast of the city, began 
three years later, and Winnipeg received its first power from the site in 
1911. In the postwar years, city building slowed considerably from the 
rapid pace of the century’s first two decades, partly because of slower 
population growth through the 1920s.20 In part, too, the slowdown was 
due to the uncertain economic times of the early to mid-1920s, when the 
recession that had begun in 1913 reasserted itself following the Great War. 
But the intensive city building through the early boom years meant that 
the three Prairie cities had laid the basic infrastructure groundwork by 
the end of the Great War, and thereafter, this groundwork required pri-
marily maintenance work rather than outright replacement.
By the 1920s, few people (not least the municipal officials them-
selves) doubted which cities flexed the greatest political, economic, 
and cultural muscle on the Canadian Prairies. Nor would any deny the 
future import to both the region and the nation of cities like Edmonton, 
Saskatoon, and Winnipeg. In fact, the fortunes of those cities were part of 
a much larger, continent-wide trend that would see the growing promi-
nence of the urban, often at the expense of the rural. In the United States, 
extensive railroad networks, and the access those networks provided to 
Midwestern raw resources (especially coal and iron ore), transformed 
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cities like Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Chicago into titans of steel 
and iron fabrication through the late nineteenth century. Thereafter, 
based on that early industrial growth, Midwestern cities emerged 
through the first three decades of the twentieth century as the primary 
sites for the production of one of the most important commodities of 
the twentieth century: the automobile.21 Although William Cronon’s 
Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West offers a much bleaker view 
of the rise of the industrial city through the same period, Cronon never-
theless shows how western cities (like his Chicago) emerged out of the 
Great War as economic, political, and, increasingly, cultural power cen-
tres. This shift would come later to the Canadian Prairies than elsewhere 
since agriculture dominated Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba until 
at least the end of the Second World War. However, all the early signs 
of growing metropolitan power were already in evidence at the onset 
of the Depression: skyrocketing population growth, intensive infra-
structure building, and increasingly complex bureaucratic forms. In 
Winnipeg, for instance, important rail lines like the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, the Northern Pacific, the Canadian Northern, and the Grand 
Trunk–National Transcontinental linked that city with critical regional, 
national, and continental markets, thus securing access to much larger 
markets for Winnipeg business interests.22
uRBAN WORK RELIEF AT THE BEGINNING  
OF THE DEpRESSION
Municipally initiated work relief schemes were not uncommon fea-
tures of the urban landscape even before the onset of the Depression. 
Local improvement projects, typically small scale and seasonally based, 
offered underemployed labourers limited opportunities to earn some 
money between the end of the harvest season and the beginning of 
the spring construction season.23 The conventional wisdom during 
recessions or periods of seasonal market instability was that work relief 
was preferable to direct relief. Work relief kept men busy, reinforced 
the work ethic, and limited the possibility of welfare dependence. 
 Building Cities 101
Throughout the recession of the early 1920s, for example, the federal 
government, while maintaining that unemployment relief was a local 
responsibility, nevertheless offered some financing of public works 
designed to create employment.24 By 1929, little had changed in this 
approach to unemployment relief.25 “The main question is already 
settled,” declared the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix on 8 November 1929. “It 
is agreed that work is the best solution of any unemployment prob-
lem and that public authorities should, so far as possible, spread their 
spending programs over the winter season.” The editor of the Manitoba 
Free Press concurred: “Public works, which are needed and which the 
public funds can afford, should . . . be undertaken.”26
By autumn 1929, when municipal governments began feeling the 
Depression’s first effects, they already had in place a tradition of work 
relief. Due to the difficult situation in which the cities found themselves 
that winter, the provinces agreed to bear a portion of the costs associated 
with winter public works construction in the western cities.27 Saskatoon 
officials learned of the Saskatchewan government’s plan to aid the munic-
ipality in late December. Wary of the increasingly sticky issue of respon-
sibility for the unemployed, the provincial government took great pains 
to iterate Saskatoon’s basic responsibility for its own unemployment 
problems. The provincial minister of Railways, Labour, and Industries 
did admit, however, that in extraordinarily “acute” or “widespread” unem-
ployment conditions, the federal and provincial governments had both 
the reason and the obligation to provide some form of unemployment 
relief. But by the minister’s estimation, Saskatoon’s entire jobless popu-
lation—including both single and married men—numbered only 327.28 
In a city of little more than forty-three thousand, this hardly qualified as 
either acute or widespread. Saskatoon’s own count of its jobless popula-
tion, though, was at least twice this number.29 The discrepancy between 
the numbers probably speaks more to the shortcomings in the province’s 
method of counting than to any conscious exaggeration of the problem 
on the part of the city: the provincial officials arrived at their estimate 
by counting only those men who had registered at the provincial unem-
ployment office. In any case, provincial authorities undoubtedly recog-
nized the inaccuracy of their official count because they asked the cities 
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for submissions of potential public works that could provide jobs to the 
province’s urban unemployed over the coming winter.
Despite this encouraging tone, the Saskatchewan government, 
along with the provincial administrations in Alberta and Manitoba, had 
serious reservations about establishing, without the participation of the 
federal government, any real and far-reaching unemployment policy that 
would undoubtedly set dangerously costly precedents. Saskatchewan 
officials suggested that civic administrators develop alternate plans for 
tackling the unemployment problem because, as the deputy minister 
of Railways, Labour, and Industries had explained, “the furnishing of 
employment cannot of necessity be undertaken in every city of this prov-
ince.”30 At the same time, provincial authorities across the Prairies rea-
soned that some limited provincial funding for municipal relief works, 
modelled after the federal emergency relief schemes of the early 1920s, not 
only would ease the urban unemployment problem and pacify munici-
pal demands but would do so at a small political and economic cost to 
the province. After all, provincial aid in small enough doses toward what 
was widely understood to be a local responsibility was viewed as nothing 
more than an emergency palliative move, an explicitly short-term cure 
for an expected short-term ill.
In Saskatchewan, this meant that the province was prepared to 
contribute two-thirds of the extra costs associated with winter public 
works construction. Although local improvements were generally more 
efficiently carried out during the summer, efficiency was not the main 
goal of the provincial scheme. Winter construction, the province rea-
soned, would not only provide more men with more work, but it would 
do so when that work was needed most. The province also promised to 
reimburse the city for sharpening picks, one of the few tools permitted 
on relief jobs; maintain worksite shacks for the men; and keep gravel 
roads open for construction purposes on any project falling under the 
scheme. The program was not, however, intended to help finance any 
work that the city would normally carry out under less adverse economic 
conditions unless the men were employed “solely for the purpose of 
providing unemployment relief.”31 Nor did the province allow the city 
to charge materials or equipment purchases against the relief scheme, 
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mainly because these had a residual value outlasting the winter. And 
while the province was prepared to contribute financially, it would not 
assume any responsibility for the administration of the relief projects. 
The Saskatchewan government expected Saskatoon’s civic authorities not 
only to determine the “nature and extent” of the proposed projects but 
also to take full responsibility for the rotation of the men at work, ensur-
ing that “as many men as possible should share in the work provided.”32
Upon hearing of the province’s promised financial aid, Saskatoon’s 
engineering department immediately set about drawing up plans for 
storm sewers, a sewerage outlet at Eleventh Street, and a water-main 
extension along Eighth Avenue. According to engineering department 
estimates, the province would be responsible for nearly $20,000 under 
the scheme. The city’s chief engineer selected the three projects care-
fully according to certain criteria: they all demanded large amounts of 
hand labour, the city considered them useful and necessary, and they 
were expected to employ some 350 married men over the coming winter. 
With rotating shifts of sixty different men each week, each man would 
receive one week of work out of every six-week period. With a minimum 
wage of forty-five cents per hour, each worker would earn an average of 
twenty-two dollars in a week.33
Although helpful, the provincial interventions hardly matched the 
magnitude of the unemployment crisis facing the cities. The provinces 
soon added their voices to the municipal chorus calling for the federal 
government to accept some responsibility for unemployment relief. For 
his part, not only did Prime Minister Mackenzie King maintain that the 
federal government had no responsibility for any urban unemployment 
problem, but he even denied that a problem existed. For all his political 
savvy, he vastly underestimated the depths into which some parts of the 
country had fallen. Over the winter and early spring of 1929–30, how-
ever, the urban unemployment rate grew ever higher, and it was not long 
before the crisis had assumed such proportions that the federal govern-
ment could continue to ignore it only at its peril. King’s Liberals paid for 
his mistake in the 1930 general election.
The newly elected Conservative prime minister, Richard Bedford 
Bennett, true to his election promise to find work for all who were 
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willing “or perish in the attempt,” introduced a series of unemploy-
ment relief acts designed to provide work to all who were willing.34 The 
Unemployment Relief Act, passed in 1930 and in effect for one year, and 
the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act, passed in 1931 and likewise in 
effect for a single year, provided a legislative framework that allowed the 
federal government to enter into agreements with provincial govern-
ments to finance urban work relief schemes. It was under the legislative 
authority of these two acts that most of the urban work relief projects 
in the early 1930s took place. But the legislative framework, despite the 
hope it offered, was unwieldy, requiring municipal authorities to submit 
relief work proposals to their respective provincial governments for 
approval rather than to the federal government directly. The provinces 
would then resubmit those proposals to Ottawa, and federal funding for 
approved projects would finally flow back to the cities through the pro-
vincial governments. This complicated system reduced federal costs sig-
nificantly by downloading administrative tasks to the municipalities. It 
also nicely upheld the fiction that unemployment relief remained a local 
responsibility by staying inside the bounds of constitutional divisions of 
powers.35 Still, the two unemployment relief acts offered considerable 
aid to the cities. In the first one, the federal government promised to bear 
25 percent of the material and labour costs of approved urban work relief 
projects. Upon federal approval of a given project, the provinces would 
match the federal contribution, leaving 50 percent of the work relief cost 
to the municipality. The second relief act, even more attractive to cities, 
doubled the amount of Ottawa’s contribution to approved urban work 
relief programs.
THE CASE FOR WORK RELIEF
 Benefits for Cities
That these “emergency” measures should have taken the form of work 
relief rather than direct relief, or “doles,” is in some ways surprising.36 
After all, municipal, provincial, and federal authorities knew that from 
a short-term cost perspective, work relief was far more expensive than 
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direct relief. Whereas simple payments made to the unemployed, either 
in cash or in kind, cost cities only the relief itself plus a small admin-
istrative output, work relief typically involved the labour costs—again, 
in the form of cash wages or kind—plus the often considerable cost 
of materials. Depending on the sort of work relief on order, this could 
range anywhere from a small initial outlay for snow shovels or brooms 
to some 40 percent of the costs associated with more substantial pro-
jects like buildings or bridges.
Edmonton’s chief engineer made clear the difference in cost 
between work relief and direct relief in a letter to the city commissioner 
in June 1931: “Sewer construction including labor and material, seems to 
run about $12.00 per man day, whereas on the other extreme, direct relief 
. . . was 49.3¢ per man day last winter.”37 For smaller projects like grad-
ing, the difference was less extreme, but even these ventures cost cities 
roughly 50 percent more than straight direct relief. For every dollar spent 
on labour costs of grading jobs in Edmonton, for example, the city spent 
a further fifty cents or more, depending on the work, on associated costs 
such as pay for foremen, horse teams, equipment, and extra lunches for 
the men. In December 1931, Edmonton’s chief engineer explained that 
“in the case of sidehill grading, the roads have to be gravelled later on, 
protection fences and draining facilities have to be supplied, and recur-
ring annual maintenance costs are involved.”38 Clearly, dollar for dollar, 
direct relief consistently cost cities less than work relief.
Still, useful and necessary local improvements at half the usual 
price, even if the municipality’s half was borrowed, was an offer no city 
could easily refuse. “The decision that the federal government will finance 
the unemployment schemes is of tremendous importance to Saskatoon 
and the province,” Saskatoon’s mayor, John Hair, explained in September 
1931, “as it will mean that money will be obtainable for this work at a 
much lower rate than could be obtained by either the cities or the prov-
ince. The probable saving will be approximately 20% on the cost.”39 Even 
after the provinces and the federal government could no longer afford to 
support urban work relief, cities insisted on using government contribu-
tions to direct relief toward wages on local improvement schemes when-
ever they could.40 After all, municipal authorities thought, the economic 
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downturn would probably end soon, but the improvements would con-
tinue to serve the city for years, even decades, to come.
One consistent theme running through most local discussions of 
possible work relief programs was an insistence that they be necessary 
and useful. City administrators knew that the city’s own contributions 
to work relief programs would be palatable to city ratepayers and non-
ratepayers alike only if they met this criterion. Useful projects, moreo-
ver, enhanced a city’s stature immeasurably. The Broadway Bridge, for 
example, had long been considered by Saskatoon’s city council as a 
much needed traffic conduit connecting the popular Broadway district 
on the city’s south side with its downtown.41 The bridge would also go 
a long way toward relieving traffic on the decrepit Nineteenth Street 
Bridge. Although its construction irritated several shopkeepers along the 
top of Broadway near the river for several months, the city’s ratepayers 
overwhelmingly supported the project, both as a relief measure and as 
a critical addition to the city.42 Winnipeg’s city council was likewise 
“very desirous” of building the Civic Auditorium, for its cultural value 
as well as its promise of substantial employment for Winnipeg’s jobless.
Both Winnipeg and St. Boniface similarly considered their 
Norwood and Assiniboine bridge projects “absolutely necessary,” mainly 
because of increased traffic across the older bridges from St. Boniface, 
Dawson Trail, St. Mary’s Road, and St. Anne’s Road. The two cities also 
anticipated that the bridges would form a connecting link to the Trans-
Canada Highway. Likewise, responding to criticism of the construction 
of Alberta’s Bowker Building in 1934, Superintendent of Buildings D. E. 
McDonald argued that it was “an absolute necessity” because the prov-
ince had been “up against it for office space.” The building, of course, 
was also “a great assistance especially to the labor men in the City of 
Edmonton and provided employment for a great number.”43
This is not to suggest that everyone agreed on which projects were 
necessary, or even useful. In December 1931, for example, Edmonton’s 
city council sought to have the construction of a bridge over the Rat 
Creek ravine built as a relief project under the Unemployment and Farm 
Relief Act. Despite heavy promotion in the Edmonton Journal’s editorial 
pages and the clear support of city council, M. J. Warner of the Cromdale 
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Community League registered the league’s opposition to the project, 
insisting that the ravine be filled in instead.44 Both the Highlands 
Community League and the Westmount Community League agreed, 
arguing that a fill-in would offer the local unemployed more work and 
could employ more men.45 The Eastwood Community League, however, 
was “unanimously in favour” of the proposed bridge, but only if it was 
built with reinforced concrete since this would “employ local labour 
entirely.” The League argued that although a steel structure might last 
longer, most of its fabrication would occur elsewhere, doing Edmonton’s 
local unemployed no good. A steel bridge, the league continued, “would 
not add the colour or beauty of a concrete structure.”46 As for the fill-
in proposal, Mrs. C. W. Lee, secretary of the Local Council of Women, 
“strenuously objected to this bridge being replaced by a fill” because it 
would destroy “the beauty of the surroundings of a natural park.”47 The 
Edmonton Art Club similarly recommended that no ravines be filled 
unless and when the city grew so large as to require the space for resi-
dences or businesses. Like Mrs. Lee, the club wished to retain the area’s 
natural beauty.48 In the end, despite the pockets of local opposition, the 
bridge project went ahead as a steel structure.49 The bridge was com-
pleted some four months later and opened to public traffic on 30 April 
1932. We can only speculate what the city council thought of the opposi-
tion, but it seems likely that any opposition was too weak, or considered 
so by council, to make much difference.50
 Benefits for Business
In addition to providing work for the unemployed, work relief went 
some way toward maintaining the many contracting and construction 
companies operating in the cities. Because private sector building all 
but stopped during the Depression, bridge and building construction, 
storm sewer work, and gravelling and paving jobs helped these busi-
nesses survive. Seeking the contract for the bridge project in Winnipeg, 
for example, the Dominion Bridge Company appealed to Premier 
Bracken. “What I have most at heart,” the company’s vice-president 
wrote in October 1930, “is the fact that this is the only work coming 
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up in this territory which would enable us to keep our plant working 
during the winter months.” If the contract went elsewhere, “we will be 
compelled to close down our plant.”51 In seeking a contract for supply-
ing brick for Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium in February 1932, the man-
ager of Alsip Brick, Tile, and Lumber Company similarly noted that 
“our men are suffering in common with every one else, and we plead 
their case for them.”52
In fact, these firms consistently appealed to the cities and prov-
inces, especially when they learned that work relief projects had been 
approved at senior levels of government. Upon learning of Edmonton’s 
plans to construct a reinforced concrete bridge crossing Groat Creek 
ravine early in 1931, for instance, the Poole Construction Company 
offered to do the job for a competitive price of $1,900, promising that 
“all labour would be supplied under relief conditions and material by 
or through the city.” Consulting with the city’s chief engineer as to 
whether Poole should be awarded the contract, City Commissioner 
Leslie discovered that the city’s engineering department had already 
made a start on the bridge using its own employees. In this case, even 
though the chief engineer believed that Poole could do the job just 
as well, the company’s offer was turned down. Contracting out could 
prove to be a time-consuming process, and the bridge needed to be 
completed before the end of April or Edmonton would risk losing the 
75 percent contribution from the federal and provincial governments 
under the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act.53
Work relief generally took the form of construction. Not only did 
construction work employ large numbers of men, but it also aided the 
construction industry, whose general economic health was a key indi-
cator of municipal prosperity.54 Fearful of losing businesses and facto-
ries and their taxes, especially the general wealth they represented and 
the employment they generated, the cities had a real economic interest 
in maintaining the impression that work was going on, that they were 
dealing with the problem.55 “Enterprise breeds enterprise,” the editor of 
the Edmonton Bulletin pointed out in November 1929. “Lethargy induces 
stagnation. A progressive city encourages private investment and draws 
population. Nobody wants to live or invest money in a city whose people 
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seem to take for granted that their community has run its course and 
reached its maximum development.”56
Prescriptive letters to city administrators also almost invariably 
counselled work relief over direct relief as the best method to deal with 
the unemployment problem. The heads of contracting concerns and 
building associations, steel mill and quarry owners, lumber operators 
and coal dealers all expressed a consistent desire for the institution of 
public works relief over the dole. W. H. Carter of Winnipeg’s Carter-
Halls-Aldinger construction company castigated Manitoba’s deputy 
minister of Public Works for moving the province’s support in 1933 from 
work relief to direct relief. “As to direct relief,” he wrote, “you and the 
Dominion Government have employed the best brains of the continent 
to study the cheapest method of administering direct relief; you have 
this down to a science. The same thought has not been given to a relief 
works programme.”57 Secretary Lorne Mellish of the Edmonton Builders’ 
Exchange was pleased to learn that the city planned to borrow money 
from the federal government for a works program to avoid relying on 
direct relief.58 Edmonton’s Western Supplies Limited similarly believed 
it “very desirable to proceed with some such useful work at this time 
and the city receive the lasting benefits and reduce to some extent the 
expense in connection with unproductive relief.”59 The company was 
even willing to supply the city with waterworks-related material on 
credit, to be paid for in better times, to “provide some employment 
now when it is needed so badly.”60
The Saskatchewan Association of Architects supported work 
relief because it would benefit not only unemployed men in Saskatoon 
but also anyone involved in constructing a new building, from gen-
eral contractors and subcontractors, to mechanics, labourers, supply 
men, teamsters, hotel and restaurant keepers, railway workers, and busi-
nessmen generally.61 The Winnipeg offices of the Canada Ingot Iron 
Company made a similar case to Manitoba’s minister of Public Works 
in September 1931. The company, specializing in producing corrugated 
metal culverts for sewerage and drain projects, complained that it was 
not receiving an equitable share of provincial and municipal orders for 
relief work. If the provincial and municipal governments failed to make 
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more orders, the company warned, many of its employees would be 
added to the unemployment list.62 Winnipeg’s Building Trades Council, 
for its part, protested that some “so-called ‘work-schemes’” involved costs 
that far outweighed their value, resulting in high public expenditures 
with a correspondingly small “social value” to either the unemployed 
or the city at large. But the same objection could not be raised against 
house building. “Apart altogether from the economic aspect of hous-
ing schemes,” the council argued in September 1933, “it is surely a State 
obligation as well as a Health necessity to see to it that the whole of its 
people is decently housed.”63
 The Work Ethic
What also made work relief preferable to direct relief was the difficulty 
that many Prairie residents had with the idea that the unemployed 
should get something for nothing, that the urban jobless might enjoy 
wages without offering up any work or time or effort in exchange. 
These sentiments emerged early, spread widely, and remained consist-
ent throughout the early Depression years among relief policy-makers. 
Winnipeg’s Alderman R. Maybank reported to the secretary of the 
Civic Unemployment Relief Committee, “Our own matter is pecu-
liarly the question of getting further assistance to defray administra-
tion costs and to do away with the system of giving relief without 
any work in return.”64 Maybank added that, according to another 
Winnipeg alderman, even Gideon Robertson, the federal labour min-
ister, felt the same way: Robertson “personally thought it would be 
very much better if we could arrange some such plan because he quite 
agreed with the representations that giving something for nothing 
is destructive of morale.”65 Edmonton’s city council agreed that “all 
men in receipt of relief should be asked to do some work in return.”66 
Saskatoon’s Mayor Hair likewise asserted that “the dole suggestion is 
entirely out of the question.”67 Manitoba’s unemployment relief policy 
stated it most explicitly: “Work is the cure for unemployment, rather 
than ‘Direct Relief’ which is simply a dissimulation of the ‘Dole.’”68 
This sentiment persisted, even as the Depression worsened. Mayor 
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“Fightin’ Joe” Clarke of Edmonton, for example, suggested in 1935 
that “the average citizen . . . whilst sympathetic to meeting the actual 
necessities of the unemployed has a deep aversion to this method of 
relief and invariably insists upon some quid pro quo in the form of 
work in return for the relief provided.”69 A short time later, Clarke 
declared that he did not want to “encourage . . . any recipients of cash 
relief from the taxpayers to think that they do not have to earn the 
money they receive.”70
The economic, political, and social benefits of work relief projects 
underwritten in part by federal and provincial funding were not lost 
on the city officials in charge of relief works, who consequently tried to 
squeeze as many items as possible related to their projects into the tri-
partite work relief agreements. But keeping a close eye on city reimburse-
ment statements were federal and provincial accountants and comptrol-
lers, whose task it was to ensure that the cities were not taking unfair 
advantage of government contributions. While generally supportive of 
the work ethic, federal and provincial officials indicated very clearly what 
their funds could and could not be used for. Typically, such funds could 
not be applied toward the purchase of any materials or equipment—
graders, tractors, hoists, shovels, assorted tools—that would have a resid-
ual life beyond a project’s completion, although some small compensa-
tion was offered to cover the rental of some items. Nor, in the case of 
Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium, would the province pay for furnishings 
or other equipment inside the building.71 The same was true for any 
departmental expenses or overhead costs. In Edmonton, for example, this 
meant that fully 10 percent of any relief project’s cost fell outside of its 
relief work agreements with the federal and provincial governments.72 
Where cities did submit expenses above and beyond what those govern-
ments regarded as legitimate, senior officials typically thwarted their 
efforts. “From time to time certificates of expenditure are received which 
include amounts for equipment . . . which have a residual value,” federal 
Commissioner of Unemployment Relief Harry Hereford admonished 
Manitoba officials in 1932. “It has been ruled that the Dominion govern-
ment will not contribute to the cost of items of this nature.”73 In that 
particular case, the city was not reimbursed for those items.
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puBLIC WORKS RELIEF pROjECTS: THE FIRST 
uNEMpLOyMENT RELIEF ACT
 Winnipeg’s Twin Bridges
On 4 September 1930, just a few short weeks before the Unemployment 
Relief Act passed in Ottawa, Manitoba’s Public Works minister met 
with representatives of the cities of Winnipeg and St. Boniface to “find 
some way of financing the building of the Assiniboine and Norwood 
Bridges.”74 The proposal had three parts: demolishing two narrow 
bridges constructed earlier in the century; opening and widening the 
streets leading to the proposed spans, a co-operative venture involving 
both Winnipeg and St. Boniface; and constructing the two new bridges 
themselves. Engineers from both cities estimated the cost of the project 
at a little over $1 million and expected the work to provide employ-
ment for some four hundred men.75
Everyone at the meeting agreed with Winnipeg’s Alderman 
Honeyman that the construction project was probably “the best method 
of meeting the [unemployment] problem.”76 But everyone also recog-
nized that, as Honeyman pointed out, “it would be impossible in these 
hard times to have the rate-payers pay for this expensive scheme and 
the only way we can undertake it is to bring as attractive a scheme as 
possible before the people.”77 In fact, Honeyman’s colleague on council, 
Alderman A. J. Doucet, was skeptical of the whole scheme. “It will be 
many months before anything can be done on the project,” he said. “If 
1000 men, which I consider a minimum, were employed on the construc-
tion work, it would cost $3000 a day for wages, taking $3 a day as the aver-
age wage. It would take at least 100 days to complete the work, making 
$300,000 for wages.”78 Alderman Murchison of St. Boniface agreed: “If 
the federal government cannot see its way to financing the whole project 
with convenient terms for repayment of our share of the cost, then I 
think we can go no further.”79
Making relief work programs attractive to city ratepayers chiefly 
meant spreading their costs across as many jurisdictions as possible. Like 
other public works proposals drawn up that autumn in cities across 
the Prairies, the joint Winnipeg–St. Boniface bridge project depended 
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heavily on contributions from the federal and provincial governments. 
Winnipeg and St. Boniface certainly intended “to take advantage of the 
Ottawa Unemployment scheme.” Manitoba’s Public Works minister, 
W. R. Clubb, told the representatives of the two municipalities that if 
Ottawa agreed to contribute to the bridge construction, the provincial 
government would “give some assistance.”80
The idea for the two spans was based on studies of current and 
future traffic patterns conducted in both Winnipeg and St. Boniface. 
Those studies concluded that both bridges would serve the two munici-
palities immediately, as well as in the near future when, or so city planners 
expected, the main Trans-Canada Highway would enter the area across 
the spans.81 At that time, the main Trans-Canada Highway followed a 
course northward, veered east to Whitemouth, and then turned south 
where it connected with Ontario. “I think that as years go by the pre-
sent location of the Highway will cut straight through to the Springfield 
road,” Honeyman pointed out, “and therefore this bridge is needed not 
only for the present needs but for future needs.”82 The idea was to con-
struct a main arterial route running from St. Boniface on the south side 
of the Assiniboine to Winnipeg on the river’s north side, just west of 
where it intersects with the Red. Two bridges were required because the 
route would cross both rivers.
The twin spans, city planners and the two city councils believed, 
would increase traffic through the cities, enhancing the wealth of both. 
This was a point that business interests in both cities insisted be made 
directly to Ottawa. “When we ask for financial support of the federal 
government, the need for unemployment relief must be stressed,” David 
Campbell, the representative of the four trade boards in the two cities, 
urged those present at the meeting. “It must also be stressed that the 
project will be a connecting link in a federal highway.”83 A Manitoba Free 
Press reporter concurred, arguing that construction of the two bridges 
“would be links in a new highway from Winnipeg to the south, run-
ning down the east side of the Red River, or via Pliney to the border.”84 
Easier access to American markets, the writer reasoned, could only be 
good for Winnipeg. Importantly, the bridges also promised to strengthen 
transportation and communication networks between St. Boniface and 
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Winnipeg, a connection that the Winnipeg Electric Company was happy 
to support. The company offered $50,000 to the project for “the laying of 
rails and other railroad equipment across both structures” and for rea-
ligning tracks from the “north side of the Assiniboine bridge into the 
Main Street street car houses.”85
With the city councils’ arguments in hand, Premier Bracken and 
a delegation of representatives from both cities, together with the prov-
ince’s minister and deputy minister of Labour, travelled to Ottawa the 
following day, and on 1 October 1930, they entered into an agreement 
with the federal government.86 Though city officials welcomed the fed-
eral and provincial commitments of $170,000 each, the news resulted 
in squabbling between the city councils of Winnipeg and St. Boniface. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, disputes centred around how to divide the costs 
of the municipal share of the projects. Cost-sharing arrangements for the 
Main Street Bridge on the Winnipeg side of the Assiniboine was not in 
dispute: Winnipeg would assume the entire $240,000 municipal share, 
leaving $120,000 each to the federal and provincial governments. But 
the Norwood Bridge crossing the Red required the two cities to divide 
the $280,000 municipal share. In earlier meetings of representatives for 
both cities, it had been agreed that because citizens of St. Boniface were 
more likely than Winnipeg residents to rely on the Norwood Bridge, 
St. Boniface would contribute two-thirds of the municipal share. In 
mid-October, St. Boniface’s city council balked, insisting that the two 
cities each contribute half of the municipal share of the cost of both 
bridges.87 Winnipeg’s Alderman E. D. Honeyman urged a speedy resolu-
tion to the dispute, suggesting that “should the electorate of Winnipeg 
or St. Boniface turn down the proposition their one chance at securing a 
half million dollar improvement at half-price will be lost forever.”88 One 
month later, the two cities were still deadlocked, but now St. Boniface 
suggested that if it paid two-thirds of the municipal share, then 80 per-
cent of the unskilled labour employed on the job should come from 
its unemployment rolls.89 Not until the end of November did the city 
councils sort out their differences, agreeing that St. Boniface would pay 
two-thirds of the municipal share on the understanding that two-thirds 
of the unskilled labour would be St. Boniface men.90
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Once the agreement had been struck, Winnipeg’s Civic Unem–
ployment Relief Committee appointed a special committee to get the 
project started. One of the committee’s first steps was to appoint A. J. 
Taunton, a member of the Board of Engineers, to serve as resident engi-
neer for both bridges at a salary of $500 per month. The appointment 
was critical: Taunton held primary responsibility for arranging purchase 
orders and requisitions, certifying payrolls, and following procedures for 
passing accounts and establishing progress estimates. He was also respon-
sible for making recommendations to the committee on tenders received 
from companies eager to carry out the various tasks associated with the 
bridges’ construction, as well as for overseeing the entire bidding pro-
cess. All contracts, ranging from suppliers for piers and abutments to 
steel fabrication and erection, passed first across Taunton’s desk, and the 
committee, relying heavily on Taunton’s engineering expertise, awarded 
the contracts based solely on his recommendations.91 On the engineer’s 
advice, the committee issued tenders for steel fabrication, having decided 
to construct the bridges using a steel superstructure, and accepted the 
Dominion Bridge Company’s bid of $136 per ton.92 Shortly thereafter, 
some three hundred unemployed steelworkers were busy at the bridge 
company’s shop fabricating steel for the bridges. Early in the new year, 
another three hundred unemployed men would find work doing the 
actual construction.93
 Saskatoon’s Subway and Sewerage Work
Not surprisingly, other cities followed steps similar to those established 
in Winnipeg. When news of the Dominion scheme reached Saskatoon, 
for example, Mayor John Hair presented the provincial government in 
Regina with an ambitious $700,000 unemployment relief work scheme 
prepared by the city’s engineering department. The proposal included a 
street subway, storm sewer work, and a new wing for the City Hospital.94 
Saskatoon went through the same process as Winnipeg, submitting its 
work relief program to the province, which in turn sought approval 
for funds from the federal Unemployment Relief Act appropriation. 
The province approved the city’s plan of $300,000 for the subway and 
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$150,000 for the storm sewer work, both of which promised employ-
ment to Saskatoon’s unskilled jobless labourers, but dismissed the 
$250,000 proposal for the new hospital wing. In defending its decision, 
the province argued that the hospital project would employ primarily 
tradesmen, and Saskatoon tradesmen were already engaged on other 
work throughout the city. The money, provincial authorities explained, 
would be better spent on a building in Regina.95
The “subway,” essentially a rail bridge crossing over Nineteenth 
Street near Saskatoon’s downtown core, was designed to enhance the 
flow of goods and traffic through the city. Since the subway fell under 
the terms of the Unemployment Relief Act, the federal and provincial 
governments each contributed $50,000 to its cost. Because it would be 
used by the railway companies, the Canadian Pacific and the Canadian 
National railways contributed a further $50,000 apiece to the project, 
leaving $100,000 to be paid by the city.96
 Edmonton’s Roadway Improvements
Edmonton’s work relief scheme, proposed that same autumn, did not 
share the grand scale of the other two cities’ programs, nor did the city 
authorities show much enthusiasm for the federal unemployment leg-
islation. Edmonton’s wan response to the Unemployment Relief Act 
was due in part to the engineering department’s engagement in nearly 
$1 million worth of public works projects, mainly road improvements, 
throughout the city as part of the city’s normal operations through the 
fall and winter of 1930. Although the work was not explicitly directed 
at the unemployment problem, it nevertheless lowered the jobless rate 
considerably in the city. Another reason was the city council’s hesitance 
to commit the city to millions of dollars in costs. Alderman Findlay, 
for one, urged caution. “The council should go slow” in endorsing 
any proposal for work relief under the new act, he pointed out in late 
September 1930, “as it might mean the saddling of the city with ten or 
twenty millions of dollars expenditure.”97 In the end, the city embarked 
on a modest work relief program under the legislation, with the same 
vision as that of authorities in Winnipeg and Saskatoon: improved 
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communication and transportation systems within the city. Through 
the summer and early fall of 1930, the Alberta government had been 
busy constructing highways radiating from Edmonton in all four direc-
tions. Business boosters in the city, such as the editors of the Edmonton 
Bulletin, believed that the city could best complement the new pro-
vincial highways by connecting them “at the boundaries with equally 
good or better roadways leading to the business centre of the city.”98 By 
17 September, the city’s engineering department had drawn up plans 
for more than $200,000 of road construction, paving, grading, and grav-
elling. The largest and most important of these plans was the paving of 
Calgary Trail on the city’s south side to meet up with the new provin-
cial arterial highway connecting Edmonton and Calgary.99
Edmonton’s Calgary Trail improvements, like Saskatoon’s subway 
project and Winnipeg’s bridges, represented city officials’ efforts to bind 
their unemployment relief goals to their city’s current and future infra-
structure needs. Their decision to focus those efforts on improved trans-
portation systems is not surprising. The opening decades of the twentieth 
century had seen the dawn of the mighty automobile age, and automo-
biles, of course, demanded serviceable roads. Cars and trucks were inter-
esting curiosities at the beginning of the century, but by the late 1920s, 
they had become critical means of both personal and commercial trans-
port. It was the First World War in particular, according to American his-
torian Merrill J. Roberts, that illustrated the important benefits of road 
transport.100 Belligerents on both sides made use of some 130,000 motor 
trucks for transporting supplies and troops to great effect through the 
course of the war. Furthermore, the war made accessing rail transport 
in North America more difficult, mainly because rail traffic was largely 
dedicated to moving supplies and troops toward harbours where steam-
ers waited to carry them to the conflagration overseas, forcing Americans 
and Canadians to rely on alternate means of transportation.
After the war, the idea of road transport was on the rise. The 
moderately strong economy of the 1920s, coupled with a trend that saw 
businesses maintaining smaller inventories in-house and consequently 
requiring more shipments of goods more often, made motor transport 
even more attractive. Saskatchewan’s experience is telling. The province 
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registered only fifty-four new motor vehicle licenses in 1907. By 1920, it 
had issued more than sixty thousand.101 Truck transport was more spe-
cific, more direct, and faster than rail transport. While the journey of 
rail-delivered goods ended at the railway depot, motor trucks could 
manoeuvre city streets and ship goods directly to the merchant’s or con-
sumer’s door. Finally, automobile prices declined steadily through the 
1920s, making them more affordable to more prospective motorists.102
THE DEEpENING DEpRESSION: THE SECOND 
uNEMpLOyMENT RELIEF ACT
By the autumn of 1931, the economic situation had grown worse, and 
the number of jobless larger. Serious signs of problems had appeared 
in the spring and summer of that year as the federal Labour minister, 
Senator Gideon Robertson, toured the West.103 Upon his return to 
Ottawa, he described alarming conditions suggesting that neither 
Bennett’s celebrated tariff nor his government’s Unemployment 
Relief Act had made any significant dent in the unemployment situ-
ation. The federal government’s Unemployment and Farm Relief Act 
was designed, according to James Struthers, “to deal with the crisis 
in the West” and was “rushed into Parliament on Dominion Day.”104 
Once again, cities in the West drew up programs of relief based on 
estimates made by their engineering departments and city planners. 
When word of the new federal relief scheme arrived in Saskatoon, for 
example, the city applied for approval of another $300,000 storm sewer 
project. Along with the submission, Mayor Hair reminded provincial 
officials how badly Saskatoon’s jobless were faring, estimating that 
out of a total of fifteen hundred unemployed married men in the 
city, fifty were “very distressing cases.” Considering the acute needs of 
these men and their families, Hair asked the province if the city could 
begin work on enough of the sewer project to provide employment 
for those fifty men.105 Despite the fact that the new act had yet to 
be officially enacted by Parliament, the province approved $30,000 
toward the project.
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 Saskatoon’s Broadway Bridge
For Saskatoon, the sewer project was only the first part of its unemploy-
ment work relief construction plan. Municipal authorities had long 
viewed a bridge crossing the South Saskatchewan from the increasingly 
popular Broadway district on the south side to the downtown core on 
the north as an ideal relief project. In fact, ever since A. E. K. Bunnel, a 
Toronto city planner hired by the City of Saskatoon to advise on needed 
infrastructure works, had suggested the bridge in 1930, city officials had 
seemed to be biding their time, waiting for the right moment to intro-
duce the plan. A new bridge, city officials believed, would not only offer 
a much needed conduit between the Nutana residential area and the 
downtown core but would also relieve traffic on the decrepit and dan-
gerously narrow Nineteenth Street Bridge. “The reason for building the 
bridge in the first place,” City Clerk Tomlinson wrote provincial officials 
in December 1932, a month after the new bridge opened, “was to remove 
street car tracks from the existing traffic bridge on account of the danger 
in operating over such a narrow bridge.” The necessity of the new bridge 
became clear in April 1932, a few months after construction began, when 
a streetcar jumped the track on the older bridge. The city clerk believed 
that it was only “through sheer luck a serious accident did not result.”106 
Shortly after Ottawa announced the new relief act in July1931, Mayor 
Hair, City Commissioner Leslie, and Chief Engineer Archibald dis-
cussed potential capital works that would provide employment for the 
estimated fifteen hundred jobless married residents expected by October. 
The project would need to be large enough to sustain this number of 
unemployed men for twelve months.107 The bridge fit the bill.
By September, the number of jobless married men needing 
employment had grown to twenty-four hundred. Even given Chief 
Engineer Archibald’s estimation that 25 percent of this number were 
physically unfit for manual labour, the city still had to find employment 
for nearly two thousand men.108 Rumours trickling down to Saskatoon’s 
city council through one of the city’s Conservative Mps suggested that 
the federal government would contribute 50 percent of a project’s cost to 
a maximum of $350,000.109 The city’s engineering department estimated 
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the bridge project’s cost at $1.2 million, and city council agreed to top up 
any amount over the $700,000 limit imposed by the legislation. Gaining 
federal and provincial approval for the project, though, was no easy 
matter. Despite submitting the project to provincial authorities in early 
September, the city had heard nothing from Ottawa by late October. As 
a Star-Phoenix writer observed, “The delay in receiving word from Ottawa 
as to the building of the new bridge has created considerable apprehen-
sion that it is not meeting with the approval of federal authorities or that 
financial conditions will not permit of the undertaking.”110
A report leaked to the Star-Phoenix by an eastern correspondent the 
next day, however, suggested that neither federal approval nor financial 
conditions were the cause of the delay. Although the provincial govern-
ment had forwarded the bridge proposal to the federal Department of 
Labour, the paper reported that provincial authorities “did not especially 
press or suggest that this work be undertaken.”111 An indignant Premier 
Anderson responded to the charge almost immediately.
The statement being made at Saskatoon that the provincial 
government has not approved of the proposed bridge is 
entirely erroneous. The whole matter of bridges, including the 
Saskatoon bridge and those bridges over the Saskatchewan 
River, was placed before Hon. G. D. Robertson, minister of 
labor, when he was in Regina last. The request of the City of 
Saskatoon was also taken up in Ottawa by the attorney general 
on his recent visit east. The Saskatchewan government was not 
prepared to recommend an expenditure of $1,200,000 but has 
recommended an expenditure of $1,000,000.112
Anderson’s strong public display of support for the new bridge effec-
tively eliminated any lingering doubts about the success of the applica-
tion. But city officials had counted on and planned for a $1.2 million 
bridge. The $200,000 shortfall compelled city engineers in charge of 
the bridge’s design to return to the drawing board and reduce the pro-
ject’s costs accordingly.
In the early evening of 4 November 1931, Saskatoon Mp F. R. 
MacMillan wired Mayor Hair, unofficially advising him of the federal 
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government’s intended $350,000 commitment to the bridge project.113 
With both federal and provincial approval essentially secured, Saskatoon’s 
city relief machine ground into action. City Clerk Tomlinson issued ten-
ders for the construction, gravel, cement, and steel required for the bridge. 
Chief Engineer Archibald, in consultation with Dean C. J. Mackenzie of 
the University of Saskatchewan’s engineering department, finalized the 
bridge’s design and implementation plans, and the city council, together 
with the provincial government and the Local Government Board, 
discussed and debated financing arrangements.114 The city council’s 
plans, based on engineering department estimates, anticipated a deben-
ture repayment period of fifty years at 5 percent interest—an amount 
that many ratepayers would doubtless have balked at under normal 
economic conditions. But, as a Star-Phoenix writer observed late that 
October, “while the ratepayers of this city are not unanimous in their 
opinion as to the desirability of undertaking such an ambitious project 
at the present time, opposition to the project has not been particularly 
noticeable.”115 Saskatoon’s ratepayers confirmed that assessment nearly 
one month later, voting to pass the debenture bylaw by a margin of four 
to one.116
On a clear, crisp, bitterly cold Saturday morning, Mayor Hair 
returned to Saskatoon on 12 December following a three-day confer-
ence with provincial authorities in Regina. He carried with him a signed 
agreement authorizing the city to begin construction of the Broadway 
Bridge under the terms of the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act.117 
That afternoon, Saskatoon’s city council awarded the bridge construc-
tion contract to the R. J. Arrand Construction Company, whose bid of 
nearly $262,000 was more than $22,000 below that of the next lowest 
bidder. Anticipating the project’s approval, the city engineering depart-
ment had issued tenders for the job and had received wildly varying bids 
from contractors. “The tender of the lowest and successful bidder was 
less than 50% that of the highest,” Dean Mackenzie later recalled, “and the 
nearest responsible bid was 33% higher than that of the lowest bidder.” 
Speculating on the reasons for the wide spread among bids for the 
same job, Mackenzie suggested that the labour and material conditions 
imposed by the provincial and federal governments on the construction 
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project “appeared to contractors to carry heavy risks” and led some con-
tractors to incorporate compensatory amounts into their bids.118
The most important of these conditions, not surprisingly, related 
to the relief workers employed on the project and underscored the city’s 
intention that the construction of the bridge was first and foremost a 
relief project designed to provide maximum employment to the city’s 
jobless. To this end, the contract kept construction machinery to a bare 
minimum so that the bulk of the work would rely on hand labour.119 
This meant that the contractor could use no machinery other than 
cement mixers, pile drivers, hoists, and air hammers. Even the concrete 
that would fill out the bridge’s superstructure could not be poured from 
cement trucks; it would instead be mixed on one side of the river bank, 
put into wheelbarrows, wheeled by hand to the work site, and dumped 
directly into the forms some twelve hundred feet away. Furthermore, the 
city, not the contractor, purchased cement, aggregate, and steel directly 
from local suppliers “in order to provide as much local labor as pos-
sible.”120 Following purchase, those materials were shipped to the work 
site on local trucks driven by relief workers. Once at the site, all materi-
als passed through the hands of relief workers; stone was crushed, sand 
unloaded, even steel bent “on the site by the engineering department, 
using local labor.”121 The contractor was also required to rely almost 
entirely on relief workers taken from the city’s relief rolls; he was allowed 
only three of his own men on the job: a superintendent, a general fore-
man, and an accountant. All other workers were to be rotated according 
to relief schedules designed by the city engineering department accord-
ing to family size, and no worker was allowed to work more than eight 
hours on any given day. Hourly wages were set by the city at a minimum 
of forty-five cents for common labour, ninety cents for carpenters, and 
one dollar for electricians.122 Finally, while the contractor was permitted 
to fire any worker for cause, “the city engineer was made the final court 
of appeal in all disputes.”123
Clearly dominating the job’s work distribution was George D. 
Archibald, the city’s chief engineer. As far as possible, he organized the 
labour like a regular construction contractor giving work to the unem-
ployed rather than like a charity giving alms to the poor. Archibald, 
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together with the contractor, R. J. Arrand, had a bridge to build, not a 
boondoggle to keep idle men occupied. In this spirit, their attention 
from the beginning focused on the practical matters of getting the job 
done. Chief among these was the time restriction imposed both by fed-
eral dictates and by the local weather. The federal government insisted 
that all relief projects carried out under the 1931 Unemployment and 
Farm Relief Act be completed no later than mid-December 1932. If the 
Figure 5. The construction of Saskatoon’s Broadway Bridge, 1932. Relief workers in a 
cofferdam lay the foundations for the bridge’s second pier, using hand shovels to carve 
through the dirt and hard blue clay. In the upper left is the pump house, where river 
water was pumped out of the cofferdam. City of Saskatoon Archives, 1104-003-006.
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engineers wanted to remain within their time limit, they would have to 
work fast. What’s more, by the time construction began, the mid-winter 
weather had turned bitterly cold, promising to make the work difficult 
for the many relief workers employed on the job. Added to this were 
the constant threat of an early spring ice break-up and the possibility of 
June flooding. Over the twelve months ahead, the planning team would 
have to organize materials and labour by drawing on their previous expe-
rience with local seasonal changes. During the first construction stage, 
from New Year’s Day to March 15 over the eleven coldest weeks of the 
year, they would take advantage of the thick ice covering the river to 
construct the bridge’s six piers, four of which would stand in the river.124
To get this first critical job completed in time, work ran continu-
ously day and night, even through Sundays and holidays, according to 
Mackenzie.125 Workers first erected a light scaffolding across the river and 
then constructed wooden forms that sat on the river bed and jutted out 
of the ice; they used cofferdams to clear out the river water from the 
area where the piers would stand. Nine thousand cubic yards of con-
crete, prepared on the banks, was then transported by hand cart along 
the scaffolding to the forms, into which it was poured and left to dry. 
At one point, the temperature dropped in just a few hours to less than 
–30°C, accompanied by a “biting northwest wind.” The cold threatened 
the integrity of the concrete, which had to maintain a temperature of at 
least 32°C in order to pour properly. Workers hurriedly wheeled barrows 
of concrete along twelve hundred feet of rickety open-air scaffolding 
twenty feet above the ice to pour it into the pier forms before it froze.126
After mid-March, even though the river ice typically did not begin 
to break up until at least mid-April, the planning team avoided most 
river work for fear of flooding. In previous years, the river had risen by 
as much as twenty feet between April and June, and the engineers knew 
that such a flood would threaten the whole structure. Between mid-
March and June, then, the planning team set workers on the approach 
spans and retaining walls on either side of the river bank. Despite the 
coming spring, several feet of frost and ice still remained on the banks, 
and a good deal of excavation was required to clear the area. The false-
work and forms for the two arches over the banks were constructed next, 
Figure 6. The elaborate falsework of the Broadway Bridge’s arches, 1932. Workers mixed 
cement on the riverbank of the South Saskatchewan River, loaded it into wheelbarrows, 
and then manoeuvred the wheelbarrows along the narrow wooden trundle before 
dumping it into the pier forms below. City of Saskatoon Archives, 1104-003-045..
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leaving the arches over the river and the surface of the twelve-hundred-
foot span to be constructed after the threat of flooding had passed.127
By October, the bridge’s five arches had been completed, and the 
pavement and street railway tracks had been laid on the bridge’s surface. 
Some eleven months after the project had begun, the Broadway Bridge 
opened to public traffic on 11 November 1932. The bridge’s overall aes-
thetic was subdued. In the words of its designer C. J. Mackenzie, “careful 
attention was given to aesthetic considerations, and especially in view of 
Figure 7. The arch work for the Broadway Bridge, 1932. When the photograph was 
taken, the bridge’s official opening was just over two months away. City of Saskatoon 
Archives, 1104-003-050.
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the nature of the undertaking, all pretentious ornamentation, terminal 
pylons, etc., were avoided and reliance placed in the inherent beauty of 
simple bold outlines and proportions.”128
 Edmonton’s Multiple Projects
Like city engineers across the country, Edmonton’s chief engineer, A. 
W. Haddow, was called upon by city council to draw up a list of possi-
ble relief works in anticipation of the new federal Unemployment and 
Farm Relief Act. The engineer listed twenty-three items totalling a little 
more than $1 million, comparable to the other cities’ plans that summer, 
but none among them was on as grand a scale as Saskatoon’s bridge or 
Winnipeg’s auditorium. Haddow instead proposed a series of sewer and 
drainage projects, some grading, boulevard, and gravelling work, and 
the construction of small bridges over portions of the city’s extensive 
ravine system along the river valley.129 Most of the individual projects 
on the list cost considerably less than $50,000. Compared to Saskatoon’s 
Broadway Bridge and Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium, with estimated 
costs of nearly $1 million each, Edmonton’s plans to spread its resources 
across a number of smaller projects were conservative, to say the least.130
The city commissioner reported to city council on 18 August 1931 
that Edmonton’s program of work had been prepared “primarily to pro-
vide the maximum percentage of labor keeping in view also at the same 
time the permanent requirements of the City.”131 Here was the city plan-
ner at his most pragmatic. That work relief was meant to provide the 
maximum amount of work to the maximum number of unemployed 
married men was a given, but work relief was also designed explicitly 
to fulfill present and future city needs. The city’s aldermen concurred 
with the plans, and the following day, Edmonton’s mayor, with council’s 
approval, travelled to Calgary to meet with Prime Minister R. B. Bennett 
and representatives of the provincial government to discuss their partici-
pation in the city’s work relief plans. Significantly, the council members 
also appointed Chief Engineer Haddow to join the mayor at the Calgary 
conference, thus revealing their anticipation of his critical role in work 
relief negotiations.
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Upon his return to Edmonton some days later, Haddow reported 
to City Commissioner Mitchell that the federal and provincial govern-
ments were “willing to contribute substantially” to the city’s work relief 
plans. This was happy news, considering that the city’s relief officer had 
earlier mentioned to the engineer that some three thousand married 
men were unemployed and on relief in the city, and that their number 
would not decrease until at least April of the following year. But even 
with federal and provincial funding, the city could not provide for all 
unemployed married men on relief. One possible solution, the engineer 
suggested, was to institute “some part time arrangement” so that more 
men could be employed in relief work. Instead of each man working 
full-time at the city’s minimum hourly wage of fifty cents, each man 
would work half-time, or even quarter-time.132
 Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium
Winnipeg likewise initiated a new series of work relief projects in the 
autumn of 1931 in answer to the federal Unemployment and Farm 
Relief Act. After considering a series of possible construction projects, 
the city settled on nearly $1.5 million worth of work, including a new 
relief office, sewer work, the Sargent Baths, and two more new bridges 
at Salter Street and St. James. Upon approval from the province and the 
federal government, the new schemes got underway, and by October 
1931, work crews taken from the city’s five thousand unemployed mar-
ried men were busy working on the relief office and the sewers.133 
Despite the size of the projects begun that autumn, the city still had 
its sights set on a new Civic Auditorium. In early October, Winnipeg’s 
mayor, Ralph Webb, spoke informally with Premier Bracken about it, 
and the matter was taken up in the provincial Cabinet. The Cabinet 
subsequently approved the auditorium, although only offering a little 
more than $150,000 toward the project; the province was prepared to 
submit the proposal to the federal government if the city was able to 
come up with approximately $350,000 toward the cost. With the federal 
contribution of 50 percent of the total cost, the city would have nearly 
$1 million to complete the project.134
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Following some haggling over cost sharing through most of 
October, all three levels of government finally agreed that Winnipeg and 
the Province of Manitoba would each contribute 25 percent of the pro-
ject’s cost, and the federal government would cover the remaining 50 
percent on the assumption that the total cost would be $832,000.135 The 
province, though, insisted that the men be rotated on the job such that 
Figure 8. Relief workers in Winnipeg, 1931. Here, workers prepare the foundations 
of the site that will house the Civic Auditorium. The engineers who organized the 
project insisted on using as little construction machinery as possible. Relying on 
hand labour instead of machine labour meant that more men could find work on the 
project. Provincial Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg – Buildings – Municipal – Civic 
Auditorium, Collection item 10, N9182.
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no one man would work more than one week in three. City engineers 
and architects, moreover, would have to submit construction specifica-
tions, building plans, and all contract terms to both the province and 
the federal government. The city would also have to furnish the land and 
agree to have the building “substantially completed” by 1 May 1932.136
Work on the auditorium began almost immediately, with men 
clearing and grading the land upon which the building would stand and 
then rushing to complete the walls and roof before the first snowfall so 
that workers could stay relatively warm inside through the cold winter 
months. By late December, though, the project was running seriously over 
budget, and the city informed provincial officials that a further $100,000 
was needed to finish the job. A large part of the problem revolved around 
higher-than-expected tenders received from city contractors for various 
parts of the job, including electricity and wiring, ventilation, plumbing, 
and stone construction. The province grudgingly contributed the addi-
tional $100,000, given that the project was well underway, but when the 
city again sought an increase in the budget, this time for another $32,000 
for an all-stone building, the province balked. In a letter to the city 
clerk, Public Works Minister W. R. Clubb stated firmly, “The Provincial 
Government . . . is very desirous of having it definitely understood that 
the maximum price of all relief works must be considered as fixed and 
not subject to increase.” Turning down the city’s request, Clubb ordered 
“that a very careful canvass shall be made into all phases of the building 
with a view of effecting the greatest possible saving.”137
Following the province’s refusal, Winnipeg’s city council asked 
the engineering department, including the city architects, whether it 
would endorse any changes that might bring the cost down. The first to 
go from the auditorium plans was more than thirteen feet off the height 
of the main building, entirely eliminating the planned third floor. Chief 
architect G. W. Northwood explained that the change would not affect 
the auditorium’s “essential features.” It would, however, mean that the 
building’s upper balcony could not be built, reducing the main audi-
torium’s seating capacity from 4,500 to 4,150. A small antechamber off 
the main section’s south side would be retained, but a planned gallery 
would not. Any further savings, the architect maintained, would have to 
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come from the revised (and reduced) tenders submitted by the electri-
cal and plumbing firms, and the companies supplying materials.138 One 
such supplier, the Alsip Brick, Tile, and Lumber Company, upon hearing 
news of the escalated costs of the auditorium, suggested that the city use 
brick and stone in the building’s construction rather than just stone. 
“The Stone men have had a pretty good inning in this relief work,” the 
company’s manager wrote in late February, “and there is no question 
.  .  . but that they will get a very large contract out of it.” Using a com-
bined brick and stone construction “would make what we consider in 
our opinion, a much nicer building.”139 In the end, the city went with 
the all-stone construction, considering its cleaner line more fitting for a 
public auditorium.
NO SIMpLE ANSWERS: ALBERTA’S 
ADMINISTRATION BuILDING
Debates over construction materials on relief projects—and particularly 
who would supply them—could even provoke interprovincial squab-
bling. When the Alberta government, in December 1929, announced 
plans to build a new administration building as a relief project, it met 
with immediate—and threatening—reactions from interested parties 
outside the province. The gist of these reactions turned on whether the 
successful contractor should make plans to use Indiana limestone or 
Manitoba Tyndall limestone in the construction of the building. The 
provincial government, hoping for the lowest price for stone possible, 
issued a call for tenders to quarries in both Canada and the United 
States. Upon hearing of the intended tender process, Premier John 
Bracken of Manitoba angrily fired off a telegram to Alberta’s Premier 
John Brownlee: “We had hoped your government would follow [the] 
policy of Dominion and Manitoba governments by giving first prefer-
ence to a Canadian product,” he admonished, “and thus materially aid 
in development of the country’s natural resources.”140 Tapestry lime-
stone from Manitoba’s Tyndall region, Bracken pointed out, was widely 
used in Canadian construction projects and compared favourably with 
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Indiana limestone. His central message was clear: using a variety of 
limestone imported from Indiana when comparable limestone was 
available domestically in Manitoba undermined the national interest. 
One day later, on 27 December, Secretary J. M. Davidson of Manitoba’s 
Industrial Development Board wired Brownlee, again arguing that 
Manitoba limestone was “equal to imported product and is used in 
some of the finest buildings in Canada from coast to coast.” Interestingly, 
like Premier Bracken’s telegram of the day before, Davidson main-
tained that Manitoba limestone was equal to Indiana limestone in 
quality but stopped short of saying the same about the cost. Davidson 
ended his message by reminding Brownlee that Manitoba was “coop-
erating in finding markets for Alberta products” and that he hoped 
Alberta would “reciprocate by giving first preference to products from 
the West’s own economic area.”141
Responding to Bracken’s telegram first, Brownlee sidestepped 
entirely the issue of whether the limestone should come from domes-
tic or foreign suppliers. Instead, he pointed out that Tyndall quarries 
had been invited to tender for the contract and that the Alberta govern-
ment would make a decision “when the tenders are opened.”142 It was not 
until Manitoba’s Industrial Development Board made public through 
the Alberta press their protest, and that of the Manitoba government, 
against Alberta’s tender process that Brownlee addressed the issue directly 
in a letter to Premier Bracken: “This [press] report stressed the fact that 
Manitoba was consuming a great deal of Alberta coal and that there 
should be reciprocity between Provinces. . . . The coal men of this Province 
feel they are receiving little, if any, support from either your Government 
or the business firms who presumably support the Winnipeg Industrial 
Association.”143 In the end, Alberta decided to use Tyndall limestone from 
Manitoba “to assist as much as possible in stabilizing industrial condi-
tions,” even though the Indiana stone tender was considerably lower. 
Furthermore, the Indiana stone required some finishing that would have 
been done in the province and would have provided $25,000 to $35,000 
in wages to Alberta workers. In another letter to Bracken, Brownlee con-
cluded by expressing the hope that the Manitoba government would “con-
tinue to assist us in efforts to extend our coal market in your Province.”144
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On one level, the Alberta government intended its administration 
building to provide the local jobless with work, but as the interprovin-
cial exchange between Brownlee and Bracken makes clear, relief work 
entailed a good deal more than state aid to unemployed workers. The 
construction of the million-dollar building made good economic sense 
for the province. The cost of renting space for provincial departments 
in privately owned office buildings throughout the city came to more 
than $48,000 per year, and the province would probably have had to 
find additional space to accommodate offices associated with the newly 
acquired natural resource rights.145 However, in moving all provincial 
departments to the new administration building, the province left sub-
stantial vacancies in seven office buildings in the city; the owners of these 
private buildings could no longer count on regular rent payments from 
the province.
Municipal officials in Edmonton encountered a similar problem 
when in 1934 they considered approaching the federal government about 
the possibility of initiating a purely federal relief construction project. 
Future senator W. A. Griesbach warned city officials away from the idea. 
“There may be opposition to new public buildings in Edmonton,” he 
suggested to Mayor Daniel Knott, “because they have the effect of empty-
ing certain office buildings and therefore making it difficult for owners 
of public buildings to meet their municipal taxes and it reduces rentals 
in office buildings.”146
By the end of 1932, most of the major work relief programs carried 
on in Canadian cities under the Unemployment and Farm Relief Act had 
been completed. Two of the larger ones discussed above—Saskatoon’s 
Broadway Bridge and Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium—held their official 
openings well after the structures were substantially finished.147 But the 
soaring relief costs that had long overwhelmed municipalities across the 
Prairies had begun to take their toll on the federal and provincial gov-
ernments. In fact, it became clear as early as the summer of 1932 that the 
federal government had no plans to renew its work relief funding and 
financing scheme that had for two years made major urban work relief 
projects possible. Prime Minister R. B. Bennett believed that he had little 
choice but to abandon entirely the costly policy of federal support for 
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work relief schemes in favour of the cheaper direct relief. It was no mere 
policy shift. Rather, it was a complete reversal of the federal unemploy-
ment strategy. During his 1930 election campaign, Bennett had promised 
work for wages, the abolishment of the dole, and an end to unemploy-
ment. By 1932, unemployment levels were higher than ever, direct relief 
was Ottawa’s new approach to the unemployment problem, and the era 
of work for wages was over.
At the local level, cities simply could no longer afford to continue 
the policy on their own. This did not mean that cities were prepared 
to abandon work relief altogether, but in place of the major projects 
that had characterized work relief since the autumn of 1930, cities now 
employed jobless married men for small-scale, short-term work such as 
snow shovelling, street sweeping, and brush work. City engineers and 
planners organized this work as well, but never again would they be 
responsible for orchestrating massive undertakings using unemploy-
ment relief labour as they had during the early years of the Depression. 
City councils continued to ask them for advice on projects that might be 
proposed to the senior levels of government, but neither the provinces 
nor the federal government would sign work relief agreements of the 
sort they had approved under the two unemployment relief acts.
In the end, what cities like Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg 
were left with was a series of practical and useful infrastructure improve-
ments that they would not have been able to afford on their own. And 
while the projects were never able to provide the cities’ jobless with 
steady work, they nevertheless offered urban residents work when there 






Charlotte Whitton, the famed director of the Canadian Council on 
Child Welfare, wrote to Saskatoon’s city clerk in early January 1931 
asking about that city’s relief policies for the unemployed. City Clerk 
Mordaunt Tomlinson replied quickly and decisively: “We distribute 
nothing without work, as otherwise we should be creating paupers and 
there is no doubt in my mind that this is the greatest danger at this 
time.”1 Whitton was undoubtedly pleased with the clerk’s reply, but his 
response was not entirely truthful.2 Saskatoon’s city relief administra-
tion, like those operating in Edmonton and Winnipeg, struggled to 
provide its resident jobless with relief work and often came up short. At 
the same time that the city clerk was claiming that his city distributed 
“nothing without work,” all of the city’s public works projects com-
bined were employing no more than five hundred men, yet well over 
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one thousand men were unemployed and on relief in the city.3 And 
these numbers did not account for any of the unemployed women on 
direct relief in the city. The situation was the same in Edmonton. “Last 
year,” the city’s chief engineer wrote on New Year’s Eve, 1931, “there 
remained a large number of married men who could not get regular 
work. As far as possible, these men were handled by giving them direct 
relief.”4 Similar conditions faced Edmonton a year later, when the city 
relief officer admitted, “We have not anywhere near sufficient work to 
keep the relief cases occupied, and it is our opinion that they are much 
better occupied than they are idle.”5 Put simply, there was never enough 
work to keep all of the urban unemployed occupied all of the time, 
forcing relief officials to, in fact, distribute something without work.6
The creation of paupers, as Saskatoon’s city clerk pointed out, 
was considered by relief officials in all three cities as a serious and nega-
tive repercussion of unemployment, especially among able-bodied men. 
Pauperism threatened the work ethic and contributed to demoralization 
among the unemployed. Work relief in its broadest sense was designed 
to counteract these effects. Compelling able-bodied unemployed men 
to work for their relief reinforced the work ethic and guarded against 
both welfare dependence and demoralization, as it gave them something 
useful to do with their time.7 But city officials by no means applied 
their work relief policies to all able-bodied men equally. Rather, they 
reserved employment on their major work relief schemes explicitly (and 
nearly exclusively) for unemployed married men, primarily in an effort 
to prevent the withering of the main breadwinner role. They justified 
this practice on the basis that, theoretically at least, married men’s work 
relief wages would help support whole families. Meanwhile, they denied 
employment to the increasing number of what they viewed as poten-
tially dangerous single men congregating in their cities in the hopes that 
doing so would encourage those men to accept work on farms or in 
work camps well outside of the city’s borders.8 Work relief policy, both as 
a concept and as a practice, therefore, represented one tool in relief offi-
cials’ toolkit that could simultaneously accomplish these two city policy 
goals: maintaining the ideal of the breadwinner role and moving single 
unemployed men out of the cities.
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The degree of success in these efforts, however, was in many ways 
contingent on a broader policy narrative written by the provincial and 
federal governments. As detailed in the previous chapter, from 1930 to 
1932, all three levels of government together funded and financed major 
urban work relief schemes designed primarily to keep unemployed mar-
ried men working. These years saw the regular and mostly willing par-
ticipation of such men in the relief projects. In fact, there were typically 
far more men clamouring to secure a job than there were jobs avail-
able. This was not surprising since the work took place within the city 
and offered workers a real hourly wage, mimicking conditions in the 
normal capitalist labour market.9 By the fall of 1932, however, the senior 
governments had abandoned the policy of financing urban work relief 
schemes in favour of cheaper contributions to cities in the form of direct 
relief. Thereafter, cities administered smaller, less expensive work pro-
jects, using as labour mostly unemployed married men on direct relief. 
Aside from their smaller size, the main difference between these projects 
and their pre-1932 counterparts was that workers were not paid in cash. 
Instead, the men had an account at the relief department, and the work 
they did was credited to that account, as a form of payment against their 
relief “debt.” Not surprisingly, unemployed married men’s participation 
in whatever small relief programs the cities could cobble together on 
their own fell off considerably. According to the associate editor of the 
Winnipeg Tribune, Ronald Hooper, the men were “galled by general con-
ditions,” and “it irritates these men to find themselves and their wives 
without a nickle [sic] in their pockets after some days of rather humiliat-
ing work on the public streets.”10
Urban work relief policy related to single men was likewise dic-
tated in large measure by policy-making at the provincial and federal 
levels. From 1929 to 1932, both the provinces and the federal government 
insisted that cities were responsible for all unemployment relief–related 
cases inside their borders, including unemployed single men. This forced 
relief officials to deal with what was fast becoming the problem of masses 
of unemployed single men congregating in their cities. For city officials, 
unemployed single men were “pests,” “agitators of the worst type,” and 
“potentially dangerous.” Winnipeg’s Alderman Ralph Maybank warned 
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in the spring of 1930 that single unemployed men congregating in the 
city “have no place to sleep and nothing to eat; the danger lies in the 
fact that they may take the law into their hands.”11 City administrators, 
together with the provincial governments, encouraged single unem-
ployed men to leave town and take farm jobs or work at camps operated 
by the provincial and federal governments through the winters. During 
spring and summer, authorities found various ways to minimize the 
threats posed by single unemployed men, including simply cutting them 
from the relief rolls altogether and hoping they might leave of their own 
accord.12 After the fall of 1932, the federal government effectively took 
responsibility for single transient unemployed men, making arrange-
ments to house them in relief camps administered by the Department of 
National Defence.13 This essentially freed cities from taking any further 
responsibility for single homeless men and reduced the potential for dis-
order that they represented.
BuILDING MEN: FROM THE NEW pOOR LAW  
TO DEpRESSION-ERA WORK RELIEF
Western societies have long believed in the idea of insisting that the 
very poor offer up some form of work in exchange for alms, charity, 
or relief. Even the “great monuments of antiquity,” as historian John 
Garraty suggests, could be seen as (very) early public works relief pro-
jects.14 But it was the emergence of the workhouse in the late sixteenth 
century that marked nation-states’ first efforts at institutionalizing in 
an organized way the exchange of work for charity.15 Thereafter, thou-
sands of the idle poor entered, mostly involuntarily, Europe’s work-
houses—the hôpital général in France, the tuchtuis or rasphuis in the 
Netherlands, the casas de misericordia in Spain. However, historians are 
quick to note that many more people received “out-door” relief—that 
is, benefits or cash outside of the workhouse.16 Whether the aid came 
inside the workhouse or not, the idea that the poor must work for their 
relief became well established and would remain so through the nine-
teenth century and into the twentieth.
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The administration and delivery of poor relief has long been 
about more than mere economic considerations. In fact, gendered 
assumptions and constructions have infused ideas about welfare pro-
vision at least as far back as the Poor Law Amendment Act (also called 
the New Poor Law) of 1834. Historian Sonya Rose argues that the act 
itself “proclaimed that men were solely responsible for the economic 
welfare of families” because it offered relief to families through men 
only.17 The New Poor Law, then, adopted the ideal of the family wage 
and emphasized the relationship between men and the role of breadwin-
ner. The corollary to this, of course, was that women and children came 
to be viewed as dependents of men. Historian Marjorie Levine-Clark 
recently linked the aims of the New Poor Law with Victorian medical 
discourses that cast women as frail and naturally dependent on men. 
These medical discourses shared an easy alliance not only with the 
New Poor Law’s ideological assumptions about the male breadwinner 
role but also with working-class male activists’ fear that women’s lower 
wages would undercut their own, as well as with middle-class moral-
ists who insisted that women should “limit or cease their work both 
for their own health and that of the families they were presumably 
neglecting at home.”18 Considering women far too frail and delicate 
for waged work thus served several ends. It is this idea—that women 
did not share the “ablebodiedness” of men, to use Levine-Clark’s term 
to describe their husbands, brothers, or fathers—that correspondingly 
reveals how British society at that time linked men’s independence, 
manhood, and breadwinner status with work as a means of providing 
for their families. In the end, much like the work relief systems set up in 
the urban Prairie centres a century later, the New Poor Law emphasized 
(and in fact was preoccupied with) protecting the male breadwinner 
role. These ideas informed the approaches to dealing with unemploy-
ment that city councils on the Canadian Prairies would use in the 
twentieth century. Work relief—that is, compelling relief recipients to 
offer their labour in return for food, clothing, and shelter—was one of 
several stones upon which both the New Poor Law of 1834 and Prairie 
cities’ unemployment relief policies of the 1930s rested. Another was 
the breadwinner role itself.
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WOMEN NEED NOT AppLy
While the Depression may have threatened the male breadwinner ideal, 
it simultaneously bolstered it. As we have seen in previous chapters, city 
relief policy-makers focused much of their attention on families, partic-
ularly on the unemployed married man. In good, or at least stable, eco-
nomic times, the male breadwinner ideal maintained a quiet insistence 
of its simple truths: that a man’s rightful and natural role was at the 
head of his household and that his responsibilities to his dependents 
were to be fulfilled through hard work and the wages that it produced. 
In unstable economic times, that quiet insistence grew louder, anx-
iously reinforcing what many considered a man’s natural provider role 
in the face of unprecedented social and economic threats. Historian 
George Chauncey, writing in the US context, argues that times of eco-
nomic difficulty have affected men’s sense of their masculinity, creating 
hyper-heterosexual environments: “The reaction against the challenges 
posed to manhood by Depression conditions was widely evident in the 
culture, from the celebration of powerful male physiques in the public 
art of the New Deal to the attacks on married women for ‘stealing’ 
men’s jobs.”19
Emphasizing the protection of men’s breadwinner status was not 
uncommon on the urban Prairie. “Why should working girls give up 
their jobs for men?” one Saskatoon woman, who identified herself only 
as “A Working Girl,” asked the editor of the Star-Phoenix in May 1932. 
“Because men are the breadwinners. How many girls are working to 
support their families? Nine out of ten are working to satisfy their own 
desires.”20 Here, women’s work is dismissed as supporting frivolous pleas-
ure rather than affirmed as contributing to the family economy. It was 
only the family man’s work that supported his wife and children. And, 
at least according to this “Working Girl,” women should leave their jobs 
during periods of widespread economic distress and give them over to 
the breadwinners.
Similar thinking pervaded the administration of work relief 
programs. Any women who disputed this attitude typically met with 
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resistance. One of Edmonton’s female relief officers advocated for offer-
ing relief work to qualified women: “As representing women and girls 
in this City, I fail to see why they should be discriminated against, as we 
women feel they are entitled to the same consideration as men.” Noting 
that women “cannot take up employment in tunnelling and such like 
work,” she nevertheless believed that women could certainly work on 
lighter jobs.21 But despite her efforts, no women joined men on work 
relief projects, although some tried. In July 1931, Saskatonian Lily Whaley 
wrote Mayor Hair seeking employment through the city’s work relief 
program: “My circumstances place me on the same level as a man, and I 
will be glad if it could be possible for the city to provide manual labour 
as far as these unemployed men for myself at the same low salary rather 
than be compelled to ask for relief.”22 The mayor was sympathetic to 
Whaley’s request, suggesting that unemployed women might do a little 
light gardening for the city (as she might for her own kitchen garden 
at home), but Chief Engineer George Archibald warned against such a 
measure, writing to the mayor two days after Whaley’s letter was written: 
“It is probably quite true that there are many unemployed women in 
the city that could perform manual labour, just as well as many of the 
men who are at present time engaged on this sort of work. However I 
do not think the city should take any step in this direction as I am quite 
sure there would be a very serious revulsion of feeling on the part of the 
public if women were to be engaged on even lighter forms of labour-
ing work.”23 Letters to local newspapers generally confirmed Archibald’s 
warning. “The great majority of [employed] married women are working 
just so they can get away from their husbands and have a good time,” 
one concerned citizen wrote in a letter to the city council in October 
1931.24 Another asked the editor of the Star-Phoenix, “Supposing we all 
practiced the selfish economy of married couples working, what would 
be the result? The world would sink into oblivion.”25 In the end, much 
like women in other Prairie cities, no Saskatoon women were employed 
on relief projects. Relief work was for breadwinners, and breadwinners 
were married men. Even single men with dependent parents or other kin 
did not qualify as providers.
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ExCLuDING SINGLE MEN, 1929–32
The deepening depressed conditions through the early 1930s exacer-
bated anxieties about the inability of married men to sustain their 
prescribed main breadwinner role. This should not, however, be taken 
to mean that the Depression ushered in any kind of “crisis of mascu-
linity.”26 Rather, relief policy-makers, although they would not have 
used these terms, were anxious that a particular masculine construc-
tion at a particular moment in time was under threat. Recent writing 
on the constructions of masculinities through time suggests that the 
very definition of “manhood” is historically contingent, continuously 
contested, and subject to the contexts of place and circumstance.27 
Influential masculinities theorist R. W. Connell, for example, argues 
that there is no single masculinity, but many. This is not to suggest, 
however, that masculinity is so diverse that it lacks the specificity to be 
useful as a category of analysis. While individual men might develop 
distinct senses of their own masculinity, their engagement with shared 
cultural references, similar situations, and common struggles with 
other men tends to have a unifying effect, crystallizing an otherwise 
amorphous form. Neither are all masculinities equal in their effects or 
potential effects on society. Instead, societies tend to feature competing 
masculinities, some of which are held in higher esteem than others. 
The most admired, what Connell calls the “hegemonic” masculinity, 
need not be totally dominant or even held to by the majority, but it 
does serve as the cultural leader or authority. During the Depression 
years, a bourgeois, or middle-class, ideology represented this cultural 
authority, this hegemonic masculinity. Its hallmark was the male bread-
winner role.
During the interwar years, and specifically the Depression, anxi-
eties over the threat to the male breadwinner role manifested as an 
undermining of the jobless family man’s morale, his self-respect, and 
his “manhood.” “It is infinitely better in the interests of the morale of 
the [married male] citizens,” declared Edmonton’s mayor in August 1931, 
“that an opportunity be afforded to earn by means of relief work rather 
than to perpetuate direct relief which virtually resolves itself into the 
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dole system.”28 The city commissioner further pointed out that work 
relief would “eliminate or at least restrict the necessity for continuing 
direct relief and thereby correspondingly enable many of our citizens 
to maintain their self-respect in supporting themselves by their own 
productive labor.”29
As a result of these concerns, relief officials reserved participation 
on city work relief projects almost exclusively for married men, and 
especially for married men with children. In most cases, especially as 
the Depression wore on, urban relief administrators tried to give more 
work relief to men with more dependents. In September 1931, for exam-
ple, Saskatoon’s mayor reasoned, “It is quite apparent that the married 
man with no children does not require as much as the married man 
with a family of five or six.”30 According to Saskatoon’s labour distribu-
tion system, this meant that married men with six or more children 
qualified for twenty-two days of work on the Broadway Bridge project 
within every four-week period. On the other end of the scale, married 
men with no children qualified for no more than sixteen days of work 
each month.31
The privileging of married men over single men on work relief 
jobs emerged early. In December 1929, for example, City Commissioner 
David Mitchell emphasized that Edmonton’s “emergency relief plan is 
for the benefit of unemployed married men who are bona fide residents 
of the city. The city is not in a position to consider others. No single men 
will be employed under this plan and each married man will be carefully 
investigated by relief officer Magee before being placed at work.”32 The 
same conditions applied several weeks later when Edmonton began a 
new relief project on the Garneau sewers: city officials stated that “as far 
as possible this work will be confined exclusively to bona fide married 
residents of the city.”33 In doling out work on a new nurses’ residence 
being added to Saskatoon’s City Hospital in the summer of 1930, Mayor 
John Hair assured citizens that “a rigid checkup is being maintained to 
insure that the people who were given jobs are bona fide citizens, mar-
ried men with dependents receiving first consideration.”34 That same 
summer, large placards posted at the entrance to Edmonton’s city hall 
announced that only married men supporting families needed apply at 
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the relief office for work on the city’s latest waterworks construction pro-
ject, and the city commissioners issued an “iron clad ruling that no single 
men . . . can take advantage of the work offered.”35
Any ruling, however “iron clad,” would have little effect unless it 
was enforced rigorously. This was easy enough at the relief office itself, 
where men assembled to receive their work orders each day: the relief 
officer simply assigned jobs only to married men. The process became 
more complicated when the city contracted jobs to local construction 
and hauling companies. Although the married-man-only rule applied 
to private firms involved on relief jobs, the relief office, being one step 
removed from hiring workers, found it more difficult to ensure that only 
married men were hired. For the most part, the contracted private firms 
followed city work relief distribution policies. For example, W. H. Carter 
of Carter-Hills-Aldinger Company explained the company’s practices 
and experiences on Winnipeg’s bridge work in a letter to the province 
in the fall of 1933: “We possibly employed on two relief jobs during the 
month of July 1932 around 500 men, and say 500 more in the plants in 
Winnipeg processing materials.” By rotating the men so they worked 
half-time at most, Carter estimated that his company had made provi-
sion for some two thousand men. All of the men were married, Carter 
said, and, based on an average family size of five (according to provincial 
statistics), he estimated that “this would take care of 10,000 individuals at 
least and possibly more.”36
But not all contractors followed city dictates. Typically, city offi-
cials relied on outside complaints that single men were working on relief 
jobs. When Edmonton relief officials learned, for example, that the J. B. 
McDonald and Son grading company was using a single man to haul 
gravel for a relief job, the city’s chief engineer instructed the company to 
“remove him and make room for a married man.”37 In another instance in 
Edmonton, Alderman James Ogilvie received an anonymous letter advis-
ing him that “someone named Swanson was employing single men on 
city work.” Upon looking into the matter, the city’s chief engineer found 
that Swanson, who had earlier won a curbing and walk work contract 
from the city, had in fact hired five single men as finishers and form set-
ters. The remaining thirty men on the project were married. The engineer 
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only allowed Swanson to retain the single men when he learned that 
finishing and form setting required experienced hands and no married 
men with that experience were available. Perhaps more importantly, the 
results of the engineer’s investigation showed that Swanson employed 
no other single men on the job.38 The chief engineer made a similar 
report on the Crown Paving Company and the H. G. Macdonald Paving 
Company, who had hired a combined total of eighty-seven men. All but 
five were married.39 Saskatoon city authorities were equally anxious to 
ensure that single men found no work on relief projects. In December 
1930, the city commissioner received word from a concerned member of 
the Canadian Legion that the city was “employing New Canadians who 
are presumably married but are not actually married, or if they are, have 
wives living in the Old Country.” The commissioner asked the Legion 
to provide a “list of the names of the new Canadians” since the city was 
“more than anxious to deal with the difficult problem of seeing that the 
available work goes to those most entitled to it.”40
On one level, of course, city work relief policies excluding single 
men made good economic sense: by offering work only to married men 
with wives and children, city administrators effectively stretched each 
relief dollar further than by hiring single men. But on another level, 
reserving work relief jobs exclusively for married men was aimed at ena-
bling those men to fulfill their breadwinner role and to preserve their 
morale, self-respect, and manhood. In defending his city’s policy that 
only “bona fide” married men qualified for work relief, for example, 
Saskatoon’s Mayor John Hair explained to several single men seeking 
work relief that “one of the first principals [sic] of manhood was to recog-
nize women and children first. Until we have taken care of women and 
children I had no authority to deal with men such as they.”41 Manhood, 
in the mayor’s estimation, involved breadwinners taking care of their 
families, not unemployed single men working on relief jobs. The may-
or’s admonishment suggested that the single men lacked even a basic 
sense of what “manhood” was all about. His message was simple: single 
men need not expect work relief from the city until the married men 
were able to fulfill their breadwinner role. The director of Edmonton’s 
special relief office agreed with the principle of maintaining the primacy 
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of the breadwinner role through relief work, but he expressed it in legal 
rather than economic terms. “Undoubtedly,” he asserted in 1934, “a man 
has a legal responsibility to take care of his family.”42
Others believed that an unemployed married man’s inability to 
provide for his family would negatively affect the man’s self-image, and 
only a proper course of work relief would ameliorate that unhappy sit-
uation. In a letter to Manitoba’s Public Works minister in November 
1932, Ronald Hooper, the Winnipeg Tribune’s associate editor, wrote that 
married men had “struggled hard to keep off relief and preserve their 
self-respect.” But those same men, the “heads of families who are home-
owners, who have been encouraged to expect a relatively high standard 
of living,” were nevertheless “coming on relief in increasing numbers.” 
In Hooper’s opinion, one he claimed was shared by unemployed family 
men throughout the city, heads of families needed relief work, prefer-
ably paid in cash to “help them in preserving their self-respect and make 
things a little easier for their wives.”43 Hooper’s emphasis on the loss of 
self-respect among unemployed heads of households speaks primarily to 
his anxiety over married men’s loss of breadwinner status due to unem-
ployment rather than to a concern about simple pauperism. His remarks 
also reveal how class anxieties intersected with gendered ones in relief 
policy debates. Work relief would not only maintain the breadwinner 
role among both working- and middle-class married men, but it would 
also bolster the self-respect—and class position—of those unfortunate 
cases who had enjoyed a high living standard before they lost their jobs.
Groups representing unemployed workers also believed that with-
out a proper course of work relief, the unemployed family man’s man-
hood was in danger. Direct relief for married men, the Building Trades 
Council explained to Winnipeg’s relief officials, meant “suffering priva-
tion, under-nourishment of women and children, and the stagnation of 
manhood.” Direct relief, like unemployment generally, led to a “loss of 
stamina, the disintegration of the home, and other heart-rendering [sic] 
effects.” In the view of the Building Trades Council, unemployed mar-
ried men required “a standard of wages sufficient for any self-respecting 
citizen to maintain his home and family with the necessities of life.”44 
Edmonton’s Unemployed Ex-Service Men’s Association (uEMA) shared 
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that view. Formed sometime during the summer of 1930, the association 
claimed to represent nearly 250 married men, together with more than 
700 dependents.45 The association drew liberally on the idea of men’s 
provider role, linking it, perhaps not surprisingly, with veterans’ ser-
vice to King and Country during the Great War in order to seek better 
unemployment relief terms for its membership.46 The uEMA president, 
F. J. Barringham, wrote to federal Labour Minister Gideon Robertson in 
June 1931: “The main object of this association is to solely look after the 
interests of the unemployed ex-service men [sic] and his dependents.” A 
proper work relief program, he wrote, would likely go some direction 
in alleviating their unhappy situation. Work relief would allow these 
men to “preserve their self respect by working honestly for the living 
of themselves and their families.”47 At the same time, the uEMA set itself 
apart from other unemployed men, suggesting that non-Canadians (and 
presumably non-veterans) did not share their type of manliness: uEMA 
members, Barringham reported to Robertson, “ask that they not be 
expected to stand in line with those of foreign extraction many of whom 
cannot speak our language. They ask that in any works undertaken that 
they be not classed with those that can never hold anything in common.” 
The uEMA, in other words, claimed that its members were willing to 
work for their relief, and hopefully maintain their breadwinner role in 
the process, but their role as provider was of a higher order than family 
men of foreign extraction.
Married men themselves also used language linking their desire for 
work relief to their provider role. One Edmonton man wrote to the mayor 
applying “respectfully for work of any kind” to support his wife and five 
children.48 Another who had “done no work” for months and who had a 
“wife and invalid daughter” to support sought the mayor’s help in find-
ing him at least three days’ work each week.49 And a third, responsible for 
“bringing up and educating six children,” asked for the mayor’s help in his 
efforts to “earn a dollar cutting lawns, trimming hedges, and doing gen-
eral garden work.” The man even offered to cut the mayor’s lawn for free, 
reasoning that doing so would be “a recommendation in itself to other 
citizens.”50 Like so many other unemployed family men, these three made 
their requests for relief work as husbands, as fathers, as breadwinners.
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Sometimes unemployed workers’ use of the breadwinner ideal 
produced real results. In September 1931, for example, Saskatoon’s city 
council agreed, after hearing from a delegation of workers, to rescind 
its plan to reduce relief workers’ wages from forty-five to forty cents per 
hour. The workers had argued that wages on relief jobs should at least 
“give a married man enough to live on according to the number of his 
children.” The city council’s decision was not unanimous, but one alder-
man who spoke out on behalf of the married men suggested that “if 
there was to be any cutting, it should be on other city employees from 
the top down.” The delegation of workers attending the council meet-
ing greeted this remark, according to the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, with a 
round of applause.51
 City authorities were quite conscious of the hierarchy of relief 
and the implications of their work relief distribution policies. “Married 
men should, I feel, be treated differently,” Edmonton’s relief officer con-
fided to an Alberta Provincial Police detective in March 1931. “From per-
sonal contact, I find necessity to exist among married men who have kept 
out of the bread line as long as possible.”52 Recipients, too, were clearly 
aware of the disparity in distribution of relief to single versus married 
men. One Edmonton widower, who was offered only single men’s relief 
after his wife died, railed against what he viewed as his diminished status 
in a letter to the premier in 1932: “Now they give me Single Men’s Relief, 
and compare me to the kind of men who know neither God nor Church. 
Do you think that I, 64 years old, should only eat twice a day?”53
The hierarchy of relief convinced some relief officials that single 
men were getting married only to improve their financial situation.54 
Saskatoon’s relief officer, for instance, pointed out in March 1932 that 
more than half of the 2,152 families on relief had been married for only a 
year or so. The majority of these, he claimed, “got married in order to get 
on relief.”55 One week later, the relief officer pointed to the case of a man 
who, after being married for only three days, had applied for assistance.56 
In order to deal with such situations, Saskatoon instituted a policy 
whereby newly married couples could expect no relief, and certainly no 
work relief, until they could satisfy the city that they had been married 
at least one year.57 Edmonton relief officials discovered similar activities 
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in their city, and followed a course much like Saskatoon’s. “No man on 
‘single’ relief,” Edmonton’s relief officer declared in February 1933, “shall 
be allowed to transfer to ‘married’ relief notwithstanding the fact that 
he may have been married in the meantime.”58 The situation even led 
relief officials to make moral judgements about relief recipients’ conju-
gal relationships, accusing the newly married of failing to take account 
of their poverty before heading down the matrimonial aisle. Single men 
who married without “proper foresight and no funds,” Edmonton’s relief 
officer declaimed, were not yet prepared to take on the duties and obli-
gations of the married man. “These cases are not isolated ones, but are 
occurring with sufficient regularity and frequency to indicate that there 
is an undoubted intention on the part of some people to get married and 
set up homes at our expense. When a man has no money whatever and 
has no job . . . we cannot accept [him] making his vows and then imme-
diately coming to the Relief Department to ask us to carry them out.”59
In some instances, it seems that single men, rather than getting 
married just to get on relief, claimed they were married when they 
were not. In one case, a relief officer told the tale of five single “foreign-
ers” who “had each produced the same woman in turn as his wife in 
making application for assistance.”60 Another Saskatoon man was sent 
to jail for three months after he had obtained $4.75 worth of work relief 
from the city on the apparently false claim that a certain woman was 
his wife and that one of her children was also his. The woman received 
a one-month jail sentence on the charge of “corrupting the morals of a 
child.”61 Clearly favouring a hardline approach to fraud, the relief officer 
told the court at the trial that “he was confident that many men were 
receiving relief as married men when in fact they were single and living 
with women for the purposes of defrauding the city.”62 In response to 
this trend, Saskatoon instituted a new policy insisting that applicants for 
married men’s relief produce documentation to prove that the marriage 
had actually taken place. Almost immediately, some single unemployed 
men found ways to circumvent the new policy. “Several [men] who had 
no wives,” Saskatoon’s relief officer reported, “merely bought marriage 
certificates” and produced them as proof of their married status.63 For 
these men, it seems, committing fraud to get work relief jobs reserved for 
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married men was clearly preferable to remaining on single men’s relief, 
which gave them, at best, farm work or camp work well outside the city 
and under close supervision, and at worst, the bum’s rush out of town.64
MARRIED MEN IN THE CITIES, pOST-1932
By the early autumn of 1932, city relief officials across the country 
knew that both the provinces and the federal government had effec-
tively ended their financial support for the sort of major urban work 
relief programs that had been the hallmarks of Bennett’s two unem-
ployment relief acts. The conviction that only work relief could bolster 
the main breadwinner ideal, however, appeared to grow ever stronger 
among relief policy-makers and the general public alike. Indeed, bread-
winner language played a prominent role in efforts to convince the 
federal government that the re-establishment of work relief was criti-
cal. Manitoba’s Premier John Bracken, for instance, drew on the bread-
winner ideal in an effort to secure federal dollars for Winnipeg relief 
projects. “As the period which families are maintained on direct relief 
increases,” he wrote Prime Minister R. B. Bennett in April 1933, “the 
needs which must be met increase.” At issue was more than simply 
spiralling relief costs: the very independence of the family hung in 
the balance. Bracken continued: “The recipients become dependent 
on the relief officer for the solution of many of their intimate family 
problems such as the replacing of worn out clothing, supplying sewing 
material, providing medical attention and medicine, and repairing of 
bedding and household effects and numerous other items.” The pre-
mier believed that these were clearly things that a breadwinner’s wages 
should provide. Direct relief, he warned, weakened recipients’ moral 
fibre and self-reliance, and “in some cases their desire to work.”65
Voices across the Prairies called for a renewed course of jointly 
funded work relief programs, which would surely strengthen married 
men’s sense of responsibility for their families. Without work relief, a 
Winnipeg relief department report noted in December 1933, the city’s 
unemployed had taken on an “attitude of dependence . . . resulting in an 
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inevitable deterioration of human values.”66 Edmonton’s Highlands and 
District Community League, a group representing the Highlands neigh-
bourhood, likewise feared that the system of direct relief was “destroying 
the qualities of self-respect and economic independence and initiative” 
in unemployed married men.67 The league insisted that the city imme-
diately pursue a program of work relief to counteract the destructive 
nature of direct relief. A Calgary resolution shared with Edmonton’s city 
council in September 1933 was even more explicit: “It is generally recog-
nized and admitted that the continued lack of employment of a large 
section of our population particularly in homes where women and chil-
dren are affected, is having a degrading and demoralizing effect which 
is becoming daily more intolerable.”68 Calgary’s city council, like most 
city councils across the nation, was especially concerned about mar-
ried men’s inability to provide for their families. The alternative, one 
Winnipeg businessman warned Manitoba officials, would be “a terrible 
item which you will have to pay for in years to come.”69
 Shrinking Funds and Mundane Work
The loss of provincial and federal funding for urban work relief pro-
jects, of course, had immediate and important consequences for 
urban public works plans. Gone were Edmonton’s extensive plans, 
set to begin during the winter of 1932–33, for nearly $4 million worth 
of road improvement work, waterworks and sewerage extensions, 
bridge and subway construction, and an extension to the city’s power 
house.70 Winnipeg’s new program of work was certainly off the table, 
nor would Saskatoon be able to proceed with its proposed schemes. 
The problem was simple: the cities were nearly broke. “Further capital 
commitments are not warranted in view of the City’s .  .  . abnormal 
bonded indebtedness,” Edmonton’s city commissioner concluded in 
October 1932.71 The following summer, municipal bureaucrats again 
turned their thoughts to the coming winter’s expected unemployment 
problems. “Your commissioners are in fullest possible accord with the 
idea of providing work,” Edmonton’s city commissioner reported to 
city council in July 1933, “but the city’s resources are limited and it 
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would be futile on the part of the city to even contemplate the possi-
bility of providing any considerable program of public works or local 
improvements under present conditions.”72 In Winnipeg, Manitoba’s 
assistant deputy minister of Labour resignedly wrote to city officials: 
“Provinces and Municipalities are not in a financial position which 
will permit of them entering into a program of relief works to any con-
siderable extent.”73 It was an unhappy reality shared by cities across the 
Prairies. The problem was not a lack of work, one official in Saskatoon 
remarked, just a lack of money to carry that work out.74
As city administrators soon learned from the federal government, 
this did not mean that Dominion funds were no longer available for 
local work relief improvement schemes. To the contrary, the federal 
government promised to contribute one-third of the cost of municipal 
direct relief programs, and city authorities were allowed to use that con-
tribution as wages for city relief projects, whether in cash or in kind. 
Any costs related to materials, supervision, and administration, however, 
would have to be borne by the cities themselves.75 These costs, of course, 
severely limited the sort of work relief that municipal governments 
could offer unemployed married men. Given the cities’ dire financial 
situation, the only relief projects they could undertake were ones, in the 
words of one Edmonton relief official, involving “for the most part hand 
labour and with a minimum of cash expenditure.”76 In practical terms, 
this meant that cities could carry out little more than maintenance work 
such as improving traffic views, brushing ahead of any construction work 
that might be started in better times, snow removal and ice harvesting, 
boulevarding and grass cutting, and cleaning vacant blocks throughout 
the city to prepare for their potential cultivation.77
Some city governments chose to avoid even these types of relief 
projects. Winnipeg relief officials revealed in July 1935 that “it is some 
time, two years in fact, since we had any work for relief, with the excep-
tion of the St. Boniface woodyard, where last fall the men did the piling.” 
But this could hardly be called work relief. “Each chap on relief,” the 
city’s relief officer admitted, “got, possibly, three days work every six 
months, as a credit against his relief account.” Through 1933, Saskatoon 
“endeavoured to secure a certain amount of return for relief supplied in 
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the way of work in the City Engineer’s and Parks Department.”78 The 
city’s efforts in this direction, however, did not last long, mainly because 
of the high costs. The work, city officials later explained, “involved con-
siderable expense for supervision, tools and equipment, demands by 
the relief recipients for extra food allowance on the ground that more 
food was required because of the physical exertion involved in the per-
formance of work, [and] extra clothing during the Winter period on the 
ground that such clothing was necessary to withstand the rigors of sub 
zero weather.”79 The heavy cost of these expenses, incidental to the work 
itself, convinced city officials that Saskatoon could not afford even minor 
work relief programs.
Figure 9. Edmonton relief workers, 1939. After the federal government refused to 
continue financing unemployment work relief projects, city officials could offer 
unemployed married men little more than odd jobs. Here, men are shown clearing ice 
and snow from city streets. City of Edmonton Archives, 160-1052.
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Equally important as cost to Saskatoon’s decision to abandon 
the policy of offering unemployed married men work relief was that 
“a great many of the men did a minimum amount of work.”80 The 
men’s attitudes were, in many ways, directly related to the sort of work 
on offer. While men had generally considered work on Saskatoon’s 
Broadway Bridge desirable, they had small regard for what they con-
sidered “make-work” projects that paid no real wage. On one occasion, 
Saskatoon’s city park superintendent, A. H. Browne, visited the city 
nursery to investigate claims that the men sent there to work off their 
relief hoeing garden beds were shirking. He found the men “sitting 
outside the nursery’s gate.”81
Signs of men’s unwillingness to take such work seriously had 
appeared even before the bridge was completed. In May 1932, for instance, 
city officials discovered what appeared to be the increasingly common 
practice of relief workers loafing on a nearby riverbank job used as a 
work test for those men unable to find regular rotation work on the 
bridge. The men earned groceries and fuel in exchange for working five 
hours a day, two days a week.82 “If one man wants a match to light his 
pipe,” Alderman F. A. Blain complained, “four or five seem to go into 
conference on the matter and it takes about five minutes to arrange all 
the details. The passage of a train over the Canadian National bridge 
also appeared to be a signal to cease operations and look about.”83 Relief 
officials complained about one man who had a propensity go “down 
along the river bank for an hour and a half loafing.”84 An entire group 
of men, Alderman Blain pointed out, “were not even trying to work.” 
Of thirty-six men working at the riverbank, only five men were actually 
using their tools. “And the slow-motion action of the majority who were 
using their tools,” he continued, “was not a very desirable recommenda-
tion to their industry.”85 Determined to find out for himself the extent 
of the alleged loafing, Saskatoon’s city commissioner travelled out to 
the riverbank worksite in late May 1932. He found that “out of one 
group of twenty men, only two were actually working.” Upon spying 
him, though, “the men all started working.”86 Later, the commissioner 
reported to city council that, given the men’s unwillingness to work 
for their relief, “the city would be just as well off if the relief groceries 
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were given direct as a donation with no return of any kind.” The city’s 
relief officer agreed, suggesting that the matter be set on the council’s 
agenda at the next meeting.87
Not all the men on the worksite faced charges of shirking, but 
relief officers believed that the ones who did set bad examples for the 
hard workers. In May 1932, two reports in the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix 
quoted relief officer Frank Rowland on this issue: “There are quite a 
number of industrious and conscientious men working with the relief 
gangs on the river bank who would put in a proper day’s work if they 
were not afraid that their fellow workers would make conditions uncom-
fortable for them.”88 In some cases, the shirkers went beyond merely cre-
ating discomfort for their hardworking fellows. “Some of the men were 
merely putting in time,” Rowland noted, “and if anyone tried to put in 
a proper day’s work he was likely to be thrown into the river. This also 
applied to the foreman who wanted to speed up work.”89 The men were 
“only putting in an appearance and making a pretence of being busy so 
they could get their groceries”—although Rowland had little doubt as 
to the source of the problem: “If all the Reds or near-Reds were taken off 
the relief gangs, more work would be done.”90
Edmonton, it seems, accepted with more enthusiasm the use of the 
federal and provincial contributions, which amounted to two-thirds of 
the city’s direct relief costs, as wages for work relief. Special relief officer 
H. F. McKee described the city’s work distribution system:
We receive our calls for work from the Engineer’s Department 
in specified groups, such as, fifteen men for Grierson Street, 
thirty-five men for the City Stables, etc. These calls come to the 
wicket the week previous to the time the work is done, and the 
men are picked out as they come for relief and as their turn 
falls due. After the man has worked, a payroll is made out by 
the Engineer’s Department. This payroll is checked with the 
men who are called at the wicket, and the number of hours 
worked are recorded to the credit of each individual man.91
Under this system, few unemployed married men in Edmonton 
worked on grading, gravelling, and water main extensions.92 Instead, 
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most found themselves at the city dump, at the city stables mucking 
horse stalls, or on the streets clearing debris. The experience was mark-
edly different from their earlier work on the larger projects funded 
under the federal work relief acts. In addition to receiving no real wage, 
the men found that the worksite was subject to change on any given 
day, and while the city tried to assign men work near their own homes, 
this was not always possible. A delegation of Edmonton relief workers 
reported to city council that “men were required to go very considera-
ble distances extending from the extreme limit of one end of the city to 
the other in order to perform their required quota of work.”93 The city’s 
solution to the problem was to issue free streetcar tickets to any man 
who lived more than two miles from that day’s worksite.94 The street-
car tickets cost the city a total of some $100 per week, and although 
the chief engineer acknowledged that this was a significant expense, he 
pointed out that it was the only cost associated with the relief work and 
was without a doubt “very much appreciated by the men.”95
 Relief Workers Strike in Edmonton
The married men were generally unhappy with the new work relief 
arrangements, in part because the work was labour intensive and did 
not rely on skilled labour to any great degree. What it did require, how-
ever, was a healthy body, something that, as the Depression wore on, 
fewer and fewer men seemed to have. In the fall of 1934, Edmonton’s 
Trades and Labour Council complained about the city’s stipulation 
that men on relief work use greater than “size 2 scoop shovels,” stat-
ing that the heavier shovels put “too great a hardship and strain upon 
their constitution. Many of these people have been on relief and this 
extra strain required of them with this exceptionally hard and heavy 
work for at least eight hours per day is liable to cause a breakdown in 
health, which will result in a further economic loss to the City because 
they will be responsible for their health and maintenance should they 
become sick.”96 Perhaps most importantly, however, the men insisted 
that the city pay at least some cash wages on relief jobs.97 In this, they 
found an unlikely ally in Edmonton’s Chamber of Commerce. The 
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men, of course, wanted cash to spend on whatever they chose, while, 
for its part, the Chamber of Commerce wanted as much cash circulat-
ing through the local economy as possible.98 City officials, not surpris-
ingly, took a different view of the matter. “It is unfortunate that there 
has grown up the impression that work is a penalty,” Edmonton’s relief 
officer retorted to a series of worker complaints about the system of 
payment. “As a matter of fact, relief work is paid for notwithstanding 
the different method, the same as regular work, and at the same union 
rate. If a man who has received relief takes advantage of today’s work, 
he can wipe off his liability at a good wage. The majority of those on 
relief recognize this.”99
Evidently, many relief workers did not recognize the benefits to 
being paid against their relief accounts, doing low-level maintenance 
work, and drawing what they believed was inadequate relief. On 15 May 
1934, the Unemployed Married Men’s Association (uMMA) called a strike, 
exchanging shovels for picket signs at the city stables, where the men 
normally assembled for the distribution of relief jobs throughout the 
city. On the first day of the strike, little more than half of the 126 relief 
workers that the city had ordered for the day showed up for work at 
all. Moreover, according to the city engineer, the number of workers 
who did appear was subsequently “very much reduced .  .  . due to the 
activities of the pickets.” The picketers had been “very active,” even going 
so far as to forcibly remove one of the city’s non-relief workers from 
his wagon, “evidently believing he was one of the relief men.” When 
the picketers realized that the man was a regular city worker, they left 
him alone.100
The following day, city authorities ordered a police contingent to 
the stables to ensure that the men did not engage in disorderly activities, 
but the police discovered that only three relief men remained on the job. 
“In view of this situation,” the city engineer suggested, “I think it would 
be advisable in the meantime to suspend operations . . . since most of the 
hand labour is effected [sic] by the strike.”101 Later that afternoon, despite 
an early morning downpour that threatened to continue through the 
day, more than seven hundred strikers gathered at Market Square and 
embarked on a parade through the city’s downtown streets. Many carried 
158 The Wages of Relief
signs, prepared earlier at the uMMA headquarters, reading “Support Our 
Strike” and “Our Children Are Slowly Starving to Death.”102
Relations between the city and the strikers deteriorated rapidly, 
despite some early efforts at negotiations to get the men back on the 
job. When those failed, city authorities threatened to cut from the relief 
rolls entirely any relief workers who did not appear at their scheduled 
jobsite ready to work. The city assured the workers that police protection 
would be provided on all worksites.103 But the strikers were determined 
to continue their action. Two relief workers who tried to return to their 
worksites were beaten by strikers, and a third was threatened until he 
gave up and went home.104
The uMMA also embarked on an organized campaign to get the 
wider community onside, soliciting support and funds by conducting a 
house-to-house canvass of Edmonton homes and insisting that local mer-
chants either display strike notices in their shop windows or face black-
listing by strikers.105 “Women relief strike aides,” as the Edmonton Journal 
called women strikers, supported the workers by arriving at downtown 
cafés just before noon each day, ordering one cup of coffee, and sipping 
it “until five minutes past one o’clock, keeping all stools occupied against 
other customers .  .  . so that the machinery will be so tied up that the 
owner will be forced to appeal to city council.”106 Other supporters cast 
their assistance in breadwinner language. Edmonton’s National Labour 
Council, for example, urged the city to “bring about an amicable settle-
ment as soon as possible bearing in mind the suffering of the families 
of these men.”107 The Brotherhood of Railway Carmen referred to the 
“starvation relief for unemployed married men” and voiced its approval 
for the workers’ action.108 The Unemployed Ex-Service Men’s Association 
(uEMA) went one step further, threatening to join the uMMA’s strike if 
conditions did not improve. “We are heartily agreed,” Colonel George B. 
McLeod declared at a uEMA meeting, that “there has to be a definite and 
a substantial increase in relief in the city for married unemployed.”109 
Another speaker at the meeting noted the intersection between class and 
manhood: “It is up to you as men to stand behind those in the same class 
as yourselves.”110 The uEMA would be sure, however, to maintain its own 
identity if it elected to join the uMMA action, especially since rumours 
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had been circulating that the strike had a “Red” element. Ex-servicemen 
would consequently “march under the Union Jack” to ensure that there 
could be no question as to where their loyalties lay.111
Near the end of May, the two sides reached an impasse and settled 
in for what seemed could be a long wait. While the city council debated 
acquiescing to at least some of the strikers’ demands and continued to 
press the provincian and federal governments for financial support, the 
strikers—sometimes as many as fifty at any one worksite—gathered 
for daily pickets at the stables, the dump, and various other locations 
throughout the city.112 The strikers called for at least part of their relief 
to be paid in cash, an increase in food allowances, and an end to using 
relief recipients on “maintenance work,” including “boulevarding” (that 
is, tidying up the streets), parks work, sidewalk clearing, and grass cut-
ting. They also demanded fair treatment from the city: “We’re not a 
bunch of rough-necks,” one striker maintained in an interview with 
the Edmonton Journal. He emphasized the respectable and reasonable 
nature of the strike: “All we want to do is peacefully picket the men 
who are going to work in the face of strike opposition. We want food 
for our children and for our wives and ourselves, but we don’t want to 
use force to get it.”113
As for the city, Mayor Dan Knott explained that its “hands were 
tied by the two senior governments.” Premier Brownlee had earlier 
informed the city that “the province is not prepared to take such a wide 
departure from the present system, either in amount or method, at least 
until a new agreement was discussed” with Ottawa. And the last time 
Knott had asked the prime minister for $1 million to support a proper 
program of work relief, “all [he] got for his pains was a 20-minute lecture 
on sound money.”114 Still, the mayor was game to try again, writing the 
prime minister to advise him of the strike and to call on the federal gov-
ernment to institute a new program of major public works construction. 
“The local situation is becoming more critical,” Knott wrote, “and at pre-
sent time the unemployed have refused to carry on work operations.”115
The strike situation—which had long been simmering quietly 
in negotiations among the province, the federal government, the city, 
and the unemployed—boiled over on 28 May. The trouble began when 
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five relief recipients assigned to planting potatoes at a city-owned potato 
patch in an effort to augment the following winter’s relief stores encoun-
tered some two hundred picketers determined to persuade the men to 
stop work. Twelve city police officers quickly descended on the patch, 
arresting twenty-one strikers and charging them with creating a distur-
bance. The strikers tried the same tactic the following morning, when 
some one hundred picketers attempted to stop six workers from plant-
ing potatoes. Police again arrived shortly after the attempt and arrested 
thirty-two men and one woman on charges of intimidation.116
In the end, the city council agreed to increase the food allowance 
by 25 percent, but the relief workers were still paid no cash, and the work 
remained as undesirable as ever. Although the strike was ended by vote a 
short time later, the married men’s frustration with the city’s work relief 
system remained. A little more than one year later, married men on relief 
were routinely failing to appear for their scheduled shifts, forcing the city 
engineers to regularly order about 50 percent more men than any relief 
job required “to make provision for those who don’t turn out.”117
DEALING WITH THE uNEMpLOyED  
SINGLE MAN
Single men, whether employed or not, have long been regarded as 
representing some element of danger. In the American context, for 
example, historian Howard Chudacoff traces the idea of the danger-
ous single man to at least the very earliest years of the republic. In part, 
this danger was related to the single man’s apparent independence and 
free mobility: he was, in many respects, unfettered by broader social 
concerns about respectability, family life, and responsibility. By the late 
nineteenth century, Chudacoff notes, bachelordom was on the increase, 
alongside the rise of a newly created consumer culture and growing 
urbanization. With increasing numbers of young men taking advan-
tage of “alternatives to marriage, such as opportunities for economic, 
social, and sexual independence” came a growing sense that the single 
man constituted a danger to respectable, established society.118
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The very independence, mobility, and youth that made his experi-
ence reflective of the frontier (in both Canada and the United States) 
simultaneously made the single man dangerous in a number of ways. 
Historian Paul Laipson argues that the single man represented “both 
a failure of masculinity and an excess of it.”119 His state of singledom 
(whether permanent or transitory) imbued him with an ambiguous 
sexuality: he was perceived, on the one hand, as possibly asexual or even 
homosexual, and on the other, as aggressively “hyper-masculine . . . reluc-
tant to marry because he is unwilling to restrict himself sexually to one 
woman or to give up access to the pleasures available to him as a single 
man.”120 More dangerous even than an ambiguous sexuality, however, 
was the single man’s supposed propensity for violence.121 According to 
historian Mary Beard, writing in the 1930s, single men were even behind 
the rise of fascism: “The Fascist movement in Germany, as in Italy and 
Japan, is essentially a dynamic of unmarried males. . . . Adolph [sic] Hitler, 
a bachelor like the majority of the thirty or forty leaders of the Nazi party, 
is a rover, a veteran of the World War, undomesticated and unused to the 
responsibilities connected with public life in a time of peace.”122 In less 
hyperbolic terms, others believed that younger single and working-class 
men were prone to engage at the very least in unruly, rowdy, sometimes 
drunken behaviour and that this sort of behaviour became even more 
dangerous when young men congregated.123
While Western societies generally saw single young men as rep-
resenting potential problems, economic conditions caused by the 
Depression exacerbated that potential in three important ways. Suddenly, 
single young men were not only unattached, independent, and prone 
to gather together and cause trouble, but they were also idle, suscepti-
ble to a reinvigorated Communist movement, and, perhaps worst of all, 
representative of both the wasted promise and vitality of youth and the 
bleak future of Western industrial society.124 Edmonton’s Highlands and 
District Community League warned city councillors in April 1933 that 
unemployment was “preventing the normal development in the young 
people [of] self-respect and economic independence and initiative.” 
Together, these “human qualities” represented “the most valuable asset 
of the Country.”125 Whether societal fears of single men were based on 
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real or imagined violence and disorder, freedom and independence from 
“civil society,” and danger, single men, as we shall see, were clearly singled 
out by relief administrators of Prairie cities as individuals on which to 
keep a close eye.
As early as December 1929, city officials had determined that single 
unemployed men represented a serious problem. “We have single men 
who are without food and a place to sleep,” Saskatoon’s finance commit-
tee reported, adding, “if work cannot be provided for them by individual 
effort, the only other course open is to have them arrested as vagrants 
and housed in jail, and hope that such an alternative may drive them out 
of the city.”126 Edmonton’s chief of police saw similar problems. Writing 
to the mayor in December 1929, Police Chief A. G. Shute reported the 
“increasing tendency of single men coming to the police station asking 
to be taken care of during the night.” One man who had had nothing to 
eat since the previous day vowed to “commit a crime to get taken care 
of. Many crimes—thefts, hold-ups—by men who find it impossible to 
secure employment and the inclemency of the weather drives them to 
desperation.”127
 Out of the City, onto the Farm
Given the prevailing sense that unemployed single men represented 
disorder and potential danger, especially before the federal govern-
ment took responsibility for them, city relief officials in Edmonton, 
Saskatoon, and Winnipeg employed policies designed to reduce their 
number on city relief rolls whenever possible. One way of accomplish-
ing this was to charge them with vagrancy and put them in jail.128 
Another was to shift responsibility to the family. As one relief officer 
in Edmonton explained: “It has been the practice of this Department 
in handling adult children of married couples that are on relief, to 
include them as part of the family. The method of handling the adult 
male dependent now is unquestionably cheaper than the meal and bed 
system, and provided there is accommodation in the home, it cannot 
be very much improved on.”129 Finally, cities occasionally offered single 
men some of the meanest work possible, explicitly discouraging them 
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from waiting on the city for relief altogether. Edmonton’s relief officer, 
for example, suggested that the city’s engineering department should 
“put on a good substantial force of single men with brooms sweeping 
the muck to the side of the street in little piles. . . . The offering of this 
work, day by day, until the whole street is cleaned up, would likely have 
its effect in reducing the number of men reporting for work, and con-
sequently for relief.”130 In this sense, work relief had different functions 
for different categories of relief. City relief departments simultaneously 
used work to maintain married men in the city and to remove single 
men from the city.
Far more common, however, were municipal efforts to remove 
single men by encouraging them to take up farm or camp work well 
outside the city. In this goal, city officials in Edmonton, Saskatoon, and 
Winnipeg were far from alone. US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, for instance, made substantial allowance for programs to take 
young single urban men from the cities and place them in the “healthy” 
surroundings of the American “wilderness,” there to fight forest fires, 
clear brush, plant trees, and build bridges. According to historian Jeffrey 
Suzik, Roosevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps emerged out of the pres-
ident’s “personal interest in the conservation of natural resources; but 
even more so, it grew out of a societal concern about the uncertain occu-
pational prospects of America’s jobless male youth.”131
Farm work was not an unusual or new response to the “problem” of 
single men, who had long relied on harvest work in the autumn through 
the three decades leading to the Depression. And farmers, too, welcomed 
a cheap and available labour supply of single men—and, less commonly, 
married men—to be available to work during the busy harvest season 
when wheat had to be threshed before the first frost. Encouraging single 
men to work on farms would, according to Manitoba provincial officials, 
“help solve the farm labor problem.”132 The idea made good sense to 
municipal, provincial, and federal officials for two reasons. First, paying 
part or even full wages to single men working on farms was cheaper than 
maintaining them in cities. Second, most officials recognized the added 
benefit of removing the idle and potentially dangerous men from city 
street corners and giving them something useful to do. Alberta’s Premier 
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John Brownlee, for one, believed that “the situation has to be handled 
carefully as otherwise we may have a considerable amount of disorder 
and possibly damage.”133
Also of concern was the danger that single men, if left without 
work for too long, might never learn the value of honest labour. “For 
God’s sake,” one exasperated man begged Edmonton’s Mayor James 
Douglas, “relieve me of this deadly incubus idle for a very long time.” The 
“deadly incubus” was the man’s twenty-five-year-old “terrible burden” of 
a son. In the father’s opinion, his son’s main problem could be attributed 
to deteriorating values among young people in general. “I’d clean toilets 
before I’d be a burden to anyone, but the youth of the present day just 
want to ‘glass cock’ around with powder comb glass, long hair, no cap 
or hat and they make me sick in the head and stomach—two foot wide 
pants, trailing in the gutter.” The mayor replied a few days later by letter: 
“My advice to you would be to put that boy on a farm where he would 
be compelled to do a little at least for his board, and you might make a 
man of him.”134
It was when the three levels of government began to jointly initi-
ate organized farm placement programs that seasonal farm work became 
work relief designed to serve a particular purpose. This began early in 
the Depression, as exemplified by Saskatoon’s co-operation with the 
provincial and federal governments in placing single men on surround-
ing farms in early September 1931. By mid-month, some one thousand 
single men had been placed with farmers, and another thousand were 
set to go. The city’s relief officer also instructed investigators visiting the 
homes of Saskatoon families on relief to advise any single men living 
there to “take advantage of the threshing season.”135 As an added incen-
tive, City Commissioner Andrew Leslie declared that “no more meals 
were to be served to unemployed single men, unless they were certified 
unfit for harvest work by the medical health officer.”136 Those single men 
still unwilling to take up harvesting jobs that autumn “would have a 
tough row to hoe when they apply for work in the relief camps this 
winter,” warned the mayor, who vowed to convince provincial officials 
to offer them space in the camps only after all harvest workers had 
secured a place.137
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In Saskatoon in the autumn of 1931, all three levels of govern-
ment promised to contribute to paying urban single men five dollars per 
month to work on farms. The scheme was made more attractive to single 
men by allowing farm workers to “receive whatever wages from the 
farmer they could bargain for” over and above their room and board.138 
A further five dollars per month would be paid directly to the farmer 
to take care of the extra costs associated with housing and feeding the 
men. In Winnipeg, the scheme worked a little differently, with the three 
levels of government together paying the single man a total of twenty 
dollars if he signed up to work on a farm for one year. The twenty dollars, 
representing five dollars per month for four months, would be held for 
the man in trust and paid out at the contract’s conclusion, leaving him a 
small amount of cash in his pocket when he left the farm.139
Provincial authorities had some concerns about the program’s 
“bonus to farmers,” since it, perhaps unfairly, privileged farmers by assist-
ing them in paying their labour costs. Despite these concerns, provincial 
officials believed that the costs were worth the removal of single men 
from the urban centres. The same benefit would not extend to other 
industries inside the cities because they could not remove single men 
from the cities. When two Winnipeg lumber dealers wrote Manitoba’s 
Department of Public Works seeking a similar five-dollar supplement to 
the wages of workers whom they secured from Winnipeg’s unemploy-
ment rolls, the department’s assistant deputy minister replied that such 
a scheme would set the dangerous precedent of providing aid “not only 
for every type of industry, but also for every individual firm which might 
desire to make a similar proposal.”140
One of the scheme’s greatest difficulties, according to Winnipeg 
relief officials, was that “by far the greater number of single men on relief 
in Winnipeg are without farm experience.” Selection of suitable men 
for the program was based on their health and cleanliness, as well as 
their farming experience. Some men, of course, had little or no farm-
ing experience. These were the “labourers, mechanics, carpenters, railway 
maintenance or section workers”: in other words, the young men who 
had grown up in the city. One single man, for example, signed onto the 
scheme in early 1932 and was assigned to a farm some one hundred miles 
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north of the city. He subsequently made his way north through “the 
extremely severe weather of early February.” When he arrived, the farmer 
discovered that the man did not know how to milk a cow and conse-
quently “told him to be on his way.” The man was then forced to walk 
the seven and a half miles back to nearest town, arriving there with “his 
face badly frozen.” Both the farmer and the single man were recent immi-
grants from Central Europe, and the employment offices organizing the 
movement of men to farms had evidently believed that the farmer would 
treat “one of his own countrymen” with more compassion.141 Other farm-
ers were quite happy to take in city men. In 1931, Vegreville farmer P. 
Kostynuik wrote to Edmonton’s mayor offering to take two men from 
the city’s relief rolls to work on his farm in return for their room and 
board on the understanding that the three governments would pay their 
wages. Economic benefits aside, Kostynuik felt that the rural experience 
would be good for the men, who would, he suggested, “live better than in 
the city and bring there’s childern [sic] up in good and better habits.”142 
The city quickly found two men willing to take the job.
But despite the “good and better habits” that Kostynuik’s rural 
experience promised the urban unemployed, the transition from city 
to country was not necessarily easy. In August 1931, farmer Leo Bunting 
complained that the two relief workers sent to his farm in Wildwood 
were “not worth their board.” The two men did not like the work and, 
after some time, elected to return “to Edmonton to be fed mush and 
drink soup.”143 Cattleman Charles Henry McKinnon discovered other 
difficulties associated with taking on unemployed city workers at his 
ranch. “You couldn’t even use them,” he recalled later, “because if you’ve 
got other men working on the ranch they’re drawing a certain wage and 
some other fellow working partly for the government, works that way, 
and he don’t fit with the rest of them very long. They don’t associate 
well.”144 It seemed, at least on McKinnon’s ranch, that employing regular 
wage workers and relief workers made for a volatile working environ-
ment, in part because the relief workers were receiving a government 
subsidy while the others had to work for all their wages.
Another case ended more happily. Before being placed, all appli-
cants for farm work underwent a medical check by a physician at the 
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relief offices. When one young man arrived seeking placement on a farm, 
the physician reported that the man “was found to be very weak.” The 
man “reluctantly admitted that he had not had a real meal for weeks, and 
had come for relief only after every other means had been exhausted.” On 
the doctor’s orders, he was promptly admitted to a convalescence room 
for one week, during which time he regained his strength. Shortly there-
after, he was placed on a Manitoba farm where he, according to relief 
officials, received hearty meals and a warm bed.145
How the single men felt about the farm-placement scheme is dif-
ficult to gauge in any general way. Some men signed up quickly while 
others not only refused but also counselled their fellow single unem-
ployed not to accept any farm relief jobs until the various governments 
agreed to pay something more than “starvation wages.” Some men, whom 
Saskatoon’s relief officers designated “ringleaders,” attempted to convince 
single unemployed men not to accept the jobs until the city agreed to 
pay their fares. The so-called ringleaders appeared to have some success 
in their campaign. In January 1930, R. Briscoe, a Saskatoon employment 
officer, reported that “there were a large number who were not keen to 
take jobs on farms for their board.”146
For many men, however, remaining in the city meant no work or 
relief, and possible vagrancy charges. These bleak prospects drove them 
to the relief offices seeking farm placements. In Winnipeg, some fifteen 
or thirty single men could be found at the relief office each day at three 
o’clock in the afternoon “waiting for the doctor to give them the once 
over” before being placed with a farmer seeking labourers. There, to 
pass the time, they engaged in “good natured banter” that reflected their 
shared experiences as young single unemployed men. In good humour, 
according to relief officials, some speculated that they would take a trip 
to Europe or the Mediterranean once they received their payment at the 
end of the season. Others joked that they would get married or that, with 
the payment in hand, they would soon be ready for retirement.147 They 
told stories, too. An apparently popular one was of a farmer who had 
hired two men from the relief office. A friend of the two men wished 
to go along. When told by the farmer that there was work only for two 
men, not three, the third invariably said, “Oh don’t let that worry you. 
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You’d be surprised at how little work it takes to keep me going.” Another 
story revolved around an inexperienced young city man sent for the first 
time to a farm to work. On being told by the farmer how hens produce 
eggs in their nests, the man deduced that he had found a cow’s nest 
when he discovered a pile of condensed milk cans. While stories like 
these represented single men’s efforts to “keep up their spirits,” according 
to Winnipeg relief officials, running through the stories was “a note of 
pathos,” for “still in them is the hope that it won’t be long until they can 
return to their chosen work, with some assurance of permanence and 
stability in that work and in the homes they try to build.”148
That assurance, for many single unemployed men, must have 
seemed worlds away from their current realities. One Saskatoon man 
spent $1.30 on a railway ticket to get to a promised harvest job. He arrived 
only to discover that the farmer had already finished his threshing and 
only needed a man to do some light cleanup work. The farmer paid him 
$1.50 for three-quarters of a day’s work, leaving him with only twenty 
cents for his work after deducting the railway fare. Moreover, accord-
ing to Saskatoon’s Mayor Joseph Underwood, some unemployed work-
ers complained “that farmers were making them work all day Sunday 
for their board.” In the mayor’s estimation, expecting the men to do 
any more than regular chores on Sunday “hardly seemed reasonable.”149 
Filling harvest jobs was no easy matter even where wages and work were 
reasonable. Some unemployed men in Edmonton, for example, refused 
to accept temporary harvest jobs on farms, fearing that the city would 
cut them off relief as soon as they left town. Only with relief officer T. S. 
Magee’s assurances that their fears were groundless would men finally 
accept farm job offers.
 Relief for Cities: Single Men in Relief Camps
In their effort to get unemployed single men off of their hands and to 
save money, urban relief authorities also steadfastly encouraged the pro-
vincial and federal governments to set up relief camps for single men. 
The first relief camps opened in the late fall of 1930. At first, federal 
Parks Commissioner J. B. Harkin had hoped, with good reason, that 
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the federal government would agree to open a string of relief camps 
in national parks across the West. Such relief camps, the commissioner 
believed, were a perfect solution to many of the problems then facing 
the nation. Not only would they take thousands of unemployed men 
from the cities, thereby relieving pressure on local city relief adminis-
trations, but they would also, through the men’s labour, turn the parks 
into important revenue-generating tourist attractions. In return for 
their labour, mostly on building roads into and out of the parks to 
accommodate motor car traffic, the men would get three square meals 
a day, a warm bed, and a healthy, natural setting in which to wait out 
the hard times.150
It was not to be, at least not to the scale that Harkin had envi-
sioned. Because the federal Unemployment Relief Act maintained that 
responsibility for unemployment was purely local, none of its $20 mil-
lion in appropriation funds could be used by any federal department. 
If Harkin was to get any relief money at all, he would have to convince 
provincial governments to use part of their appropriation to finance 
camp work in national parks inside their own borders. In the end, only 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba agreed to do so, believing that setting up 
camps at Prince Albert and Riding Mountain, respectively, would ease 
their unemployment problems.151
Complementing the Saskatchewan camp at Prince Albert, opened 
in the fall of 1930, was a purely Saskatoon-initiated camp at the city’s 
southern edge. The province donated the use of a government build-
ing on the site, and the city renovated it to accommodate double-decker 
bunks for some five hundred men and installed in the building two steel 
bathtubs, three shower baths, a delousing plant and dryer, and a rack 
and wash tubs for washing and drying clothes. Heating was provided 
by a stationary boiler borrowed from the city’s engineering department, 
which offered some warmth for the men and protected the building’s 
plumbing from frost. The Saskatoon camp was run with military effi-
ciency. Initially, single men applied for admittance to the camp at the city 
relief office downtown. Later, the city required the men to apply at the 
camp itself because, as the camp’s commandant explained, it engendered 
in the men “a much greater respect for authority.” It also made it easier 
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to verify the men’s statements as to their place of residence and employ-
ment history to eliminate “drifters from other provinces.”152
If an applicant was accepted, the city relief officer handed him 
tickets to the baths and delousing plant on the camp grounds. While 
the man was in the baths, camp attendants sterilized all his belongings. 
Following the bath, the man visited the camp storekeeper, who provided 
him with clean blankets, assigned him to a bunk, and instructed him 
to read the “Camp Standing Orders.” The orders ranged from insisting 
that “all men who are warned for any duties must report [for work] on 
schedule,” to ensuring that every man “must shave and generally keep up 
his appearance,” to keeping the toilets “in good order.” On this last point, 
the men were reminded that “loitering there is absolutely forbidden.”153
Any men found in contravention of the camp’s standing orders 
“did not get their next meal until they were interviewed at the Camp 
Office and given a warning.” On a second offence, “or charges of a more 
serious nature,” he was subject to summary dismissal from the camp. 
After dismissal, moreover, the camp kept a record of the incidents on file 
because, as the camp’s director later reported, “in some cases these men 
went down town and complained to some organization of unfair treat-
ment.” During the day, the men were given “a certain amount of work 
.  .  . to keep them out of mischief.”154 Clearly, most of the men’s daily 
activities were closely monitored. In the evening, the men might enjoy 
performances by various Saskatoon-based concert bands, free movies at 
Saskatoon theatres once each week, or free attendance at hockey games 
played at the Saskatoon stadium. The men were also provided with free 
daily issues of the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix. Other entertainment included 
the loans of a piano from a Saskatoon music store and a radio from the 
Hudson’s Bay Company.155
Meanwhile, Alberta opened relief camps along the Jasper-Banff 
Highway using its federal appropriation under the Unemployment 
Relief Act and accepted nearly one thousand of Edmonton’s single unem-
ployed male population over the winter of 1930–31.156 Clearly, Alberta’s 
relief camp activities aided Edmonton’s city relief machine, reducing the 
city’s responsibility for roughly one-quarter of its single male popula-
tion, at least for the winter months. With the arrival of spring, however, 
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the province intended to close down its camps and expel the men, 
posing a serious problem for the cities. If the camps closed, Edmonton’s 
city council believed, the men would have little choice but to drift back 
into the city. The rapid introduction to the city of potentially one thou-
sand single men with nothing to do caused city officials a good deal of 
anxiety. Edmonton could not afford to look after the high number of 
unemployed in the city as it was. The addition of up to one thousand 
men (and potentially dangerous ones, at that) to the mix was seen as 
simply untenable.
Edmonton’s city council had already decided to cut all single 
men from city relief for the summer and to accept no new applicants 
beginning on the last day of April; to facilitate this process, city bureau-
crats pleaded with the province to keep the camps running for at least 
another month “to prevent men from drifting into the city” before the 
cut was made.157 The province agreed to keep the camps open until the 
end of April, when the city typically shut down its office for single men. 
As of 6 May, the city relief officer reported that “no untoward incidents 
have arisen.”158 But that situation would soon change. In mid-May, the 
Edmonton Retail Clerks Association insisted that the city continue to 
issue relief to single men, and near the end of May, the United Empire 
Loyalists and the National Unemployed Workers’ Association added their 
voices to the call. The following month, those early efforts to have single 
men reinstated to the relief rolls grew larger, and by early June, Edmonton 
was reporting a “tense situation” among the single men.159 The arrival in 
the city of a detachment of the Strathcona Horse and a strengthening of 
the provincial police presence forestalled potential violence, at least for 
the time being; the city’s relief officer informed City Commissioner David 
Mitchell that because of these measures, “a very noticeable improvement 
in the demeanour of the crowd has taken place.”160 How long the single 
men’s demeanour might remain that way was anyone’s guess.
Through the summer of 1931, municipal and provincial bureau-
crats grew ever more anxious about how they might deal with what 
had become known as the “single men problem.” Certainly, the cities’ 
favoured solution was to disavow any responsibility for them whatso-
ever. To do this with a minimum amount of backlash from angry and 
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frustrated men, however, city authorities would have to find some way 
to remove the men from their borders. Sending them to work as labour-
ers on surrounding farms, as noted earlier, was one way, but the scheme 
never seemed to take up enough men. Alberta’s Department of Municipal 
Affairs suggested that single unemployed men should be “concentrated 
on a semi military basis.” Letting the single men roam through the cities 
and issuing them purchasing tickets would “leave them at large with 
a feeling of victory to take part in any disturbance agitators wished to 
promote.”161 Prime Minister R. B. Bennett appeared willing to help. The 
prime minister, in fact, along with most other municipal, provincial, 
and federal leaders, had long believed that single unemployed men rep-
resented a menace and a threat to public order. He also believed that 
they were especially vulnerable to communist ideas.162 At a meeting 
with Alberta municipal leaders in Calgary during the summer of 1931, 
Bennett assured all in attendance that the federal government “intended 
to establish camps, particularly in the Parks and in British Columbia on 
the Railways” that fall. And, as Edmonton’s chief engineer reported to 
the city commissioner, although the prime minister admitted that “the 
Government has no power to compel single men to go to camps, he 
practically suggested that the cities should cut out single men’s relief.”163 
However the cities interpreted the prime minister’s assurances, Bennett 
himself remained unwilling to allow the federal government to accept 
full responsibility for single unemployed men. Instead, his adminis-
tration’s Unemployment and Farm Relief Act, passed in Ottawa on 
Dominion Day 1931, would only provide provinces with federal monies 
to open road-building camps along the Trans-Canada Highway over the 
following winter. Although the only projects that Bennett was willing to 
finance as purely federal undertakings were in the national parks, these 
too aided beleaguered cities in no small measure.164
Most cities regarded the work plans for single unemployed men 
as good news. Edmonton’s relief officer, for instance, was pleased to note 
that the Jasper-Banff Highway camps promised to rid the city “of these 
transients who are becoming a pest on our private institutions and city 
homes in the widespread system of begging carried on.”165 Edmonton 
would also benefit by sending single unemployed men to brushing 
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and clearing camps at Elk Island National Park, a federal relief camp, 
just a few miles east of the city. Winnipeg could similarly benefit from 
new programs for the single unemployed that autumn, federal Labour 
Minister Gideon Robertson informed a Manitoba delegation in Ottawa 
in late August 1931. If the province and the city agreed to jointly pay the 
men thirty cents each per hour for work on the Trans-Canada Highway 
west of Fort William, the federal government would cover the cost of the 
men’s transportation to the worksite. This arrangement could provide 
employment for two to three thousand Winnipeg men.166 In addition, 
the federal government had set aside $200,000 for work in national parks. 
In November, hundreds of Winnipeg men, as well as men from through-
out the province, began arriving at Riding Mountain National Park, 
where they were soon engaged in constructing park buildings, clearing 
roads, and improving the park’s golf course.167
By the following spring, the threat of single men returning from 
the camps again emerged, and cities were in no better position to accom-
modate them than they had been in the spring of 1931. A worried Mayor 
Daniel Knott in Edmonton wired R. B. Bennett warning him that there 
was “strong pressure here to again open construction camps [for single 
men] at Jasper and Elk Island Parks.”168 By May, still no word had come 
from Ottawa, and Alberta’s premier intervened directly, writing the fed-
eral minister of the Interior to ask why they were being held up. There 
was, the premier warned, “an awkward situation with respect to the 
large numbers of single men in Edmonton and Calgary.”169 The min-
ister replied that negotiations over wages for supervisors and foremen 
were behind the delay, but he expected the camps to open shortly. In 
the meantime, the premier informed Edmonton’s mayor, the province 
would open several of its own camps in the forest reserves north of the 
city to accommodate up to five hundred men.170 Some weeks later, the 
first group of eighty-five Edmonton men set out for Jasper.
It is difficult to measure how the men themselves felt about leaving 
the city to spend an indeterminate amount of time in an isolated camp, 
but cases of men quitting the camps or even refusing to go tell at least part 
of the story. Although eighty-five men agreed to go to Jasper, for exam-
ple, another 119 refused, their chief complaint, according to Mayor Knott, 
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being the small wages paid at the camp. All were subsequently cut from 
the city’s relief rolls.171 A group of twenty-five men who simply left the 
Jasper camp and made their way back to Edmonton in early January 1932 
received similar treatment. When an “extremely surprized [sic]” city com-
missioner learned that the men, together with another contingent arriv-
ing in the city a few days later, had received minimal emergency relief, he 
ordered Edmonton’s relief department to stop offering the men any relief 
at all.172 But the men had their defenders. Writing to Premier Brownlee 
some days later, Secretary William E. Harrison of the Unemployed 
Ex-Service Men’s Association admitted that his organization was “most 
certainly not in support of the methods these men used in quitting work,” 
but, he added, the men should be given relief anyway “to prevent any por-
tion of them possibly affiliating with the Communistic element in the 
Province.” The threat, according to Harrison, was real and imminent. “We 
have definite proof,” he assured the premier, “that these men were lured 
away from the job by Communist propaganda.”173 Whether the men were 
communists is unclear, but relief officer H. F. McKee saw any occasion—
no matter the circumstances—on which men left camps (or farm work, 
for that matter) as a “very evident excuse for taking up their identification 
cards” and reducing the city’s relief burden.174
Clearly, then, married men and single men had very different 
work relief experiences—diference that were, in many ways, related to 
relief policy-makers’ perceptions of the nature of the problem that each 
category posed to their cities. Whereas married men’s work relief was 
intended, for the most part, to enable them to remain in the city and in 
their own homes as heads of their households, single men’s work relief 
was designed to remove them from the city. Wages paid to single men on 
farms or in camps were typically much lower than those paid to married 
men on city relief. The latter earned between forty-five cents and one 
dollar per hour. The going rate on farms, however, was five to ten dollars 
per month, and in the most notorious work camps, such as those hous-
ing the so-called Royal Twenty Centers and operated by the Department 
of National Defence, workers were paid only twenty cents per day.175 The 
single men who accepted such work, moreover, would find themselves 
relying entirely on farmers or camp commandants for their food and 
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their shelter. And while married men enjoyed a measure of autonomy 
when their shift ended, single men in the camps and on the farms were 
under more or less constant surveillance.
Earlier economic recessions had laid the foundation for the use 
of work relief as a viable approach to urban unemployment, and the 
sudden downturn in the local economy during the late autumn of 
1929 offered no compelling reason to suspect that this approach would 
not prove useful once again. Few questioned the economic, social, and 
political value of putting the unemployed to work rather than on the 
dole. Although public works entailed higher administrative costs than 
did direct relief, certain social and economic benefits made the imple-
mentation of work relief projects worthwhile. From the perspective of 
city councils, the federal and provincial governments provided low-cost 
financing and funding for local improvements at a time when, without 
that support, such projects would have overtaxed municipal budgets. The 
social benefits of providing the unemployed with work relief rather than 
direct relief also made that approach worthwhile. Not only did work 
relief offer some semblance of market and social stability during periods 
of severe economic instability, but it also purported to combat the moral 
degeneration of the otherwise idle unemployed. Finally, federal, provin-
cial, and municipal funding of public works made good political sense. 
Public works relief was simply a more popular approach to the urban 
unemployment situation than was direct relief.
But, in the end, the issue was moot. Neither the federal nor pro-
vincial governments were especially interested in restarting a course of 
urban work relief programs along the lines of those initiated earlier in the 
Depression. The cities carried on as best they could, advocating wherever 
and whenever possible for a renewal of the work relief approach to unem-
ployment, but municipal authorities would be continually disappointed. 
In city council meetings, debates occasionally emerged over relief issues, 
particularly in Winnipeg after 1934, when residents of the city elected a 
council divided between socialist/labour and business/elite councillors.176 
But those issues tended to be matters of degree rather than form. As we 
will see in the next chapter, local relief officials, municipal authorities, and 




Local Responsibility  
in Decline
The story of urban relief following the winter of 1932–33 is about the 
gradual decline of municipal influence in creating and implementing 
relief policy. At the heart of this decline was the fact that local respon-
sibility became increasingly untenable. The idea that cities were in any 
position to provide relief for their resident jobless strained credulity 
even at the beginning of the Depression; only three years later, it had 
become an obvious fiction. By that point, no major urban centre on the 
Canadian Prairies was able to provide any relief at all without relying 
on federal and/or provincial grants or loans or on debenture sales to a 
steadily falling number of interested buyers.1
During the Depression’s early years, as we have seen, municipal 
administration of work relief programs gave city governments a measure 
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of control and real responsibility. True, Prime Minister R. B. Bennett’s 
plan of financing urban relief work that employed married men a 
mere one week out of six (at best) hardly mimicked the normal capital-
ist labour market. But many of the urban public works relief projects 
carried out between the autumn of 1930 and the spring of 1933 offered 
cities first-rate infrastructure at cut-rate costs, and, to some extent, they 
also sheltered construction-related businesses from the economic storm. 
Although they did not solve the unemployment crisis or even alleviate it 
to any serious degree, they did set the cities at the centre of urban unem-
ployment relief policy-making. The municipal governments retained 
important decision-making powers over relief-related public works pro-
jects, from project selection, to the purchasing of materials, to labour 
distribution policies.
Bennett’s subsequent move to the cheaper direct relief in 1933 
pleased no one at the municipal or provincial levels. Commentators 
from nearly every quarter decried “doles” as a surefire way of destroying 
industry, the work ethic, and especially married men’s manhood. But 
the move away from federally sponsored public works relief, in favour 
of direct relief, had another significant effect: it represented the first step 
toward marginalizing the influence of city governments in determining 
relief policy. While the early insistence that cities accept local respon-
sibility for their resident jobless had certainly not been welcomed by 
urban policy-makers, that insistence had, at the very least, allowed for a 
measure of local control. In the spring of 1933, as the last of the urban 
work relief projects wound down, cities were reduced to mere custodians 
of their own relief systems.
The federal government’s establishment of relief camps to house 
thousands of single unemployed men further undermined local con-
trol over unemployment relief. The move, of course, was not unpopu-
lar among city policy-makers, who generally looked with apprehension 
upon the jobless single men congregating in their cities in search of work. 
After all, in their eyes, the single unemployed man represented disorder, 
real or imagined—the opposite of healthy productivity. Bennett’s deci-
sion to establish a system of relief camps well outside of city limits eased 
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local concerns considerably, but, at the same time, it removed responsi-
bility for unemployed single men from the hands of city authorities. The 
national relief camp system thus contributed to a much broader pattern 
of reducing the influence—and relevance—of local responsibility.
Other important policy changes continued this pattern, but the 
shift away from the local would not lead smoothly toward national 
responsibility. Indeed, the development of a modern national welfare 
state remained years away, its progress subject to fits and starts and some-
times surprising turns.2 But although the trend toward a national wel-
fare system was not a carefully planned affair, marked by a grand vision 
and clear foresight, dismantling local responsibility played a critical role 
in the process. In short, the cities mattered less after the Depression than 
they had before it began.3
“RELIEF FROM RELIEF”:  
THE MAyORS TAKE ON OTTAWA
In many ways, it was the city policy-makers and politicians themselves 
who helped author this important shift. Civic authorities, especially in 
the West, had long been calling for “relief from relief.”4 In fact, this was 
the conclusion of a western delegation to Ottawa led by Ralph Webb, 
mayor of Winnipeg, in February 1930. “We believe that the Government 
will recognize the nature of the problem,” Webb told Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King. “We do not want investigations, commissions, and 
the like, but assistance.”5 The unmoved prime minister responded 
that “with the possible exception of France, actual figures, if available, 
would show that the unemployment situation in Canada was better 
than that of any country in the world.” He went on to suggest that the 
level of unemployment was comparable to any other winter, observing 
that “at no time was any country without unemployment” and main-
taining that unemployment was, in any case, a purely local responsi-
bility. Moreover, Mayor Webb’s active Conservative Party membership 
helped convince King, a Liberal, that the “alleged” unemployment 
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condition was little more than a “Tory device to stir up propaganda 
against the government.”6
 The Conference of Western Mayors, January 1935
Much had changed five years later. As we have seen, the unrelenting 
nature of the economic depression, the haphazard and inadequate 
federal and provincial aid, and the tenacious insistence on the part of 
senior levels of government that urban unemployment relief was prin-
cipally a local responsibility had all taken their toll on city finances. 
And, of course, city bureaucrats could not have known that the eco-
nomic downturn would last so long or be so devastating. By mid-dec-
ade, city officials had had enough. No longer would mere “assistance” 
do. On 30 November 1934, Mayor Joe Clarke of Edmonton travelled to 
Calgary for a meeting with that city’s mayor, Andrew Davison, and the 
two hatched a plan to hold a conference early in 1935 to be attended 
by representatives from the larger centres of the four western prov-
inces. In presenting the plan to Calgary’s city council for approval, 
Davison explained the necessity of such a conference: “In the past, we 
have contented ourselves with making representations to the senior 
governments and then accepting whatever was offered. While we have 
gained some concessions, we are of the opinion that more direct action 
is necessary, if the senior governments are to be convinced of the neces-
sity of their assuming a greater proportion of the heavy costs of civic 
government.”7 No fewer than twenty-five western mayors agreed that 
a conference that would enable them to discuss common municipal 
problems—including interest rate reductions, unemployment relief 
costs, and municipal revenue generation—was in order.8
In late January 1935, the mayors assembled in Calgary and agreed 
to call on the federal government to assume full responsibility for relief, 
to reimburse all municipal relief expenditures to that point, and to take 
on all municipal capital indebtedness at an interest rate not exceeding 3 
percent.9 Clarke, however, had earlier appeared willing to play fast and 
loose on the issue of interest payments. On 7 December 1934, Davison 
wrote to Clarke to voice his concern about a report in the Edmonton 
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Journal, noting that, two days earlier, the paper had quoted Clarke as 
warning that both he and Davison were planning to urge the conference 
of western mayors to “put our foot down solid and tell the bond holders 
we are not paying any interest after July 1st, 1935.” Such talk, implicating 
both Alberta mayors in dangerous collusion to purposefully renege on 
municipal debts and thus threaten their cities’ credit standing, clearly 
made Davison uneasy. “As I recollect it,” he wrote to Clarke, “we agreed 
that in preparation of our 1935 budget, whether or not we liked it, we 
would be called upon to levy for our interest charges at the rates pres-
ently prevailing, but with the hope that it might be possible to get a 
reduction in such rates to an amount not greater than 3%. To suggest that 
on and after July 1st, 1935, we will refuse to pay interest of any kind, is cer-
tainly something with which I do not agree.”10 Clarifying what he called 
a “scare headline,” Clarke replied to Davison, “I did say that I thought 
the conference would be advised to put their foot down on or about 
July 1st, 1935, and announce that they would not pay excessive interest, 
that is, interest greater than we think we are entitled to pay, and that 
such decision would be laid before the proper authorities, Provincial and 
Dominion.”11 Like Davison, Saskatoon’s mayor, J. S. Mills, was not pre-
pared to undermine his city’s credit standing in any way. He did, however, 
evince some sympathy for Clarke’s position, commenting in a letter to 
him that the federal government could intervene in the matter directly 
through its “control over interest rates” and its ability to “undoubtedly 
arbitrarily reduce same if it is considered in the public interest to do so.”12
In the end, the western conference of mayors limited their demand 
on the interest rate question to urging the federal government to reduce 
rates to 3 percent.13 The delegates also insisted that the federal govern-
ment reinstitute the work-for-wages programs that had been in opera-
tion earlier in the Depression and introduce a cash relief program for all 
jobless not covered by the work-for-wages program. It was a far-reaching 
set of demands, to be sure, but, in the view of Vancouver’s Alderman 
George Miller, the demands were not inappropriate. “Unemployment 
relief should never have been a municipal matter,” he told the conference 
attendees. “It has nothing to do with the policies of municipal govern-
ment and in consequence we should in no way be responsible for the 
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unemployment situation.” Nor were the cities’ demands based on exag-
gerated claims of municipal hardship, according to Mayor Joe Clarke 
of Edmonton. “We, as a conference, are ‘on the spot,’ individually and 
collectively,” he stated. “I think we should organize here together to try 
and do something for ourselves to help the four Western provinces, do 
it definitely, and fight with our backs to the wall. Every municipality in 
Western Canada has been crowded to the wall and there is one thing to 
do and that is fight and not give up.”14
The western cities were clearly seeking a good deal more than the 
assistance that Mayor Webb of Winnipeg had sought five years before. 
Nor were the western mayors alone. On the conference’s second day, 
Montréal’s mayor, Camillien Houde, wired Mayor Davison of Calgary 
inviting the western mayors to attend a much larger conference on relief 
that would include delegates from municipalities all across the nation.15 
The mood in cities east of the Lakehead, Houde assured Davison, was 
much the same as that in the West. Already, thirteen Québec mayors 
and forty-four mayors from Ontario had unanimously passed resolu-
tions calling on the provinces and the federal government to assume full 
responsibility for urban unemployment relief.16 With the mayors repre-
senting some five million Canadians and 75 percent of the nation’s taxes, 
Houde felt certain that their demands would be difficult for the federal 
government to ignore.17
The western premiers, however, were less certain. Manitoba’s John 
Bracken pointed out in a letter to Richard Reid, premier of Alberta: “Mr. 
Bennett has consistently refused to deal directly with the Municipalities, 
and whenever they have met him he has answered them by saying he can 
deal only with the Provinces.”18 Duff Pattullo, the BC premier, concurred. 
“I do not think that anything is to be gained by representations being 
made by the provinces and the municipalities jointly,” he advised Reid in 
February 1935. “The Ottawa Government will doubtless point out, as was 
done last year, that the municipalities are the creatures of the provincial 
authority, and as such that representations can properly be made [only] 
by provincial authorities.”19 The Saskatchewan premier, Jimmy Gardiner, 
while reminding Reid that municipal representatives seeking an audi-
ence with the federal government during the most recent provincial 
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conference had been refused outright, remained open to the idea of a 
joint municipal-provincial delegation to Ottawa, provided it “would be 
recognized by Mr. Bennett.”20 While the western premiers were generally 
agreed that unemployment had long become an emergency of national 
proportions and were happy enough to accept full federal financial 
responsibility for relief, they would not countenance any federal incur-
sions on provincial authority, jurisdiction, or autonomy.
 The Dominion Conference of Mayors, 1935–37
With or without provincial support, the nation’s mayors remained 
determined to make their case. Near the end of March 1935, roughly a 
hundred mayors from all across Canada convened at the Hotel Mount 
Royal in Montréal for a Dominion-wide conference. Their demands 
were similar to those made two months earlier at the western mayors’ 
conference.21 Calling themselves the Dominion Conference of Mayors 
(DCM), the delegates arrived in Montréal armed with the latest unem-
ployment-related figures prepared by McGill University’s director of 
social research, Leonard Marsh. As a snapshot of the relief situation as 
of February 1935, the numbers were alarming. In Winnipeg, for instance, 
nearly 34,000 people, or 15.2 percent of the city’s population, were on 
relief, and almost 17 percent of the city’s annual revenue went to relief-
related costs. Just over 7,500 people in Saskatoon were on relief, repre-
senting 15.5 percent of the city’s population and consuming 22.4 percent 
of annual revenues. Edmontonians on relief numbered 11,000 and cost 
the city $463,000 per year, or 12.4 percent of the city’s revenues.22 The 
figures also revealed that, on the whole, cities in the West were worse off 
than their counterparts elsewhere in the country. In British Columbia, 
cities spent an average of 10.3 percent of municipal revenues on relief. 
The average rose to 13.9 percent in Alberta, and to 16.5 percent in 
Manitoba. In Saskatchewan, the figure was an even more striking 22.5 
percent. Average urban relief spending in Ontario, by contrast, stood at 
only 8.5 percent of municipal revenues, on the basis of data from forty-
one cities. The same figure for twenty-five cities in Québec was higher, at 
11.9 percent, whereas in the Maritimes, it dropped to only 5.1 percent.23
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But the Montréal conference, characterized by Houde as being 
without parallel since Confederation and tasked with nothing less than 
“beginning a new page in Canadian history,” was about more than cold 
numbers. In his opening address to the assembled mayors, Houde declared 
that “we are here to ascertain once and for all” whether unemployment 
relief is “really our responsibility.” The conference, he said, would involve 
“several sessions of arduous work, from which will be banished every 
trace of party spirit for the substitution of a national, municipal view-
point.”24 Each of the delegates in turn sketched a picture of his city’s 
situation. Alderman Herbert Andrews of Winnipeg lamented that relief 
costs were ruining the city’s ability to carry on the business expected by its 
ratepayers: “We lopped here and pruned there, but with each pruning we 
found we were reducing our services to a point where we were lowering 
the standard of services which our citizens are entitled to receive, having 
in mind the taxes they pay.  .  . . We must have help to keep the Prairie 
Schooner moving; just now the axles are squeaking badly.” Saskatoon’s 
new mayor, Robert Pinder, pointed out that although his city’s finances 
appeared to be in better shape than the year before, “we are coming to 
the time when we, like every other municipality in Canada, are finding it 
impossible to pay the tremendous burden of relief.”25
By the evening session of the first day—and, not incidentally, fol-
lowing a Canadian Radio Commission coast-to-coast broadcast by repre-
sentative mayors from all nine provinces—all delegates had agreed that 
unemployment was a national problem and that, as such, Ottawa ought 
to assume full responsibility for it.26 The “costs of unemployment relief,” 
the mayors maintained, had been “improperly imposed upon municipali-
ties throughout the Dominion of Canada,” resulting in a breakdown of the 
“financial structures of many urban centres, and others are in like peril.” 
Nothing less than the “Peace, Order, and Good Government of all Canada 
is imperiled by reason of the conditions which exist,” the mayors asserted.27 
Their cities were simply no longer able to bear any of the burden.
Despite the mayors’ concerted and unanimous stand, federal lead-
ers were not prepared to break fundamentally with what had become 
long-standing practice and policy. Ottawa would continue to deal exclu-
sively with the provinces.28 At the conference’s close, the mayors returned 
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to their respective home cities certain that they had made their case but 
obviously disappointed at the federal government’s refusal to deal with 
their concerns and demands directly. Nevertheless, the conference had 
not been completely for naught. In addition to generating considera-
ble press on the relief question and specifically on the cities’ financial 
plight, the Dominion Conference of Mayors had invited individual Mps 
and senators to a special meeting to hear their concerns in the Railway 
Committee Rooms of the House, after Speaker James Langstaff Bowman 
refused them audience with the House. Furthermore, as Camillien 
Houde noted in a telegram to Alberta’s Premier Richard Reid two weeks 
later, the mayors had secured a promise from Acting Prime Minister Sir 
George Perley “that our representations would be taken seriously and 
that the provinces would be approached in the matter.”29 Just what that 
meant remained, for the time being, unclear. On the one hand, Perley 
noted in correspondence with Mayor Houde that the mayors assumed 
that the federal government had “decided to call a Conference of the 
representatives of the Provincial Governments. I doubt if this course 
will be taken, but the Minister of Labour purposes [sic] discussing with 
each Province its individual situation after which an endeavour will be 
made to meet its needs in as reasonable way as possible.” There would, of 
course, be no direct space afforded to representatives of the municipali-
ties. “When dealing in this way with the Provincial authorities,” Perley 
added, “you will realize that it will not be possible for the Dominion 
Government to call in you and your Colleagues.” On the other hand, at 
least some provincial leaders assumed that a Dominion-provincial con-
ference on relief matters was on the horizon. Premier Richard Reid of 
Alberta wrote to Houde on 20 April 1935 that “a relief conference with 
the federal government is anticipated in view of the fact that the present 
relief agreement between the provinces and the Dominion has expired 
and is being extended only temporarily pending an opportunity to meet 
with the federal authorities for the purpose of going into the whole ques-
tion of relief.”30
As an outcome of the conference in Montréal, the Dominion 
Conference of Mayors (DCM) struck a Continuing Committee tasked 
with keeping the municipal relief issue on the national stage until the 
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group could meet again.31 One of the committee’s more important 
acts was to reiterate—in no uncertain terms—the mayors’ position 
on relief to anyone who would listen. “You will have noticed that one 
of our two main demands was that for the very strong reasons herein 
stated the Dominion Government should assume the entire responsibil-
ity for unemployment relief,” Continuing Committee Chair Camillien 
Houde argued in a telegram to the Alberta premier, Richard Reid, in 
April 1935.32 In another telegram to Reid four days later, Houde wrote, 
“It is imperative that the Dominion Government recognize, acknowl-
edge, and assume its sole responsibility for unemployment and relief. We 
have shown clearly that it belongs to them and to no one else.”33 Still, 
there was only so much that the Continuing Committee could do, and 
its work lagged through the summer months, especially once it became 
apparent that a federal election, as well as several provincial ones, would 
soon take place. Houde later wrote to the DCM in a review of the com-
mittee’s activities, “It was increasingly clear that no definite steps could 
be taken profitably until the various elections were over.”34
The following year, in March 1936, the DCM met again, this time 
at Ottawa’s Chateau Laurier, but the political landscape had shifted 
since the previous year’s meeting. The federal government had changed 
from Conservative to Liberal, and several provinces also had new gov-
ernments. Nevertheless, little appeared different from the mayors’ per-
spective. True, newly elected Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie 
King had called a Dominion-provincial conference for early December 
to deal in part with relief matters, but the mayors, as expected and 
despite their best efforts, were not invited. And although the prime 
minister and the nine premiers invited DCM representatives for a short 
chat in the Railway Committee Room of the House of Commons, the 
Dominion-provincial conference adjourned on 13 December “without 
taking any definite action along the lines suggested by the Dominion 
Conference of Mayors.”35 All the DCM’s Continuing Committee could 
do was issue a public letter addressed to the prime minister lament-
ing that “everything so far leads us to believe that the Inter-provincial 
Conference may reach no concrete decisions, to the great disappoint-
ment of public opinion at large” and calling on the federal government 
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to “relieve the municipalities of the load of direct relief which they can 
carry no longer.”36
As it happened, King did pledge, in the wake of the conference, to 
increase relief allocations to the provinces by 75 percent until 31 March 
1936. He also announced a Dominion Commission on Employment and 
Relief to coordinate federal and provincial employment generation and 
relief efforts. But these actions represented little more than a continua-
tion of what the mayors viewed as a failed strategy that fundamentally 
changed nothing. In this context, it is not surprising that the mayors’ 
demands from the Chateau Laurier in March 1936 were much the same 
as the previous year. Once again, the mayors resolved that Ottawa assume 
relief costs from 1 April 1936 forward.37 The resolution was particularly 
significant to the western mayors since documents recently tabled in the 
House of Commons indicated that the four western provinces owed the 
federal treasury a combined total of $111 million in outstanding relief 
loans.38 No other province had outstanding unemployment relief–
related loans from the treasury.
The reason for the western provinces’ debt was obvious: unem-
ployment relief spending from 1930 to 1935 in the Prairie cities had sky-
rocketed in that time, according to numbers prepared for the mayors’ 
meeting by economist Hymen Carl Goldenberg, then a sessional lecturer 
at McGill University.39 Spending on unemployment relief in Winnipeg 
in 1931 reached just over $900,000. Four years later, the annual amount 
had more than doubled to $1,886,000. Edmonton’s annual unemploy-
ment relief spending jumped from $87,840 in 1930 to $545,543 in 1935. In 
Saskatoon, relief spending increased even more over the same period, 
from a mere $4,231 to an astonishing $290,671. To Goldenberg, the prob-
lem was obvious: “The duties and responsibilities of municipalities have 
increased without a proportional increase in the power to raise the rev-
enue necessary to meet their new obligations.”40
On the matter of retaining at least some municipal administrative 
control over relief, however, the mayors were divided. Mayor Joe Clarke 
of Edmonton wanted nothing to do with relief administration, believ-
ing that the federal government could do the best job of “cutting out 
the chiselers” from among the ranks of relief administrators. Winnipeg’s 
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Mayor John Queen cautioned against relinquishing all administrative 
authority over relief but nevertheless advised complete federal responsi-
bility for relief costs.41 Regardless of the opinions of the mayors, Ottawa 
remained unwilling to deal with the mayors directly, and for the second 
time in as many years, the mayors returned home disappointed.
With little federal action on the matter by the spring of 1937, 
the nation’s mayors met once again in Ottawa, but this time the 
Dominion Conference of Mayors was joined by delegates from the 
Union of Canadian Municipalities (uCM).42 Discussions of a merger 
between the two representatives of the nation’s cities had begun the 
previous November, resulting not in a definite arrangement but in a 
tacit agreement to divide the work of promoting municipal interests 
among them. The uCM would carry out “general fact finding,” while 
the Continuing Committee of the DCM would collect research and 
statistics, and continue to advocate for the mayors’ position with respect 
to unemployment relief.43 In February 1937, the general secretary of 
the DCM’s Continuing Committee, T. L. Bullock (with Houde’s resig-
nation as mayor of Montréal, he had ceased to be chair), invited the 
nation’s mayors to attend the DCM’s 1937 conference in March with 
the hope “that final arrangements will be made .  .  . for an amalgama-
tion between the Dominion Conference of Mayors and the Union of 
Canadian Municipalities.”44 The amalgamation did take place, forming 
the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities.45
Stanley Lewis, the mayor of Ottawa, welcomed the delegates to 
the March meeting and “expressed the hope that the Conference would 
be a most successful one.” The mayors got down to work, forming nomi-
nating, amalgamation, and resolutions committees. By the third day of 
the conference, however, it was clear that the mayors were divided on 
whether to call once more on the federal government to shoulder the 
entire responsibility for unemployment. Some, including Deputy Reeve 
E. J. Humphreys, York Township, and Reeve J. B. Wheeler, Scarboro, 
wanted the “Dominion Government forthwith [to] take over and assume 
the entire cost of unemployment relief.” But a “large majority” of the 
mayors, after two years of having their pleas ignored, agreed to scale back 
their demands. Rather than insist that the federal government accept 
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total responsibility for unemployment, the nation’s mayors would ask 
for an increase in federal relief grants, providing that Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King also institute a work-for-wages program along the lines 
of that implemented earlier in the decade.46
Seeking to make a stronger case for greater federal involvement 
in financing urban unemployment relief, the mayors also released a 
major report that they had commissioned the previous year to survey 
relief costs across the country. Prepared once again by economist Hyman 
Carl Goldenberg and based on responses to a questionnaire circulated 
to Canada’s major cities through the summer and fall of 1936, the report 
revealed—perhaps for the first time in a uniform way—the onerous bur-
dens that many cities were forced to carry.47 The survey’s results were 
stark. Winnipeg, for instance, had spent more than $3.5 million on relief 
in 1936 over the course of just eleven months. The province and the fed-
eral government had together contributed two-thirds of this amount, 
leaving the city to come up with the final third. But the city was unable 
to raise any money and was forced to borrow the entire amount. “We’re 
absolutely sunk in the West,” Alderman E. D. Honeyman of Winnipeg 
reported to the conference delegates. His council colleague Thomas 
Flye added that without immediate aid, no relief would be possible.48 
Saskatoon appeared to be in better shape, managing to raise about 40 
percent of its one-third share of relief costs for 1936 through taxation, but 
it still had to borrow nearly $150,000. Edmonton’s situation was slightly 
stronger still, with the city putting up about 55 percent of its share and 
borrowing the remaining $250,000.49
Dominion-wide, the problems were severe. Of the sixty cities sur-
veyed, fourteen failed to raise anything at all toward their one-third share 
of relief costs, and half of the cities had to borrow at least some funds 
to make up the shortfall. Other figures from Goldenberg’s report were 
equally jarring, especially those relating to cities in the West. Relief spend-
ing in Winnipeg, for example, constituted nearly one-quarter of the city’s 
entire revenue in 1935. That same year, Saskatoon’s relief expenditure-to-
revenue ratio was even worse: the city spent more than 27 percent of its 
revenues on relief, earning it the dubious honour of having the highest 
expenditure-to-revenue ratio in the country. Edmonton, once again, was 
190 The Wages of Relief
in a stronger position than the other two cities, but it still contributed 
nearly 14 percent of its revenue in 1935 to relief alone.50
In the end, after two years of futile demands that Ottawa assume 
responsibility for urban relief costs, the mayors probably agreed with 
Alderman Honeyman’s assessment expressed at the 1937 conference in 
Ottawa: “There is no use passing the same pious resolution year after year 
and then going home feeling [we] had done [our] duty.” The bottom line 
was that “municipalities had no control over the causes of unemploy-
ment, so they should not be saddled with its effects.”51 But reiterating 
the situation each spring was clearly having no effect. Honeyman advo-
cated increasing the pressure on senior levels of government in a radi-
cal step—one that was quite possibly the only weapon left in the cities’ 
arsenal: calling a relief “strike.” The idea of simply refusing to participate 
in the entire relief process, including costs and administration, certainly 
reflected Honeyman’s frustration with government inaction. “We can’t 
go on,” he pointedly told convention delegates. “We had to curtail our 
services 33 1/3rd percent. Our employees have been cut 16 2/3rd percent. . . . 
Right now we are being carried by the grace of the Bank of Montreal. 
I don’t know how the Bank of Montreal got its reputation as a busi-
ness organization when we can’t pay and we never can pay.” According 
to the Winnipeg Tribune, Honeyman’s proposal had the near unanimous 
backing of his council colleagues, although some, like Alderman James 
Simpkin, worried about the implications for the city’s jobless reliefers if 
Winnipeg suddenly refused to pay any relief until the federal government 
assumed full responsibility. “We have almost 7,000 married men on relief 
in Winnipeg,” Simpkin pointed out, “and they are on the rolls merely 
because they can’t find a job. No further hardship should be worked 
on them.”52 By the close of the conference, the federal government had 
promised, at the very least, to include municipal considerations and issues 
in its planned nation-wide survey of Dominion-provincial financial rela-
tions, which would become known as the Rowell-Sirois Commission.53 
For the time being, the mayors concluded, this would have to do.54
The mayors met once again in Ottawa the following year, this time 
as the first annual conference of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and 
Municipalities. Once again, they appeared divided on relief policy and 
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especially on what fresh demand to make of the federal government. 
Some continued to advocate that “the entire burden of unemployment 
relief should be borne and administered by the Federal authorities.” 
Others believed that this approach, having failed several times in the 
recent past, ought to be discarded in favour of some tripartite approach 
involving municipal, provincial, and federal participation. In the end, the 
mayors decided to seek half the cost of relief from the federal govern-
ment if the provinces agreed to assume 40 percent of relief costs.55 But 
it seemed clear enough that no matter the municipal resolutions and 
demands, and no matter the degree to which they were scaled back or 
otherwise revised, the federal government would continue to deal with 
them only through the provincial governments.
FEDERAL RELIEF CAMpS
For officials in cities across the Prairies, news that the prime minis-
ter had, in early October 1932, accepted a plan to create a series of 
relief camps for jobless single men was welcome indeed.56 The cities 
had been calling for a similar idea for at least a year. In the early 
years of the Depression, most cities had been able—with the help 
of their respective provinces, the federal government, and charitable 
groups—to offer single unemployed men some form of short-term, 
emergency relief. Three related trends made this practice increasingly 
difficult to continue by the summer and autumn of 1932. First, after 
two full years of depressed conditions, the city relief machines were 
overwhelmed. Edmonton’s monthly relief bill in the winter of 1932, 
for instance, averaged more than $100,000. As more and more busi-
nesses failed and banks foreclosed, revenue generated through property 
taxes decreased. “At the rate we are going now,” Edmonton mayoral 
candidate James Ogilvie forecast in November 1934, “it won’t be long 
before the entire city is owned by the city.”57 Other Prairie cities were 
in similar straits: they simply lacked the financial resources to support 
emergency relief for single men in addition to their responsibilities 
to their unemployed married residents. Second, relief officials feared 
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that their cities would develop a reputation of offering “relief largess” 
and attract single migrants in search of “generous” emergency relief. 
Finally, most city relief officials shared the prime minister’s concerns 
that Communist organizers were active in especially Western cities, 
preying on impressionable young men congregating in search of work, 
relief, or a handout.
On 8 October 1932, the governor general signed an order-in-coun-
cil establishing a string of relief camps throughout central and eastern 
Canada. Organized under the authority of the Department of National 
Defence, the camps were to accommodate two thousand men immedi-
ately. At the same time, Prime Minister Bennett agreed to spend an addi-
tional $200,000 to establish a series of relief camps in western Canada’s 
mountain and prairie national parks under the authority of the National 
Parks Branch. By the following spring, the two streams of relief camps 
had been consolidated under General Andrew McNaughton through 
the Department of National Defence.58
While the federal promise to finance relief camps for the urban 
unemployed did little to ease their fears, uncertainty, and anger, the news 
must have comforted municipal officials anxious to mitigate an increas-
ingly tense situation developing in their cities. On 21 October 1932, for 
example, Saskatoon city police were on guard at city hall as rumours of 
potentially violent protests circulated throughout the city. Although the 
rumours were not realized at that time, frustration among the jobless 
continued to simmer. On 7 November, some of the city’s unemployed 
clashed with local police. The Star-Phoenix carried a description of the 
day’s violence: “Wielding blood-soaked batons and sticks, police and the 
unemployed clashed in a fierce pitched battle at 2 o’clock this afternoon. 
Charging a yelling mob of workless, nearly 90 officers accounted for a 
dozen or more casualties and half-dozen arrests.”59
A little more than a month later, a similar confrontation between 
police and protesters, this time aimed primarily at provincial officials, 
occurred in Edmonton. On 20 December 1932, city police and the 
RCMp clashed with hundreds of unemployed workers and farmers in 
Edmonton’s Market Square who were attempting to march on the pro-
vincial legislature to protest the Brownlee government’s relief policies. 
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The Edmonton Bulletin described the clash the next day: “Batons rose and 
fell, yells and jeers filled the air as here and there a rioter went down 
before the police clubs. Women among the marchers screamed impreca-
tions at the police, charging them with being cowards who were riding 
down their class, but the steady police pressure continued and the back 
of the parade was broken.”60
The bloody conclusion of the Hunger March, like the conclusion 
to similar protests in Saskatoon a month earlier, revealed the extent of 
anger and frustration with relief policies at all levels. The large number of 
unemployed workers and farmers who participated speaks to the evident 
unpopularity and apparent inadequacy of relief policies and provisions, 
Figure 10. The Edmonton Hunger March, 1932. On 20 December, hundreds of the 
unemployed gathered in the city’s market square. They planned to march to the 
provincial legislature some nine blocks away and confront Alberta premier John 
Brownlee with their grievances. Edmonton police, together with RCMP, blocked their 
way. Glenbow Archives, NC-6-13014g.
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both rural and urban. This anger and frustration would crystallize once 
more, this time emerging out of single relief camp workers’ experiences.
Almost immediately, it became clear that the camps were unpop-
ular among their young single residents as well. On the surface, camp 
life seemed a better, more productive alternative to living hand to mouth 
on the watery soup and dry bread available in the cities and to being 
constantly harassed, in the words of one historian, by “local police [who] 
would shoo the men away rather than arrest them as vagrants, while 
special patrolmen chased them from the freight yards back towards 
town.”61 One early camp organizer noted in December 1931 that while 
the camps promised no easy time, “particularly to men not used to this 
kind of life,” the camp benefits, including accommodation and free 
clothing, outweighed any hardships.62 But for many camp workers, the 
reality was quite different. To some, they were “slave camps” that paid 
very little for arduous, backbreaking work in isolated conditions.63 “We 
were slaves,” one camper later recalled. “What else would you call a man 
who is given twenty cents a day and is expected to believe their bullshit 
that he is an important part of the country.”64 To others, the camps 
were an affront to human dignity. Historian Bill Waiser describes the 
harsh conditions: the workers slogged through “endless days of heavy 
toil with little to show for it.  .  . . From one monotonous day to the 
next, nothing changed for the men, and the unnatural, stagnant condi-
tions of camp life steadily ate away at their self-identity.”65 The camps 
also, according to one informant, threatened the morality of especially 
their youngest—and presumably most vulnerable—charges: “The ter-
rible thing about it is that many of the men who are congregated in 
the camp are teenaged Canadian boys forced into close association with 
mature men, who have tramped the country, with the result is that the 
outlook for these boys stands a good chance of being completely warped 
and their characters so degraded and demoralized that their future is 
unquestionably seriously menaced.”66 Many campers were clearly dis-
satisfied with the whole business. Federal authorities recorded more 
than 350 camp strikes, demonstrations, and disturbances between 1932 
and 1936. Approximately 10 percent of all campers over the same period 
were dismissed for disciplinary reasons.67
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In the end, the Conservatives’ establishment of relief camps to 
house the thousands of single unemployed men ended in disorder and 
chaos, and in the deaths of at least two men on Regina’s downtown 
streets on Dominion Day, 1935. The story of the now-famous On-to-
Ottawa Trek and Regina Riot, however, began not in the Queen City but 
in British Columbia. Conditions had been deteriorating in the British 
Columbia camps for some time. Many young single men had gone to 
the relief camps in that province, in large part because most provinces 
to the east actively pushed single men out or made their staying intol-
erable. This situation was exacerbated after the autumn of 1934, when 
Department of National Defence relief camps in Alberta reached their 
capacity. Thereafter, “surplus” men were sent to open camps in Canada’s 
westernmost province. Meanwhile, the Communist-organized Relief 
Camp Workers’ Union (RCWu) had been busy trying to organize the 
relief camp workers. Formed shortly after the first camps opened, the 
RCWu quickly began agitating for better camp conditions by organizing 
strikes and walkouts, and formed grievance committees to give voice to 
campers’ complaints.68 In December 1934, faced with an outright ban on 
grievance committees and other measures to hamper its activities, the 
RCWu called for a general relief camp workers’ strike. Hundreds of relief 
camp workers from across the West answered the call and descended on 
Vancouver in a show of solidarity and protest at camp conditions. After 
a meeting with BC’s Premier Duff Pattullo ended with little more than 
a promise that the province would call on the federal government to 
investigate the camps, however, the strike quickly collapsed. The strikers 
returned to their camps disappointed.69
Nevertheless, the December strike had struck a chord. Only a 
few months later, the RCWu was already well into the planning stages of 
organizing a wider, more impressive, and precise strike. RCWu organizers 
enlisted the help of veteran radical labour activist and Workers’ Unity 
League member Arthur “Slim” Evans and called a strategy meeting in 
Kamloops for mid-March. There, organizers drew up a list of demands, 
established what would become the strike’s organizational structure, 
and set a strike date for 4 April. In early April, men began arriving in 
Vancouver, by the tens at first, but soon by the hundreds. More than 
196 The Wages of Relief
fifteen hundred strikers remained in Vancouver for the next two months, 
parading through the city’s streets, generally publicizing the poor camp 
conditions, and demanding work for wages, at the very least. Municipal, 
provincial, and federal authorities were divided as to the best course of 
action. Some, like Chief of Defence Staff Andrew McNaughton, believed 
that the strike would soon run out of steam. In some respects, it seemed 
as though he had a point. Hundreds of men had already quit the strike by 
mid-May, and more appeared ready to leave. Others, RCMp Commissioner 
MacBrien among them, favoured a harder-line approach, suggesting that 
all remaining strikers be detained and interned. Vancouver’s Mayor Gerry 
McGeer and BC’s Premier Duff Pattullo viewed the whole matter as a 
federal problem. The strikers, after all, were protesting federally organ-
ized and administered relief camps, not provincial or municipal ones. 
Of one thing, however, everyone was certain: the strike must quickly 
conclude.70
It remains unclear as to who first proposed the idea of taking the 
strike’s message directly to Ottawa. Ron Liversedge—who participated in 
the On-to-Ottawa Trek and would later write a book detailing the strik-
ers’ progress through British Columbia and Alberta and the violent clash 
at Regina—attributed the idea to an unidentified man who calmly stood 
up at a strike meeting and suggested, “Let us go to them.”71 The On-to-
Ottawa Trek left Vancouver on 4 June 1935. The men were, for the most 
part, orderly, disciplined, and dignified. They climbed aboard Canadian 
Pacific and Canadian National Railway freight cars and made their way 
east, picking up more men at each stop, singing songs of solidarity, laugh-
ing and joking, but determined and serious in their intent. In Edmonton, 
over 150 men joined the Trekkers, now nine hundred strong, who arrived 
in Calgary on 7 June.72
Prime Minister Bennett followed the Trekkers’ progress with 
much interest and perhaps equal measures of rage and disquiet. He had 
been out of the country visiting Britain when the strike broke out in 
Vancouver, but he had returned to Ottawa in mid-May determined to 
regain control over a problem that appeared to be rapidly spiralling out 
of control. They were communists all, Bennett had decided, or at least 
their leadership was, and they were bent on nothing less than destroying 
 Local Responsibility in Decline 197
the capitalist system and replacing it with a communist one.73 In truth, 
although the Trek’s leadership had communist leanings, most of the 
rank-and-file Trekkers were simply discouraged, disillusioned, and tired, 
their hopes and aspirations to find a job and start a family dashed on the 
shoals of the economic crisis. That said, Bennett did have reason for con-
cern. The Trek’s leaders headed up a highly organized and disciplined 
march east, almost military in its precision—the army of the unem-
ployed. And its numbers were growing. In Bennett’s mind, the solution 
was simple: the Trek had to be stopped.
And stopped it was. At Bennett’s insistence, the Canadian Pacific 
Railway—which, up to that point, had carried the men toward their 
goal—complained to the RCMp that the Trekkers had been illegally 
riding the rods on CpR freight trains. This complaint gave the RCMp and 
Bennett the excuse to crush the Trek. RCMp officers quickly descended 
on Regina and prevented any Trekker from boarding a train. This action 
made the situation deteriorate rapidly, for now the men were trapped in 
the city, and they were fast running out of food and cash. Bennett’s next 
move was to dispatch two Cabinet ministers—R. J. Manion, the minister 
of Railways, and Robert Weir, the minister of Agriculture—to Regina to 
assess the situation and try to negotiate an end to the Trek. The ministers 
met with Trek leaders and arranged for a small delegation to travel to 
Ottawa and speak with the prime minister directly. The meeting between 
the delegation and Bennett, by all accounts, went badly, degenerating 
swiftly into little more than a shouting match. The delegates returned to 
Regina, even as Bennett determined to end the standoff. He instructed 
the RCMp to move in and arrest the Trek leaders. The constables could 
not have selected a worse time to carry out the prime minister’s directive. 
By attempting to take the leaders of the Trek into custody while they 
were in the midst of addressing the Trekkers during a Dominion Day 
rally, the RCMp promptly ignited a firestorm. When the riot finally ended 
later that day, one man lay dead and another would die later in hospital 
as a result of wounds sustained during the battle.
At first glance, the Trek appears to have little to do with municipal 
relief matters beyond the facts that it began just outside of Vancouver, 
passed through several cities on the main CpR line, and ended on the 
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downtown streets of Regina. The Trek had, after all, originated from fed-
erally organized and administered relief camps, not provincial or munic-
ipal ones. And the Trekkers were themselves headed toward the nation’s 
capital to have it out with Bennett, not toward provincial legislatures or 
city halls to confront premiers or mayors. They were planning to take 
their complaints to Parliament directly, bypassing entirely provincial and 
municipal authorities; the Trek was explicitly not about local relief. This 
very circumvention of local authorities, however, underscored the grow-
ing irrelevance of local authorities with respect to single men’s relief 
experiences.
In any event, Bennett emerged from the riot bruised. Parents across 
the nation who had young unemployed sons about the same age as many 
of the Trekkers recoiled at the federal government’s ham-fisted and hard-
nosed response. Canadian citizens in general were sympathetic toward 
the young men, believing that they were out of work through no fault 
of their own, yet the federal government had treated them like criminals. 
Bennett was hemorrhaging what little political capital he had retained 
after five long years of economic crisis, rising unemployment, and 
failed policies.
With a federal election looming and in the hopes of lifting his 
political fortunes, Bennett trotted out a program of legislation modelled 
on the spirit of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. Included 
in the legislation was the Employment and Social Insurance Act, which 
established a limited system of unemployment insurance, as well as an 
advisory and investigative commission to oversee health insurance and 
relief matters. Bennett’s “New Deal” also included the Dominion Trade 
and Industry Commission Act and various labour laws designed to lay 
the groundwork for implementing International Labor Organization 
conventions such as a minimum wage, a weekly day of rest, and eight-
hour working day regulations. To its critics, Bennett’s New Deal consti-
tuted little more than a deathbed conversion to greater governmental 
involvement in the economy. Constitutional scholars doubted it would 
pass constitutional muster, given that it encroached heavily on provincial 
jurisdiction. Liberal Opposition Leader Mackenzie King agreed, but he 
voted for it anyway, recognizing that not to do so would unnecessarily 
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risk public condemnation.74 Eventually, as King probably expected, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would strike down as ultra vires 
most of Bennett’s New Deal program.
THE DOMINION HOuSING ACT
One important piece of legislation that survived the parliamentary ses-
sion was the Dominion Housing Act, which underscored further the 
growing irrelevance of city governments to federal Depression relief 
policy. The Depression had hit housing hard. The trouble was twofold. 
First, the nation at mid-decade was suffering from a severe housing 
shortage—to the tune of eighty-two thousand homes, by some esti-
mates.75 In large measure, this was a predictable repercussion of the 
reluctance of industry (including lenders) to engage in new housing 
starts in a poor economic climate. Second, many existing homes were 
in desperate condition after years of neglect. As social scientist A. E. 
Grauer reported in a 1939 study prepared for the Royal Commission 
on Dominion-Provincial Relations, “The effects were evident in a 
decreased number of available homes, the doubling up of tenants in 
congested residential areas, and the deterioration of low rental houses 
through the inability of landlords to make necessary repairs.”76
Others had come to the same conclusion in early 1935. In January, 
Conservative backbenchers Thomas Langton Church and James Arthurs 
pressed the federal government to embark on a national housing pro-
gram. Such a potentially far-reaching plan, with unknown, though 
doubtless costly, implications, was too much for Bennett. He suggested 
instead the more conservative approach of referring the issue to a select 
parliamentary committee for study and recommendation.77 In the end, 
the Parliamentary Committee on Housing, headed by Conservative 
Mp and New Brunswick businessman Arthur Ganong, advised that the 
federal government ought to insert itself forcefully in the housing field 
to redress what was rapidly becoming regarded as a crisis.78 A federally 
assisted housing program, the commissioners believed, had the poten-
tial in one fell swoop to solve all sorts of Depression-related problems: 
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not only could such a program ease the housing shortage by increas-
ing the number of affordable rental units, but more accessible affordable 
housing would also lessen disease caused by overcrowding and reduce 
the crime associated with “slum” conditions.79 Equally important, the 
committee’s final report asserted, a coordinated, national housing pro-
gram would create immediate employment in the construction industry, 
easing considerably the cost of unemployment relief.
By June, the committee’s report had given way to draft legisla-
tion, but the Dominion Housing Act (DHA) shared almost none of the 
earlier concern for the creation of affordable housing or its supposed 
ameliorative social effects. The DHA instead tended to encourage high-
end construction, with the hope on the part of the federal government 
for a “trickle-down” effect: citizens of means would trade their present 
homes for newer ones, leaving their vacated homes to lower-income 
groups. The DHA promised an appropriation totalling $10 million toward 
encouraging new home construction. It was a simple enough plan: the 
DHA invited approved lending and financial institutions to collaborate 
with the federal government and prospective homebuilders (either indi-
viduals or commercial outfits) in the construction of new homes on 
purchased land. The federal government would contribute 20 percent 
of the total cost from its $10 million appropriation, while the lending 
institution would put up a further 60 percent and the borrower the 
remaining 20 percent. The DHA set loans from the federal appropriation 
to the lending institutions at 3 percent interest and allowed the lending 
institutions in turn to seek a maximum of 5 percent interest from the 
borrower on the entire 80 percent loan. This, the government reasoned, 
would encourage lenders to make available for new construction their 
own substantial reserves of a reported $75 million.80 During Commons 
debates on the bill, G. D. Stanley, Mp for Calgary-East, summed up the 
potential for stimulating the ailing housing sector. As he pointed out, 
the lenders “had $75,000,000 today which they wished to place if they 
could be convinced that the security was sufficient. When you have loan 
companies and organizations coming before the committee and saying 
that they have $75,000,000 which they wish to loan, you have a very splen-
did beginning at any rate; and all they need—so they said—is sufficient 
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confidence in the undertaking, that their security will be assured.”81 Sir 
George Perley, minister without portfolio in Bennett’s Cabinet, calcu-
lated that the government’s $10 million appropriation would translate 
into a more conservative $50 million in new housing construction with 
the participation of private lenders and borrowers.82 Whether the DHA 
would inject $50 or $75 million into the nation’s housing sector, the bill 
promised much in the way of stimulus to lending institutions, land 
developers, and unemployed construction workers, among others.
Alas, the DHA would not live up to its early promise. For one thing, 
banks were not interested in financing the sort of low-cost housing that 
the nation so desperately required, preferring instead to back higher-end 
housing starts that were beyond the reach of most potential homeown-
ers, as well as land subdivisions for development in better economic 
times.83 In the end, the act had a limited impact, both on homebuilding 
and employment generation. This was noted with disdain by the nation’s 
mayors at their 1936 Ottawa conference of the Dominion Conference of 
Mayors, where they concluded that “the unsatisfactory housing condi-
tions existing in many Canadian cities is causing grave concern to public 
health, civic, and other authorities, and . . . the Dominion Housing Act, 
1935, has not alleviated this serious condition.”84 Only 150 homes were 
built in Manitoba and a paltry two in Saskatchewan under the act. Not 
one was built in Alberta.85 The trouble was not that either Albertans 
or westerners in general lacked interest in the scheme. The Edmonton 
Bulletin, for example, “was deluged with requests for information and as 
to how loans could be obtained under the Dominion Housing Act.”86 
As noted by the head of the Mortgage and Loan Association of Alberta, 
the problem was that “no loan company was going to make loans in 
Western Canada on a basis of five per cent.”87 Such a low rate of return 
on investment simply made little sense when much higher returns could 
be earned on other investments elsewhere. Some housing construction 
activity did take place in Alberta, though not under the DHA. Nearly two 
hundred new homes appeared in Edmonton in 1937, for instance, but 
they generally featured inferior building standards, cost an average of 
less than $500 to build, and looked not “much more elaborate than dog 
kennels or rabbit hutches,” according to one observer.88
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The DHA was, however, remarkable in two important ways. It was 
the first nation-wide initiative designed to stimulate employment outside 
of any explicit and existing unemployment relief apparatus. Certainly, 
the federal government had had a hand in earlier employment-gener-
ating projects (the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway comes to 
mind), but job creation in those instances was primarily incidental, not 
central to the schemes. Nor did those projects appear at times of com-
parable mass unemployment. Ostensibly, this meant that participating 
homebuilders or developers could hire whichever workers they liked to 
complete the job, whether those workers were actively employed or look-
ing for work, whether they were on relief or not. More importantly, the 
city relief machines that had exercised such authority over relief labour 
distribution policies in the past had no standing either way. A second 
significant feature of the DHA was that it broke with the established tra-
dition of federal partnering with provincial and municipal authorities 
on urban unemployment matters. Of course, the act did not bar local 
authorities from participating in the scheme, provided they were able to 
raise their 60 percent of any home’s cost themselves. In reality, however, 
as sociologist and anthropologist D. G. Bettison points out: “It was clear 
at the time that few, if any, local authorities were in the happy position of 
being able to float a debenture for housing at a rate of interest less than 
five percent. As a practical matter, the private lending institutions were 
the only source of funds likely to be applied, and the federal government 
knew this.”89
THE LIBERALS RETuRN TO pOWER IN OTTAWA
It was late October 1935 when a quietly satisfied William Lyon 
Mackenzie King returned to his old rooms in the Prime Minister’s 
Office in Ottawa. His Liberals had run a tight election race to oust 
Richard Bedford Bennett and his Conservative Party from office. But 
the Liberal campaign—run on the slogan “King or Chaos”—figured 
only partly in convincing Canadians to return his party to power. It was 
also their deep frustration at Bennett’s inability to turn the economy 
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around. In fairness, Bennett’s failed economic policies, based mostly 
on erecting tariff barriers to protect Canadian manufactured goods 
and cutting spending wherever possible, were similar to the policies of 
governments throughout the industrialized world.90 The United States, 
for example, had also erected huge tariff barriers—most famously, the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930—in an effort to protect its domestic pro-
ducers.91 These were, of course, exactly the wrong strategies to pull 
the world economy out of the Depression. As we now know, cutting 
spending had the effect of tightening the flow of money and hamper-
ing global trade and thus served only to exacerbate the already gloomy 
economic outlook. But Bennett was not alone in trying to steer Canada 
out of economic hard times using traditional—and, in many respects, 
outmoded—methods. Bennett’s early unemployment relief policies 
were no more successful—or popular—than his economic ones. By 
1935, his was a tired response to an economic crisis already five years 
old, and King won the election as much on the back of Bennett’s fail-
ures as on his own promises.
By mid-decade, most Canadians were clearly expecting new ideas 
about and approaches to the economic crisis. They had, after all, ousted 
Bennett’s Conservatives in favour of King’s Liberals, and voters in seven 
out of Canada’s nine provinces had opted for political change in their 
provincial legislatures as well: only John Bracken’s coalition government 
in Manitoba and the Liberals in Nova Scotia, elected in 1933, managed 
to reach the end of the decade more or less intact. But if Canadians were 
expecting immediate and mighty changes—something along the lines of 
unemployment insurance or even a comprehensive national unemploy-
ment relief strategy—then they would be disappointed. King, characteris-
tically perhaps, made no immediate or far-reaching unemployment relief 
policy changes save for ordering the closure of Bennett’s relief camps by 
Dominion Day of 1936, a move that would have no small effect on cities 
already worried about the number of single unemployed men waiting 
on them for relief. As of March 1936, there were no fewer than twenty 
thousand camp residents set for dismissal.92 And while federal Labour 
Department officials expected that a little better than half of these men 
would find work as special extra gang labour or in supervisory positions 
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on deferred railway track maintenance work, many would probably find 
their way to the cities.93
The provincial legislatures may well have had new governments, 
but they remained in dire financial straits and were consequently unable 
to engineer any significant overhaul of their relief systems.94 Alberta, for 
example, had watched its provincial income steadily decline ever since 
the beginning of the Depression, from $290 million in 1929 to $186 mil-
lion in 1935.95 Both Saskatchewan and Manitoba warned Ottawa point-
edly in 1936 that they were on the brink of defaulting on their loans.96 
That the western provincial economies were in bad shape was clear, and, 
as historian Robert Wardhaugh points out, “the Prairie premiers could 
hardly afford to offend a federal government they were coming increas-
ingly to rely upon for financial support.”97 Where did this all leave the 
cities? More or less in the same positions they had occupied immediately 
before the regime changes. Even Alberta’s new Social Credit government 
retained the old United Farmers of Alberta Provincial Relief Department 
appointee, A. A. Mackenzie.98 Local responsibility, if in name only, 
remained the order of the day. The city relief machines continued in 
their roles as custodians for meagre relief programs—mostly food and 
clothing distribution and rent payments—funded and overseen in the 
main by the provincial and federal governments.
On a deeper level, though, Canada’s approach to dealing with 
urban unemployment was undergoing a profound transformation. 
Cities, imperceptibly at first, were swept up in much larger policy trends 
that ushered them into the modern national system of social welfare. In 
the process, the city officials who had wielded considerable influence 
in determining the nature and character of their local relief systems 
through the first few years of the Depression saw that influence diminish 
in the wake of national unemployment relief strategies.
It was not until spring 1936 that King made his first moves toward 
altering existing arrangements. Pushed by his Cabinet colleagues, 
who, according to James Struthers, were “anxious to pay off political 
debts to friendly provincial administrations,” a reluctant King agreed 
to raise relief transfers to the provinces by 75 percent.99 In exchange, 
King insisted that the provinces co-operate fully with a new National 
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Employment Commission (NEC). The provinces, eager for access to more 
relief funds, readily agreed. What they might not have appreciated at 
the time, however, was the high degree of control the NEC would exert 
over how the provinces and municipalities administered the funds. As 
Struthers explains, “although tied to the grants-in-aid, the NEC was in fact 
designed to reduce Ottawa’s expenditure on relief over the long run by 
ensuring its administration would become more ‘efficient and economi-
cal.’”100 This was effected in part by the NEC’s appointment of Charlotte 
Whitton to reorganize and coordinate the complicated tripartite direct 
relief arrangement among the federal, provincial, and municipal govern-
ments.101 For years, she had tried, unsuccessfully, to impress on Bennett 
that responsibility for and control over relief matters should be wrested 
from the hands of non-professional city policy-makers and administra-
tors, and set in the capable hands of professional social workers such as 
herself. Architects of city relief policy, she complained, were not versed in 
the complex theories and studies relating to welfare in general and unem-
ployment relief in particular. They were wasteful with funds, sloppy with 
records, and haphazard in all matters of relief. As social work scholar 
Ken Moffat suggests, Whitton believed that “key positions in social ser-
vice bureaucracies should be given to those who had proven themselves 
through social work experience.”102
Whitton derived much of her information on local relief prac-
tices from a tour of western Canadian cities through the summer of 
1932. Her conclusions, laid out simply in her “Report re: Unemployment 
and Relief in Western Canada,” submitted to Bennett in October of that 
year, were twofold. First, at least 40 percent of relief recipients in the 
western provinces did not require relief: in fact, relief had actually raised 
their standard of living. Whitton argued that during “normal” economic 
times, many workers and farmers were idle for months at a time. The pre-
sent system of relief administered and delivered in the western provinces 
offered relief year-round. Workers on relief, therefore, had uninterrupted 
“earnings” throughout the year. Second, the relief machinery develop-
ing in the West was ridden with patronage, corruption, and wastefulness. 
Whitton accused municipal authorities, variously, of artificially padding 
their relief rolls to qualify for more federal relief dollars, stacking their 
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relief machines with patronage appointees, and spending on relief in 
wanton fashion.103
Most of Whitton’s conclusions appear exaggerated and distorted 
in light of how the city relief machines actually functioned. Certainly, 
as we have seen in preceding chapters, relief to the unemployed was by 
no reasonable standard of measurement “overly generous.” Some of her 
conclusions, like her 40 percent figure, are outright falsehoods. But her 
assessment of the situation was well received by Bennett, who found 
Whitton’s report compelling. More importantly, it confirmed his own 
suspicions that the provinces and cities were wasting federal relief dol-
lars. Less well received were Whitton’s recommendations. In short, she 
advised that trained professional social workers be dispatched with all 
haste to take charge of relief administration nation-wide.104 Bennett, 
unwilling to go that far, opted instead to reduce relief transfers to the 
provinces and the municipalities. Struthers describes Bennett’s reason-
ing: “If the provinces and municipalities were wasting federal money, the 
solution was simply to give them less money to waste.”105 In any event, 
what Whitton probably failed to notice at the time was that the city relief 
machines’ relevance and influence was already fast on the wane.
In 1936, in her new position on the NEC, Whitton determined to 
apply her recommendations, little changed from her 1932 report, to the 
problem. Henceforth, strict guidelines, regulations and protocols drawn 
up by professional social workers would direct city relief administrators 
in how to organize their relief systems. Whitton, it seemed, had finally 
won an important national role for professional social workers.106
But the NEC was more than a vehicle to enhance the social work 
profession’s prestige. Its mandate, after all, was to “find ways and means 
of providing remunerative employment, thus reducing the numbers at 
present on relief, and lessening the burden of taxation.”107 The commis-
sion, chaired by industrialist Arthur Purvis, spent the summer taking a 
full inventory of the relief question with a view to “eliminating obvious 
abuses, rackets, overlapping and the like,” as well as registering and clas-
sifying all relief recipients nation-wide.108 Aiding Purvis in his work was 
a cast of characters who King was certain would substantiate his belief 
that the federal government ought not be involved to any considerable 
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degree in funding and financing unemployment relief, and would make 
suggestions that would reduce federal responsibility for it. The six 
other commissioners were economist W. A. Mackintosh from Queen’s 
University; Alfred Marois, a Québec shoe-manufacturer; Neil McLean, a 
businessman from New Brunswick; two western Canadians, E. J. Young 
and Mary Sutherland; and Tom Moore, president of the Trades and 
Labor Congress.109
The summer of 1936 was a difficult one for cities in the West. 
Not only would they have to wait for the NEC’s interim report, widely 
expected that autumn, to discover the federal government’s next move, 
but they were forced to accommodate a 25 percent reduction in federal 
relief transfers to the provinces. King, having secured provincial co-oper-
ation with the NEC, felt comfortable enough reducing what he viewed as 
overly generous relief grants-in-aid. More immediately, the cities feared 
they would have to contend once again with an influx of single men 
from the relief camps once the camps closed their gates in July. In an 
effort to head off this onslaught, King offered money for the construc-
tion of the Trans-Canada Highway and several provincial highways, 
which promised to employ at least half of the ex-campers; he also entered 
into arrangements with the Canadian Pacific and Canadian National 
Railways to provide the remaining single men with work.110
What seems clear in retrospect is the fundamental disconnect 
between King’s aspirations for the NEC that spring, and the commis-
sion’s actual significance. On the one hand, King made it plain that he 
fully expected the commission to reduce both Ottawa’s expenditures on 
unemployment relief and its responsibility for unemployment more 
generally. The NEC would, in King’s estimation, “save the Treasury & the 
taxpayers many millions of dollars. Municipalities and provinces,” who 
King insisted would remain responsible for their own relief activities, 
“will soon find the truth of the saying that ‘every man must learn to 
earn by the sweat of his own brow.’”111 On the other hand, the NEC’s 
very existence as a national organization opened the door to greater, not 
less, federal responsibility, the potential of which King was well aware 
of. He recalled having warned Labour Minister Norman Rogers that if 
the commission recommended that the federal government “take charge 
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of all unemployment,” then “the Party would never escape that obliga-
tion on itself as one for which it was directly responsible through appointing 
the Commission.”112 Nevertheless, King had every confidence that his man 
overseeing the commission’s work, none other than Norman Rogers, 
would keep matters in their proper perspective: namely, limiting federal 
responsibility for unemployment. Rogers was, after all, an academician 
with a “broad knowledge of social, economic, and governmental prob-
lems,” King noted in his diary on 30 March 1936. In describing Rogers’s 
unemployment and relief-related remarks before Parliament that after-
noon, King averred that he had “heard nothing in the H of C which 
seemed to me more to justify post-graduate training in government, eco-
nomic, and political philosophy than the speech he made.”113
In September, the NEC presented its preliminary findings to 
Cabinet. King later recorded in his diary that he thought Commission 
Chair Arthur Purvis had “made an exceptionally fine presentation” on 
the matter.114 He especially liked the commission’s conclusion that most 
of the nation’s relief problems could be laid at the doorstep of Bennett’s 
administration. It was, King happily confided to his diary on 3 September, 
“Bennett’s reckless spending” and other “mistaken policies” that had, 
in large measure, left the relief system in such a mess.115 But although 
the commissioners’ conclusions confirmed King’s suspicions about his 
political rival’s failed relief policies, their interim recommendations as to 
the federal government’s best immediate course of action worried him. 
To his surprise and dismay, the commission laid out four recommen-
dations that, collectively and individually, threatened to increase rather 
than lessen federal expenditure on and responsibility for unemployment 
policy. First, the commission advised the creation of a national employ-
ment service organized and run exclusively by the federal government 
and designed to coordinate the nation’s labour exchange activities. The 
commission’s second proposal, modelled on the American Civilian 
Conservation Corps, was a federally coordinated national volunteer con-
servation service that would see more than thirty thousand of Canada’s 
unemployed youth trained in the nation’s primary resource sector and 
skilled, semi-skilled, and specialized trades sector. Third, the commis-
sioners advocated for a comprehensive, nation-wide rural resettlement 
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scheme that would place primarily dustbowl farmers on productive 
land in the northern parts of the Prairie provinces while avoiding earlier 
“back-to-the-land” programs that merely made “agriculture a dumping 
ground for all those who have failed in other walks of life.” Finally, the 
commission argued for a more expansive (and nuanced) housing policy 
than the earlier Dominion Housing Act. With its twofold aim of creating 
work for the all but idle construction industry and addressing the serious 
shortfall in affordable housing, the recommendation called for more fed-
erally backed mortgages, direct federal investment in affordable housing 
construction, and a home-improvement scheme.116
This was far too much federal responsibility for King. The com-
mission had clearly gone in exactly the wrong direction. Most disap-
pointing of all was the conclusion of Rogers, a protégé and academic 
friend, that the federal government ought to assume full responsibility 
for unemployment relief. Only a short year and a half before, King had 
extolled Rogers’s academic credentials as just the stuff to seriously reduce 
federal relief expenditures and responsibility for unemployment. It was 
now precisely Rogers’s academic background that made him unsuited 
to the pragmatics of politics: “I am beginning to see the wisdom of 
not taking into the Government men who have not had some politi-
cal training, however able they may be,” King wrote in his diary. “The 
academic mind is not the best one to handle problems of Government. 
It is far too theoretical. A knowledge of human nature, above all else, 
is required.”117
King rejected outright all of the Commission’s early recommen-
dations, save the home improvement plan (HIp), which was itself a fairly 
limited affair, despite the commissioners’ general view that the HIp had 
“great employment potential in the rehabilitation of existing houses.”118 
In essence, the federal government agreed to guarantee to 15 percent any 
loans made by chartered banks to homeowners for the purposes of refur-
bishing, repairing, or making additions to existing residential buildings 
in urban or rural areas. The plan appeared sound enough. A similar ini-
tiative south of the border—the so-called modernization credit plan—
had worked to good effect, stimulating the construction industry, creat-
ing jobs, and encouraging a much-needed modernizing of homes, not 
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to mention opening investment opportunities for banks’ accumulated 
assets. In Canada, lending institutions had likewise found themselves 
sitting on accumulated assets with limited investment opportunities. 
Not surprisingly, they approved wholeheartedly of the home-renovation 
scheme, especially since the scheme left in their hands exclusively the 
decision to deem potential borrowers as creditworthy or not and to 
make the loans—or not—accordingly. But the trouble with the HIp lay 
not with the lenders but with homeowners, and more particularly, with 
their lack of either borrowing power or funds to finance improvements. 
Real estate values had largely collapsed nation-wide and, according to 
John Bacher, “caused owners who had paid off most of a mortgage to 
carry mortgages of more than 60 per cent of the value of their homes.” 
The problem, then, was simple: homeowners “were unable to borrow 
more, as their properties were in some instances mortgaged for more 
than their current market value.”119
Once more, the cities were left almost entirely out of the plan’s 
administration despite the fact that one of its main features was employ-
ment creation in the construction industry. This is not to suggest that 
municipal authorities retained no authority (or responsibility) for the 
way the plan played out in their cities. Municipal administration was 
responsible for determining whether specific buildings were beyond 
rehabilitation and ought to be condemned, for instance, or whether and 
to what degree rates of assessment ought to be raised on improved prop-
erties. That said, cities doubtlessly felt strong pressure to not appear to 
be hindering in any way the scheme’s employment-creating potential. 
Ensuring that the cities kept the scheme’s unemployment-reducing goals 
in mind were local advisory committees made up of “public-spirited citi-
zens and business interests” and organized by the NEC. The committees 
kept abreast of local conditions, encouraged prospective borrowers to 
participate in the scheme, and made representations to municipalities 
pointing out the immediate and future benefits of facilitating, by any 
means, home-renovation projects. In D. G. Bettison’s assessment, “the 
plan therefore relegated local authorities to a watch-dog role on habit-
ability while local private enthusiasts were to stimulate the use of the leg-
islation through financial institutions.”120 In the end, the scheme created 
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roughly $12 million worth of construction nation-wide throughout its 
life (to 1940).121 Aside from the HIp’s minimal impact on alleviating 
unemployment, the whole program came to be characterized, derisively, 
as having provided little more than “rumpus rooms for the bourgeoisie.” 
According to a Senate-commissioned report from the 1960s evaluating 
the program, “only a wealthy minority of Canadians” were in a posi-
tion to take advantage of the HIp interest rates. As a result, many of the 
home improvements carried on under the plan were specialty projects 
like boutique fireplaces, air conditioning, panelled walls, and Georgian 
furniture.122
By the end of 1937, the NEC was ready with its final report. Its basic 
conclusion should have surprised no one, least of all Mackenzie King. 
For nearly two years, the commission’s several interim reports had sug-
gested its leaning toward the federal government’s assumption of total 
responsibility for unemployment relief. Its policy suggestions—from 
national youth training programs to housing initiatives—all envisioned 
a central role for the central government. Over the course of the next 
two years, Ottawa would move more forcefully still into unemployment 
policy. Finance Minister Charles Avery Dunning noted the enormity of 
the change: “We are stepping into a field which hitherto has not been a 
field of the dominion parliament, a field which according to the opin-
ions held by very eminent gentlemen, we have no constitutional right 
to occupy, and which we can justify entering at all only as primarily an 
attack upon our great national problem of unemployment.”123 In impor-
tant ways, however, the federal government had been “stepping into” the 
field for some time—at least since it became clear that “local responsibil-
ity” was effectively a fiction.
The basis of King’s concern was, as Struthers notes, the very same 
as Bennett’s had been through the first half of the decade: local authori-
ties were in a position not only to best gauge local needs but also to put 
an effective limit on the extent of relief disbursement. On the one hand, 
if local authorities, with their limited resources, remained reliant on fed-
eral grants-in-aid for their relief systems, then the federal government 
would retain control over relief costs. If, on the other hand, local authori-
ties relinquished responsibility for local relief, then the only effective 
212 The Wages of Relief
check on relief spending would disappear. The NEC’s only dissenting 
commissioner, Mary Sutherland, articulated the danger:
The further removed and more centralized government 
becomes and the less direct its taxing power, the less easily can 
the individual relate his own responsibilities to its functions. 
No matter which government is responsible for and 
administers relief . . . there will be constant pressure to increase 
the benefits and to enlarge the base of admittance to benefits. If 
responsibility is centralized in the Dominion Government, the 
counter-pressure from local taxpayers will be eased. The 
irksome, unwelcome and hard check provided by necessity by 
municipal officials, harassed by mounting demands on 
diminishing revenues, will be removed.124
Still, unemployment remained high across the Dominion. Despite 
indications in the summer of 1937 that recovery was finally on the hori-
zon, the fall and winter dashed King’s hopes. Unemployment numbers 
increased, especially in the West, owing in part to a drought-ridden 
wheat harvest. In the spring of 1938, King agreed to a $40 million appro-
priation for federally organized work relief projects, including road, 
wharf, and office building. None of these measures eased directly the 
pressures facing local relief authorities. More relevant to their concerns 
was a new bill introduced into Parliament that spring—the Municipal 
Improvements Assistance Act.
Like King’s other recent interventions, the new act was rela-
tively limited. It promised low-interest loans (at 2%) to municipalities 
to create local jobs on local improvement projects. The act is signifi-
cant not for the amount it promised to local improvements—the entire 
appropriation was limited to $30 million, with Edmonton, Saskatoon, 
and Winnipeg qualifying for little more than $200,000 each—but rather 
for the tight federal oversight and control over how the loans could be 
spent.125 For one thing, the federal government required municipalities 
wishing to participate in the scheme to submit “detailed financial esti-
mates demonstrating to the satisfaction of the Minister that the project 
to be constructed or the improvements or renewals to be made will be a 
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self-liquidating project.” The federal government also retained the right 
to impose further regulations on the actual work as it progressed.126 In 
July, municipal authorities across the Prairies learned that those regula-
tions included what Ottawa was calling “fair wages” and an eight-hour 
workday for all employees.127 This severely restricted the ability of the 
cities’ engineering departments to spread the work among unemployed 
workers. It also caused no end of administrative problems. “I am afraid 
the Dominion Government,” Saskatoon’s Mayor Pinder complained to 
the premier in November, “has hedged the Act around with so many 
regulations that it will be difficult for most of the cities to secure any 
real assistance through it.”128 Nevertheless, by late January 1939, Ottawa 
had finally approved $13,000 of a $15,000 proposal for an Electrical 
Distribution Building. Ottawa had reduced the loan by $2,000 because 
under the terms of the act, the federal Department of Finance would not 
accept the cost of equipment and fixtures associated with the project.129 
City administrators also learned that Ottawa had approved another loan 
under the act for $40,000 for a replacement of a standby plant at the 
city’s pumping station and a further $40,000 for the construction of a 
large water main on Fourth Avenue and Twenty-Fifth Street. The latter 
project, Saskatoon’s city commissioner pointed out, would be especially 
useful, given that it would improve the water supply for both the Nutana 
neighbourhood and the city’s downtown core. The water main would 
include “the installation of plumbing in some two hundred and fifty 
to three hundred houses which are located on modern streets but have 
never been connected up to the sewer and water mains on account of the 
owners not being able to secure the necessary funds.”130 Labour distribu-
tion policies differed little from earlier in the decade, save for the city 
reserving first preference to laid-off city workers.131
In Edmonton, city commissioners had quickly drawn up a list of 
public works projects totalling nearly $700,000 in the hopes that “the 
Dominion Officials tentatively approve of as many items as possible.” The 
city council was disappointed to learn that “certain limitations . . . ruled 
out most of the items submitted.”132 Part of the trouble was that most of 
the projects as submitted weren’t self-liquidating. Equally problematic, 
for city officials and the unemployed alike, was the federal regulation that 
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“the money cannot be used for any work completed prior to the signing 
of the agreements.”133 Unfortunately, the city had already begun work on 
some of the projects, including a power plant and telephone extensions, 
prior to federal approval under the terms of the act and so could not be 
reimbursed for costs incurred up to that point. In the end, the city did 
receive approval for a paving program and a new substation building for 
the Electric Light Department; it also received $150,000 to help replace 
the city’s streetcars with a trolley-bus system at a combined, though 
much reduced, total of around $200,000. The city had also submitted 
plans for a $27,000 waterworks department workshop and meter-room 
building, but Ottawa required “more details as to [its] self-liquidating 
feature.”134 After several weeks of no word from Ottawa, the city reduced 
its cost proposal to $20,000. Early the following year, the city learned that 
Ottawa had nevertheless turned the project down, mainly because “the 
warehouse itself was not self-liquidating.”135 As for Winnipeg, the city 
made repairs to the Fort Rouge police station, improved and extended a 
portion of the city’s waterworks system, and contributed to the General 
Hospital’s rebuilding program.136
In short, the Municipal Improvements Assistance Act was nothing 
like the unemployment relief–related public works construction earlier 
in the decade. Its appropriation was relatively small: as late as March 1939, 
Ottawa had approved of projects representing only a little more than $1 
million worth of labour in only five provinces.137 The act also limited 
local projects to those of a “self-liquidating” nature, and it demanded 
strict adherence to federal labour restrictions. Nevertheless, municipal 
leaders were generally pleased at the prospect of another work-for-wages 
scheme, however limited it might be, and the opportunity to upgrade 
revenue-generating public utilities like water treatment plants, sewer sys-
tems, and transportation facilities after years of neglect was welcomed.
The following year, the federal government introduced similar 
work-for-wages legislation in the form of the Civic Improvements Act. 
The Rogers Plan—named after its sponsor, Labour Minister Norman 
Rogers—offered financial aid for labour costs associated with any 
municipal public works project carried on as a relief project. Under the 
terms of the act, the provinces and the federal government would assume 
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50 percent each of the direct labour costs for a limited course of approved 
urban work relief schemes. The cities would be expected to pay for all 
materials and supervision. “In approving applications from municipali-
ties,” Rogers told the House of Commons in January 1939, “due consid-
eration will be given the extent of unemployment in the municipality 
and the value of the proposed improvement to the community and the 
relative cost of materials in relation to total cost of the project.”138 The 
Rogers Plan caused some local grumbling because while it promised 
money for labour costs, it offered nothing for the materials or equip-
ment required for major public works. The Civic Improvements Act also 
issued even more stringent labour regulations than earlier work relief 
legislation—including the Municipal Improvements Assistance Act. 
Historian Patrick Brennan explains the implications for local relief con-
trol in Saskatoon and Regina:
Both city administrations, whether out of habit or from 
wishful thinking, assumed married “reliefers” would have 
priority on Civic Improvements Plan schemes and that they 
would rotate labour in the traditional way. However, federal 
authorities rejected both practices as contrary to the spirit of 
“work for wages.” To avoid any “misunderstandings” the 
province ordered city officials to ensure that no compulsion 
was used in hiring, that all men were taken on full-time for the 
duration of the project, and that every man received the 
prevailing wage for the work done in cash.139
Such restrictions were unheard of through the relief projects of the 
early 1930s. Still, by early 1940, Saskatoon had completed most of its 
approved projects under the act, including $50,000 for a stone recovery 
and revetment project on the riverbank and $120,000 more for side-
walk, curb, and boulevard work.140
Following the twin policy shift ending the expansive public works 
relief programs of the early 1930s and the creation of federal unemploy-
ment relief camps for single men in 1932–33, city relief policy dimin-
ished in importance. Thereafter, in incremental stages, the federal gov-
ernment inserted itself more forcefully into relief policy, increasingly 
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overshadowing local responsibility. Through its housing legislation, the 
National Employment Commission, and federally funded relief works 
programs, the federal government marginalized the city relief machines 
and undermined, in all but name, the concept of local responsibility. 
The development of a comprehensive national welfare system still lay 




Throughout the first years of the Depression, Canadian cities stood on 
the front lines of urban unemployment. To them fell the mighty task 
of making provision for the care and maintenance of those affected by 
the economic downturn. Although the cities received financial sup-
port from the provinces and the federal government to aid them in 
that task, the concept of local responsibility—born centuries earlier in 
Britain’s Poor Laws and written into the cities’ articles of incorpora-
tion—left in municipal hands the primary responsibility for adminis-
tering and delivering relief to the urban jobless.
But local responsibility also meant local control, however tem-
pered it turned out to be. On the one hand, local responsibility offered 
city relief administrators and policy-makers the freedom to set relief 
policy according to their own understandings of the meanings of 
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poverty, unemployment, and relief. On the other hand, local responsibil-
ity compelled them to act when they could ill-afford to act and would 
have preferred not to act at all. It also compelled them to mediate among 
myriad interests whether or not those interests share their conceptions 
of their society’s needs. In the end, it was in the very administration 
and delivery of unemployment relief that cities found ways to reduce 
what they viewed as the Depression’s worst threats to the economic and 
social order. It was, in many ways, the widespread realization that the 
Depression was no short-term downturn that spelled the end of local 
responsibility. Despite the early prominence of urban authorities to the 
administration and delivery of unemployment relief, they gradually 
became less relevant to the process.
In the main, this book has explored the Depression experience 
through the lens of city administrators, policy-makers, and planners. The 
important vantage point of the (primarily) men who made and carried 
out relief policy reveals their biases, concerns, and anxieties about the 
future of their fledgling and fragile cities at a moment of extraordinary 
social and economic dislocation. The cities were relatively new when the 
Depression began. Only three short decades before, there were no urban 
centres on the Prairies west of Winnipeg. In the ensuing thirty years—
years that can only be described as raucous—Prairie cities experienced 
a massive economic boom, two serious recessions, and a World War. 
On the eve of the Depression, the cities had stabilized, and their policy-
makers confidently looked forward to steady expansion and growth. The 
severe economic downturn savaged them more than it did urban centres 
elsewhere, mainly because of their reliance on a single commodity for 
their survival.
The chief goal of city policy-makers through the early years of the 
Depression was a simple one: to help their cities survive the economic 
and social crisis more or less intact. They quickly discovered that “intact” 
was open to wide interpretation among the many groups and individu-
als affected by their relief policies. Neither the provinces nor the fed-
eral government, for example, had any interest in seeing cities defaulted 
and bankrupt—cities were, after all, the economic, political, and cultural 
engines of the nation—but neither did they want the cities becoming too 
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big a drain on their own shrinking coffers. Urban businesses were under-
standably interested in their own economic survival, and their keen fol-
lowing of the supply side of local relief policy for opportunities to feed 
the relief machinery reflected that interest. Community groups—includ-
ing community leagues, ethnic, religious, and cultural organizations, 
and media representatives—asserted a wide array of opinion about how 
best to deal with the unemployment problem. And, finally, relief policy 
affected most intimately the unemployed relief recipients. Relief admin-
istration and delivery both governed and was governed by the ways in 
which recipients and society in general responded to relief policy.
Those who ran the city relief machines drew up rules and reg-
ulations and protocols to address the Depression’s most severe effects, 
and relief authorities hoped that these would soften the hardships faced 
by so many while at the same time safeguarding the cities (and more 
specifically, the cities’ sense of themselves). City governments organ-
ized their relief administrations according to two main thrusts. First, 
they worked to distinguish between single and married men, as well as 
between men and women, in order to promote specific—and highly gen-
dered—values. Single men, for instance, could expect less from city relief 
than could their married brothers because for the most part, they repre-
sented danger rather than stability and responsibility. Similarly, women, 
whether single or married, could expect less relief than their brothers 
could—whatever the latter’s marital status. The urban Prairie society’s 
ambiguous relationship with unemployed men, and especially with the 
ways it conceived of manliness and of men’s relationship to work, is also 
revealed through the cities’ work relief policies. Work relief helped to 
cast unemployed men—that is, those who did not receive work relief—
as lazy, as paupers, as broken, as shameful, as dangerous, and as frauds. 
Society needed protection from them, but the men themselves needed 
protection from want and starvation and, perhaps more importantly, 
from the idea of unemployment and all its attendant consequences that 
together undermined his manliness. Men on work relief were the last 
bastions of normalcy in dangerous days, but they were the very cause of 
dangerous days when they were not. The unifying theme and the guard-
ian against danger, then, was work.
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Marital status clearly meant a great deal to municipal policy-mak-
ers during the 1930s. Relief policies set single men, together with women 
and ethnic minorities, on a second-tier welfare track even while they 
maintained married men on the first tier. Policy decisions about where 
different welfare applicants fell on the hierarchy of relief, then, reveals 
not only the status that policy-makers accorded to relief recipients, but 
also what threats policy-makers believed each category of relief posed to 
the patriarchal and capitalist industrial order.
City bureaucrats also ran their work relief systems in what they 
imagined were “pragmatic” and “practical” ways, always trying to stream-
line operations and make them as efficient as the machines they believed 
them to be. For the most part, officials preferred to view work relief 
as productive labour, as work that contributed to projects their cities 
needed to complete, rather than as boondoggles designed to keep oth-
erwise idle men busy. Work relief was, in other words, work, not charity. 
City engineers and city planners ran their work relief projects much as 
they had run general city infrastructure building earlier in the century. 
They discovered, of course, that in many ways work relief brought with 
it its own peculiar logistics, created in part by restrictions on labour and 
materials imposed by senior levels of government, as well as by the fact 
that relief workers had varying degrees of skill and experience. Direct 
relief systems operated according to similar principles, with city officials 
generally creating relief policy with an eye to economy.
As I have attempted to demonstrate, prevailing conceptions about 
single unemployed men versus married ones, in tandem with a solid lib-
eral faith in the work ethic, played a crucial role in the administration 
and delivery of Depression-era unemployment relief. This is not to say 
that ethnic and class considerations had no influence on the character of 
city relief machines. However, in comparison to the gendered and liberal 
ideologies that have been the focus of this book, issues of ethnicity and 
class do not figure as prominently in city records, local newspapers, and 
federal and provincial reports, perhaps because ethnic and class biases 
were widely shared among city elites and therefore required little com-
ment or debate. The overriding concern of city officials was rather to 
ensure that all unemployed married men would continue to be able to 
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support their families and otherwise carry on as they would in normal 
economic times. Implicit in this goal was the assumption that social sta-
bility rested on the male breadwinner model, an ideal to which men and 
women of all classes and all racial and ethnic backgrounds should be 
encouaged to subscribe.
This book is the result of an effort to understand the mindset 
of local elites in three relatively small North American cities strug-
gling against extraordinary circumstances. I have argued that although 
those circumstances were undeniably difficult, city officials wrested 
all that they could from them. But this book has also been about the 
men, women, and children who had little choice but to live with the 
policies that city officials put in place. For businesspeople—both small 
and large—city relief policies often set up barriers, but they also offered 
opportunities. For community leaders, those same policies posed chal-
lenges that prompted them to voice their constituents’ concerns. And, 
for the unemployed, city relief initiatives produced a system to be ana-
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directly representing approximately five millions of its population and more 
than seventy-five per cent of the taxes paid; THAT from and after the first day 
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 43 Memorandum of Proceedings, Continuing Committee of the Dominion 
Conference of Mayors, 11 August 1936 to 15 March 1937, VA, 33 D-2, file 3, p. 3.
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